Problems of COMMUNISM

MORES & MORALITY UNDER MAO

Paul Hollander *Tooshar Pandit*

Michael Freeberne

SOVIET ECONOMIC PROBLEMS

Peter Wiles *Leon Smolinski*

Imogene Erro

TELEVISION IN THE USSR

Wilson P. Dizard

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Mores and Morality in Communist China

EDITORS' NOTE: If the Soviet brand of totalitarianism has shown a tendency towards a greater degree of moderation in the decade since the death of Stalin, the same cannot be said of the totalitarianism that reigns in Communist China. This is evident in many areas of Chinese life, but nowhere more conspicuously than in the new morality which the regime seeks to impose upon its citizens. In the first of the three articles below, Mr. Hollander explores this morality and the extent to which it impinges on the most private spheres of the citizens' life—sex, marriage, and family relationships. Next, Mr. Pandit points out the violence done to traditional Chinese religious and moral values by the new Communist ethic, and in the final article Mr. Freeberne offers some diverting glimpses of contemporary Chinese life and official attitudes that also serve to illustrate the omnipresence of party power and ideology.

Privacy: A Bastion Stormed

By Paul Hollander

NOTHING ILLUMINATES the essence of totalitarianism more clearly than the characteristic compulsion of totalitarian regimes to extend their control into every nook and cranny of the life of the citizen—his daily activities, his thoughts and attitudes, his moral conduct, his relationships with others, private as well as public. The Chinese Communist regime is far from an exception in this regard: in fact, of all totalitarian systems to date, it appears to be the most ambitious and determined in its drive to impose officially prescribed patterns of morality and of marital, family, and sex relationships. Its apparent aim is to "politicize" all personal relationships and to obliterate any distinction between private and public concerns.

The ideological attitudes and the aspirations of the Mao regime in the areas of morality and interpersonal relationships may be gleaned from a survey of official statements and comments publicized in Chinese mass media. These pronouncements also shed considerable light on the difficulties that have been encountered in the effort to implement the party line in these spheres, and at the same time they are suggestive of the inadequacy of the psychological premises on which the regime's policies appear to rest.

The main pillar of the Chinese Communist ideological position is the party's view of human nature, which it

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insists upon as the indispensable precondition of a correct approach to questions of morality and interpersonal relations. This view has remained unchanged since the early 1950's and—barring a fundamental transformation of the political system—is not likely to undergo modification.

Class Definition of Human Nature

Understandably enough (for reasons to be touched upon later), the party ideologists have sought first and foremost to combat the notion of a universal human nature, positing in its place a Marxist-style class interpretation. Thus, to quote an article published in the Chinese Communist youth organ:

. . . every class has its own human nature. . . . Bourgeois individualists always dream of absolute "freedom of personality" and set this against organization and discipline. . . . [However] one's personality can be developed freely, rationally and healthily only in a revolutionary organization, under public supervision and with collective help. . . . All absurd theories of human nature must be completely exposed.[1]

Similarly, a writer in the party theoretical journal *Hsueh Hsi* (Study) takes issue with a "revisionist" philosopher named Pa Jen for erroneously suggesting that human feelings are universally shared:

He [Pa Jen] writes: "What are human feelings? I think that human feelings are common to all men. Men share a common want for food, a common liking for fragrant flowers. . . . These wants, likings . . . stem from human nature."

True, these wants, likings . . . stem from human nature, but do the hostile classes in class society have wants and likings . . . of the same character? Some want to obtain food through exploitation and do not allow others to eat to the full. Some want to drink water and expect others to drink it also; but some want to drink the blood of others. Is there anything in common between them?[2]

Another article sets out specifically to refute the idea that such feelings as devotion to one's parents, the "longing for love," "concern for friends and friendship," "homesickness," and even "the joy of living and hatred of dying" are universally shared human emotions. Thus, for example, the same unfortunate Pa Jen is again taken to task, this time for thinking it "only human that one is unable to carry out a firm struggle against his reactionary family." Says the article:

Actually, this is in every way a sign of vacillation in a revolutionary stand. A loyal, heroic and staunch fighter of the proletariat is capable of drawing a line of distinction between himself and his counterrevolutionary parents.[3]

Turning to love, the article goes on to quote the words of a "folk song" about proletarian love in an effort to differentiate it from that of the "exploiting classes":

"The girl carries away the soil as the boy dredges the pond. Sweat drips from their bodies along with muddy water. The girl does not complain of fatigue though she has carried a thousand loads; nor does the boy feel the chill of the mud. It is inconvenient for them to talk to each other because there are too many people, but they understand each other at heart. Both the boy and the girl are heroic fellows. They work until the stars disappear and the sun rises."

Can this kind of love engendered in common labor be found in the exploiting classes?

As for the view that fear of death is universal, the article associates such claims with "the dirty soul of the revisionists who measure men by the meanest psychology of individualism." Here, too, Pa Jen is condemned with special severity for maintaining that "when his life is at stake, even a proletarian hero would 'get nervous' and 'waver'; otherwise he would be inhuman." Apparently, the Chinese Communist ideologues are not content to demand that the citizen be willing to sacrifice his life for the party; they also expect him to do so cheerfully and without flinching.

It is not difficult to see why the whole concept of widely shared human qualities is repugnant to the Mao regime, for any admission that all human beings have much in common would tend to inhibit the intense hatred which the Communists seek to inculcate towards certain classes, groups, and individuals. As many observers have noted, a major goal of Communist totalitarian propaganda is to make people forget that their alleged "class enemies" belong to the same species as themselves, and the denial of the universality of human nature is essential to the achievement of this goal. For only if people are led to believe that different classes have different "human natures" will they accept the idea that inter-class antagonisms are irreconcilable, and only then can they be relied upon to carry out the struggle against those defined as "enemies"

[1] Wang Tzu-yeh, "Hu Feng's 'On Human Nature'—Just a Lie," *Chung-kuo Ch'ing-nien* (China Youth), No. 18, 1955; English translation in *Selections from China Mainland Magazines* (hereafter cited as SCMM), U. S. Consulate General, Hong Kong, No. 15, pp. 7-8.

[2] Kuan Feng, "On Human Nature and Class Nature," *Hsueh Hsi*, No. 17, Sept. 3, 1957; SCMM No. 112, p. 11.

[3] Red Flag Literary and Art Critique Group of Peking University, "Are There Sentiments Common to Mankind in a Class Society?" *Chung-kuo Ch'ing-nien*, No. 11, 1960: SCMM No. 221, p. 14.

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with the necessary consistency and relentlessness. As will be shown later, the rigid differentiation of social groups on the basis of class and political criteria is a cornerstone of Communist morality as preached by the Mao regime.

Remnants and Germs of Individualism

Judging from the volume of discussion about it and the intensity with which it is condemned in the party press, individualism is regarded as one of the basic traits of bourgeois mentality whose persistent remnants in present-day Chinese society constitute a major threat to the regime's efforts to inculcate "correct"—*i.e.*, Communist—behavior patterns. On closer inspection, this individualism reveals itself to consist of a varied assortment of apolitical aspirations, ambitions, and attitudes, especially aspirations towards greater material and spiritual comforts. Examples would be a personal preference for urban rather than rural living (manifested in the shirking of "hardship positions" in the countryside); the desire to obtain higher education for oneself, or a better job more in line with one's special training, without due regard for the current needs of the economy; or even the simple wish to choose one's friends or spouse from among persons of like background and education.

The desire for greater material well-being—often stimulated, paradoxically enough, by the very claims and promises of the regime—appears to be ranked as one of the most insidious forms of individualism. As an illustration of this sort of improper attitude, an article in the CCP youth organ *Chung-kuo Ch'ing-nien* (China Youth) quotes at length from a letter supposedly written by a young woman party member, calling it "representative of the thinking of some young comrades":[4]

"I often cherish this beautiful hope: with the progress of each five-year plan . . . material wealth will accumulate, wages will increase and hours of labor will decrease, and living conditions will improve further. By that time our small family will be even happier than now. We shall live in a modern flat well furnished with bookshelves, a radio receiver and a television set. Every day, after our work, either my husband or I will bring home some fruits and tasty chocolate, and while relaxing on a comfortable sofa we will watch television, listen to the radio, or read some books. . . . On Sundays we will bring our child home from the nursery . . . and buy her some things to eat and to wear. Both my husband and I would have nothing more to desire. Neither do we entertain any illusions about doing great meritorious service to win greater rewards from the people, nor do we long for the wanton life of the bourgeoisie. All we hope for is such a peaceful life. . . . Yet this ideal of ours is criticized by our comrades. . . . I feel that . . . if one serves the people all his life, leaves a place after it has been built and then builds another without even enjoying a family life, such a hard life is quite meaningless. . . . Revolution and construction should serve the future and the people, but they should also serve the present and ourselves."

Castigating the attitude expressed by the letter-writer, the article sarcastically remarks:

Yet, compared with the big family of socialism, how insignificant the small family hankered after by Hsiao Wen is!

The repeated admonitions voiced in party journals against such manifestations of "individualism"—manifestations rooted, apparently, in the rising expectations of the people—make it plain that the regime views the preoccupation of "certain comrades" with the attainment of material comforts and "ease" as dangerously detrimental to revolutionary morale. Thus, for example:

. . . there is a section of the people who, with the steady improvement in livelihood, are indulging themselves in material enjoyment and forgetting the revolutionary tradition of diligence and courage. . . . The temptation of material life corrupts morale.[5]

The same article, giving an interesting twist to the Stalinist thesis of the sharpening of class struggle after the victory of socialism, brands aspirations for a better material life as evidence of a recrudescence of bourgeois ideological tendencies:

. . . in the present complicated class struggle, the greater the improvement in our living standard, the more vigilant we must be against the infiltration of bourgeois thought . . . [and] the more we must be determined to inherit and promote an austere revolutionary style of the proletariat. . . . In our times, aspiration to ease is an expressoin of the exploiting ideology of the bourgeois class, and diligence and thrift are expressions of the great revolutionary will of the proletarian class.[6]

Another attitude which Chinese party propaganda likewise denounces as a survival of the "exploiting ideology" of "bourgeois individualism" is aversion to physical labor, or the idea that physical labor is demeaning and inferior to mental types of work. Indeed, the almost compulsive manner in which the regime has sought to propagate a cult of physical labor would seem

[4] Wu Chih-p'u, "On the Ideal Life of Revolutionary Youth," *ibid*: SCMM No. 219, pp. 16-17.

[5] Kan Feng, "In Discussing 'Too Many Pleasures Stifle Ambition,'" *ibid*., Nov. 16, 1960: SCMM No. 249, pp. 22-23.

[6] *Cf.* also Wu Chiang, "A Discourse on Public Interests and Individual Interests," *ibid*., Dec. 10, 1961: SCMM No. 297; and Ma T'ien-ting, "Seek Pleasure and Happiness Through Struggles . . .," *ibid*., Feb. 1, 1961: SCMM No. 253.

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to suggest that growing numbers of Chinese have come to harbor premature ambitions of escaping the hardships of physical toil and earning their livelihood in some "easier" and more dignified way.

The official exaltation of physical labor cannot be explained simply as a rationalization of economic need reflecting China's retarded level of technological development—or a cautious estimate of future technological progress. Party propaganda on the subject consistently abstains from holding forth the prospect, even in the distant future, of that state of "ease" which might permit relief from heavy toil; in fact, it makes a point of insisting on the permanent value and need of physical labor. For example, a discussion in *Chung-kuo Ch'ing-nien* asserts:

Some bourgeois intellectuals think that with the development of mechanization and automation manual labor will be eliminated. This kind of viewpoint is wrong in the extreme. Marxism-Leninism holds the view that manual labor will never be eliminated.[7]

Thus, the stress on physical labor goes beyond mere accommodation to current economic realities and appears to take on the character of a cult of "hardship for hardship's sake" expressive of typical totalitarian concepts of discipline and service. Behind the regime's fulminations against the corrupting influence of material pleasures and its insistence on hard labor as a necessary element in building Communist character, one may also detect fear of a loss of revolutionary zeal, or of the same sort of "bourgeoisification" attributed—rightly or wrongly—to Khrushchev's Russia.

It is significant in this context that Chinese propaganda sermons on the salubrious effects of physical labor are directed, more often than not, at the intellectuals. The regime's requirement that intellectuals participate in physical labor is clearly motivated by ideological and political rather than economic considerations. No secret is made of the fact that the primary purpose of assigning them to occasional periods of work on farms, in factories, or on construction projects is to effect their ideological "remolding."[8]

An interesting aspect of most Chinese commentaries dealing with "survivals" of bourgeois ideology is their implication—for the most part unexplained—that the acquisition of correct Communist views and attitudes is no permanent safeguard against deviationist backsliding. There are constant warnings that, no matter how well-indoctrinated a person may have become or how sincere his intentions, the forces of evil ideas and attitudes are always ready to pounce on him, and that therefore self-control and ideological "rectification" cannot for a moment be relaxed. For example:

If learning is not reinforced and constant vigilance is not maintained, one might very easily be influenced by non-proletarian ideology.[9]

Indeed, the guardians of party orthodoxy seem to regard it as more natural for people to err, especially in the areas of ideas and morality, than to think and behave "correctly." Even the phraseology of many of the articles on these subjects is suggestive of a belief in the basic fallibility of man: "people slide back," they "succumb to wrong ideas," are easily "tempted," "corrupted," and so on.[10]

The Correct Handling of Love

The whole Chinese Communist approach to questions of human behavior and morality is thus characterized by the imposition of rigid class and politico-ideological criteria. This is perhaps most vividly illustrated by the way in which party ideologues and propagandists treat the subject of intimate relations between the sexes—or what they commonly refer to as "the love problem."

Here, the party appears to be waging a battle on two fronts. On the one hand, it denounces promiscuity and the treatment of women as "playthings" as survivals of the corrupt moral standards characteristic of capitalist society; love is to be regarded as a serious affair and must be "correctly" handled. On the other hand, the party simultaneously argues that people in love should not allow their emotional involvement to assume overwhelming proportions, because the idea that love transcends everything in importance is also a bourgeois notion!

More specifically, the official ideologists insist that love should never interfere with work or with one's dedication to the party and its leaders, to the collective, and to the political tasks at hand; nor should it be allowed to get in the way of the prescribed detestation of

[7] Ch'ih Liao-chou, "The Militant Program for Cultural and Educational Work," *ibid.*, June 16, 1960: SCMM No. 219.

[8] *E.g.*, see Yen-Tzu-yuan, "Resolutely Turn Intellectuals into Laborers," *ibid.*, Dec. 16, 1960: SCMM No. 251. On the subject of difficulties connected with the re-education of intellectuals, see Chou Chien-jen, "Widening the Scope of Knowledge *versus* Ideological Remodeling," *ibid.*, Feb. 5, 1962: SCMM No. 305. (The latter article combats the apparently not atypical view that higher intellectual attainments obstruct the acquisition of correct political-ideological attitudes.)

[9] Yen Sheng, "The Need of Making a Correct Estimate of Oneself," *ibid.*, April 16, 1962: SCMM No. 315, p. 2.

[10] *E.g.*, see Kan Feng, "What If We Fail to Guard the First Pass?", *ibid.*, March 16, 1962: SCMM No. 309.

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class enemies. Going a step further, they argue that love cannot be enduring and worthwhile unless it is based on a shared commitment to goals transcending the individuals concerned—that is, unless it is integrated with the goals of the collective, *i.e.*, of the party. Love, or any strong attachment to another person, it is held, cannot be isolated from the individuals' political attitudes; and anyone who is not concerned with the collective, who lacks political motivation, cannot truly love.

Published discussions of "the love problem" in the party journals provide ample illustration of these official attitudes. In one such discussion, for instance, the following example is cited to show the sort of social-political criteria which, in the party's view, ought to take precedence over mere personal feelings as a basis for love and marriage:

. . . Hsieh Ta-sa knew for sure that Kuo Kuo-liang was an agricultural expert of the Ili Chi collective farm, while Kuo Kuo-liang also knew from press reports that Hsieh was a model worker at the Red Guerrillas' collective farm.[11]

Again, an article in a women's magazine clearly points to political background as a major qualification of a desirable bridegroom:

He was a very enthusiastic, smart, and capable man. *More important still* was the fact that he had participated in the revolution since 1939 and was a member of the Communist Party. All these things held attraction for a young girl.[12] **[Emphasis added.]**

One even finds the suggestion that when love is based on correct socialist criteria, physical separation ceases to be a hardship for the couple concerned. In an article entitled "How I Handle My Love Problem," a young woman party member writes:

Not long ago I received a letter from Lao Tang telling me that he had already registered himself to participate in the work of dredging Tungting Lake. This news gives me so much joy. I believe that he will cultivate himself through collective labor to become an active builder of socialism. Our future is bright and full of happiness.[13]

The official effort to "politicize" love appears, indeed, to have encouraged some young party members to go farther than even the party thought desirable in trying to form love relationships on the basis of political considerations. In the mid-1950's particularly, party journals frequently published letters sent in by young women activists telling of their efforts to cultivate love affairs with their "team-leaders" or with "politically advanced" cadres. Evidently, some male comrades—presumably less advanced—began cultivating similar affairs, and the party finally felt compelled to reaffirm the "principle of voluntariness in love life."[14]

Can One Love a Class Enemy?

Some people . . . ask: "Why is it that people of antagonistic classes can also fall in love with each other? Doesn't this show that love has no class character?" In our opinion this is an entirely erroneous argument. There have been people from antagonistic classes who have fallen in love with each other. But such a thing could only happen when the world outlook of one party was influenced by another class to such an extent that a change set in, thus engendering some common ideological foundation.

—From an article collectively authored by the Red Flag Literary and Art Criticism Group, Chinese Department, Peking University, in Chung-kuo Ch'ing-nien (China Youth), No. 11, June 1, 1960.

"Public" vs. "Private" Love

More than anything else, the official line on love is a reflection of the party's fundamental opposition to any sort of emotional attachment between individuals which might tend to compete with, and perhaps overshadow, their dedication to the party and the regime. Yet, the curious fact is that the regime itself, by sweeping aside the traditional familial marriage controls, was largely responsible for encouraging the very kind of romantic love which it now opposes. Romantic attachments are, by nature, highly individualistic and tend to absorb a substantial share of the interest, energies, and time of the participants at the expense of their wider social commitments. Hence, it is understandable that such relationships should be discouraged by a regime that seeks to make total claims upon its citizens.

It is interesting to observe, however, that the party, while it frowns upon intense romantic relationships

[11] Chung T' ei, "Be Smart and Firm, and Fight Against Such Bad M as Ma Cheng-laing," *ibid.*, Aug. 16, 1955: SCMM, No. 13, p. 8.

[12] Liu Lo-ch'un, "Why Our Marital Relations Became Strained," *Hsin Chung-Kuo Fu-nü* (Women of New China), No. 11, 1955: SCMM, No. 22, p. 5.

[13] Article by Chou K'e-hsien, *Chung-kuo Ch'ing-nien*, No. 11, 1955: SCMM No. 22, p. 4.

[14] "Respect the Principle of Voluntariness in Love Life," a summary of letters from readers, *ibid.*, No. 10, 1956: SCMM No. 14.

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between individuals, positively encourages a highly emotional and unrestrained attachment towards the party and its leaders. The model citizen, as portrayed in the official mass media, typically keeps his love for wife or sweetheart, family or friends, within circumscribed bounds, never letting it interfere with civic duty. Yet in contrast to this reserve in his personal private relationships, the same model citizen displays, and quite obviously is expected to display the most unreserved kind of sentimental—even romantic—affection for the leading figures of the party. Consider, for example, this reaction to a visit by Party Chairman Mao Tse-tung:

"If it was not Secretary K'o, who could it have been?" But when I saw the felicitous smile on Yang Hsin-fu's face, my heart started to pound wildly. "It could not have been Chairman Mao?" . . . Chairman Mao? At first, I was dumbfounded, and then I embraced Yang Hsin-fu tightly. . . . I felt as if my blood was starting to boil . . . and my heart was leaping out of my chest.[15]

Or the following account of a visit to a factory by Liu Shao-ch'i, as related by one of those present:

I was suddenly called . . . [and] informed . . . that Comrade Shao-ch'i would look at the wall-newspapers . . . and would come to our plant to acquaint himself with the "blooming and contending" situation here. This was unexpectedly good news. Despite the pressure of work every day, this comrade of the central leadership could manage to squeeze out time to read wall-newspapers and survey the "blooming and contending" situation. How could we not be moved? . . . I could hardly restrain the thumping of my heart as I pondered the matter. . . . No sooner had he emerged from the meeting room than there arose a thunder of handclapping. Comrade Shao-ch'i waved his hand. . . . Young workers, forgetting a day's toil and their empty stomachs, were seized with an agony of exultation. Some of these young fellows still lingered on the street at the front gate of the plant staring in the direction of his car after it had already driven far off. . . . My mind is still full of whirling thoughts all these days since Comrade Shao-ch'i left. I can never forget the most impressive lesson he has imparted to us.[16]

In the light of these examples, it may not be too far-fetched to suggest that the cult of personality, as developed in Communist China and other totalitarian societies, represents, in part, an instrumentality for the transference of emotionalism from the sphere of private interpersonal relations to that of the citizen's relations to the leaders of party and state.

Prescriptions on Marriage and Family

As has been shown, then, the model Chinese Communist citizen is expected to avoid the pitfalls both of a casual attitude towards sex and of over-intense romantic involvement. It would be wrong, however, to infer from this that what the regime wishes to see is the single-minded dedication of the citizen to the pleasures and preoccupations of family life. To devote too much attention to one's family is also regarded as an error, and the party propaganda machine drives this home in no uncertain terms. For instance:

A man called Li Chien-hua, praising this kind of vulgar, selfish "happiness," cried out: "Is there any other place in the world which is warmer than the family?" He contended that "it is the family that gives you love and brings you up, . . . that gives you everything." . . . He believed that the family can bring people "infinite joy." This is really a big lie. . . .[17]

Another party journal offers the reader a sharply contrasting "positive" example in the person of a Mrs. Chu:

She [Mrs. Chu] often says to her sons and daughters-in-law: "You must listen to the party and do what it tells you to do. . . . The group is the important thing. Our family is not so important." Having a mother who loves the group so much, the sons and daughters are little concerned over their own family affairs. Whenever they meet at home after returning from work, they talk about production and challenge one another to do better. They think of nothing else. The old woman is pleased to see all this. There was a time when, during her leisure, she collected forty cartloads of high-quality manure and delivered all of it to the production team.[18]

Not surprisingly, the tendency to devote too much time and attention to family life has sometimes been pictured as only a part of much more serious "deviationism," as in the following case of a man whose own wife — in exemplary Communist fashion — finally denounced him to the party as a "masked counterrevolutionary." Writes the wife in one of the party journals:

In his leisure hours he would either read stories or play with the child, caring nothing for the ideological struggle.

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[15] Wang Lin-ho, "I See Chairman Mao Tse-tung Every Day," *Shanghai Wen-hsueh* (Shanghai Literature), No. 8, 1960: SCMM No. 228, p. 34. (Actually, on the occasion described, the author narrowly missed seeing Mao. The title of his article is more figurative than actual.)

[16] Yen Shang-hua, "A Most Impressive Lesson—Report on a Talk by Liu Shao-ch'i," *Chung-kuo Ch'ing-nien*, No. 21, 1957: SCMM No. 41.

[17] Wei Wei, "Backwater and Billows," *ibid.*, No. 14, 1960: SCMM No. 227, p. 41.

[18] "Love the Group" (editorial), *Chung-kuo Fu-nü* (Women of China), March 1, 1962: SCMM No. 320, p. 27.

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. . . I was seized with remorse for showing affection to a counterrevolutionary. . . . I began to review my past carefully and to lay bare all the information in my possession.[19]

As indicated earlier, the party holds political compatibility to be the cornerstone of a correct marital relationship. It also seeks to encourage later marriages, partly in order to allow a longer period of full-time dedication to political work and education, and partly on the ground that this will contribute towards a healthful avoidance of sexual over-indulgence:

. . . if people get married when they are older . . . their minds will have assumed greater control over their bodies, enabling them to handle problems more intelligently and to curb their sex urge so that they will not have their health impaired through excess. . . . By getting married late, young people [also] can in the meantime spend more energy in caring about state affairs and group life, in studying political theory, and in taking part in political struggles. . . . Thus, late marriage provides a favorable objective condition for political progress.[20]

Understandably enough, the party displays an even greater aversion to premarital sexual "excesses" and preoccupations.[21]

The combination of pragmatism and puritanism that characterizes the party's approach to sexual relations is further evident in the regime's response to popular complaints against the use of contraceptive methods of birth control. Occasional letters from readers, published in party journals, indicate that the contraceptive devices available to the public were objected to by many as "troublesome" and diminishing the gratification of the husband. The complainants were sharply rebuked in the party organs for their shortsighted, pleasure-seeking attitudes and were told to think of the interests of the country and the economy.[22]

As a matter of fact, most of the published discussions regarding the proper conduct of married or family life are refreshingly candid and make it quite clear that the party expects marital bliss to be subordinated to the requirements of the economy and the "collective" interest. For instance:

[19] *Chung-kuo Ch'ing-nien*, No. 24, 1955.

[20] Yang Hsiu, "For Late Marriage," *ibid.*, June 1, 1962: SCMM No. 322, pp. 23-24.

[21] *E.g.*, see Ke Ch'ang-yueh, "Do Not Start Making Love Too Early," *Chung-hsueh Sheng* (Middle-School Student), No. 4, 1956: SCMM No. 41. This article goes so far as to suggest that masturbation and nocturnal emissions are diseases.

[22] *E.g.*, see article entitled "How to Approach the Problem of Birth Control," *Hsin Chung-kuo Fu-nü*, No. 4-5, 1955; SCMM No. 2; and "Is Contraception Still Necessary?" (editorial in reply to a reader's query), *Chung-kuo Fu-nü*, No. 14, 1959: SCMM No. 184.

The Party on "Maternal Love"

In capitalist society, as Marx and Engels aptly put it in the *Communist Manifesto*, "the bourgeoisie tears apart the sentimental veil with which family relation is draped and turns this kind of relationship into a simple and straightforward monetary relationship." To show their love for their children, the most essential thing for the bourgeoisie is to spend more money on their children so that they may be fostered as heirs to their own exploitative undertakings. They expect to earn double the amount in interest on every cent spent on their children. Sometimes this kind of monetary relationship is made even more bald. In the novel *Midnight*, for example, capitalist Feng Yun-ch'ing, for the sake of making money, told his daughter to submit herself to a bigger capitalist. In America today, a son is known to have planted a time-bomb in his mother's luggage so that he might inherit her wealth at an earlier date. This is the inevitable outcome of maternal love based upon money. . . .

Some people say that the maternal love of the bourgeois intellectuals is more pure and seems not to bear the stink of money. As a matter of fact, this kind of maternal love differs in no way from the bourgeois category. They educate their children with the bourgeois moral outlook and want them to study well, to stand out from other young people, and to reap fame and profit. Many young people who follow the "white road to vocational proficiency" are deeply contaminated by this kind of maternal love and are trapped in the quagmire of individualism.

The maternal love of the proletariat is also based on its own moral standard. It agrees in entirety with the proletarian struggle for the liberation of all oppressed people. The mother of Huang Chi-kuang loved her sons in the same way as she loved the 650 million people. After Huang Chi-kuang sacrificed his life, the heroic mother dedicated her second beloved son to the fatherland. She thought that she could show her greatest love to her son in this way. Under the reign of white terror, the revolutionary mother of Comrade T'ao Ch'eng sent her sons to stand the test of the struggle. She found the greatest comfort in sending her sons one after another on the revolutionary road. All these are the characteristics of Communist maternal love. In the Communist society, with class and private ownership eliminated, maternal love will bear no class status, and will be cut loose completely from the ideological influence of private ownership.

—From Chung-kuo Ch'ing-nien, June 1, 1960.

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. . . love for the group and proper participation in collective production involve another important matter, which is . . . making proper arrangements for family life and making it well-planned. When proper arrangements are made . . . people will feel happy, free from worries, and energetic in production. If the arrangements for family life are improper, production will be adversely affected.[23]

Totalitarianism Par Excellence

If the essence of totalitarianism is considered to lie in the maximization of political controls and the obliteration of any demarcation line setting apart the private affairs of the citizen from the public concerns of the state, the preceding survey of the Peking regime's official attitudes concerning morality and the "proper" conduct of the citizen's sex, marital, and family relationships would seem to justify the conclusion that Communist China today presents the most authentic example in modern times of a thoroughly totalitarian society.

While professing to be disciples of Stalin, the Chinese Communist leaders appear to have gone considerably farther than even the Soviet regime of Stalin's day in attempting to prescribe norms for the conduct of the most intimate aspects of the citizen's private life, in imposing collectivist attitudes and setting standards of personal morality governed by political criteria. In fact, there would seem to be no area of the Chinese citizen's existence, however insignificant, in which the regime feels that it can allow him to make his own choices without benefit of official "guidance."

The essential common characteristic of the Chinese Communist prescriptions on morality and personal relationships is their highly practical or *functionalized* character. Love, affection, friendship, and the pleasures of emotional and sexual bonds are not viewed as valuable *in themselves:* at best they are looked upon as means to other ends, at worst as potentially troublesome or useless individualistic preoccupations. The human need for love and affection is given a certain degree of recognition (except, of course, with respect to "class enemies"), but at the same time the party is careful to stipulate that the satisfaction of this need must not interfere with the citizen's political loyalty or his dedication to the goals and tasks set by the regime. Friendship is acceptable as long as it helps to cement collective unity, to promote efficient teamwork, and to bolster the fighting spirit of the group. The importance of sexual gratification is acknowledged, but the citizen is called upon to refrain from "excesses" that might reduce the energies he can devote to productive tasks and political work. The family is tolerated, subject however to a drastic curtailment of its traditional role: the regime ridicules and condemns excessive preoccupation with family affairs, stresses that family ties must be subordinated to the citizen's primary commitments to the party and to the collectivity, and has taken various concrete measures (lying beyond the scope of the present article) to limit both the family's traditional autonomy in certain areas and its child-rearing function. In this way the regime seeks to reduce the family to an "empty shell" by depriving it of its practical as well as emotional significance.

The evident determination of the Chinese Communists to subject even the most intimate personal relationships to official guidance and control may have behind it something broader and more funda-

[23] Editorial cited in footnote 18.

DOWN WITH THE FAMILY!

(A Yellowed Page from Russia's Revolutionary Past)

. . . There is no escaping the fact: the old type of family has seen its day. It is not the fault of the Communist State, it is the result of the changed conditions of life. *The family is ceasing to be a necessity of the State, as it was in the past;* on the contrary, it is worse than useless, since it needlessly holds back the female workers from more productive and far more serious work. . . . On the ruins of the former family we shall soon see a new form rising which will involve altogether different relations between men and women, and which will be *a union of affection and comradeship, a union of two equal members of the communist society, both of them free, both of them independent, both of them workers. . . .*

The Workers' State has need for a new form of relation between the sexes. The narrow and exclusive affection of the mother for her own children must expand until it embraces the children of the great proletarian family. . . . In place of the individual and egotistic family, there will arise a great universal family of workers, in which all the workers, men and women, will be, above all, workers, comrades. Such will be the relation between men and women in the communist society of tomorrow. This new relation will assure to humanity all the joys of so-called free love ennobled by a true social equality of the mates, joys which were unknown to the commercial society of the capitalist regime.

—From Communism and the Family, by Alexandra Kollontai (1920), translated from the Russian in Rudolf Schlesinger, ed., The Family in the USSR, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1949, pp. 67-69).

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mental than the mere desire to prevent these relationships from interfering with the citizen's dedication to party-prescribed tasks and goals. This is the probable recognition that there is a certain incompatibility between authoritarianism and rigidity in general political relationships and the tolerance of freedom, diversity, and mobility in relationships between individuals. Thus, while the conservation of sexual and emotional energies for political and economic purposes is undoubtedly an important objective of totalitarian regimes, these regimes must also be prompted by the realization that laxity of controls in one sphere of the citizen's life is incompatible with the maintenance of rigid discipline and restrictions in all others.

BESIDES DELINEATING Chinese Communist attitudes concerning personal relationships and morality, the evidence presented in this survey affords some insight into the problems and difficulties that have been encountered in implementing them. The frequent exhortations, complaints, and rebukes addressed to the public, or certain segments of it, by the party organs suggest that the Chinese masses are not quite so docile and so easily reconciled to the severe limitations on their personal freedoms as some Western observers have supposed. It may perhaps be true that people accustomed to material and cultural deprivation care relatively little about such intangible abstractions as the concept of personal freedom. Nevertheless, if the evidence just referred to is any guide, there would appear to be a great many Chinese who are keenly conscious of the harsh demands made upon them by the regime, who would prefer more leisure, a fuller family life, better opportunities for education (and its utilization), the right to love or associate with whom they will, without political restriction—in short, people who consider their personal lives important enough to resent official encroachments and intereference.

It is especially noteworthy that already at this early stage—which not even the spokesmen of the regime would describe as affluent—people are "hankering after" the forbidden and unavailable material and physical comforts and enjoyments, that popular expectations, in other words, have been rising at a rate which the regime views as disquieting and is trying to check.

The complaints of the masses, as filtered through the official responses to them, are also suggestive of the flaws in the psychological premises of the regime. There may be no such thing as a universal human nature, yet it appears to be true that most people, at most times and in most places, sooner or later become conscious of the deprivations they suffer—particularly when they are being told that their lot has never been better.

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Totalitarianism vs. Traditionalism

By Tooshar Pandit

EVER SINCE IT SECURED control over the Chinese mainland, the Communist regime in Peking has striven relentlessly to undermine the ethics and established institutions of traditional Chinese society and impose upon the country its own standards of morality. The regime is aware, however, that in spite of its massive brainwashing campaign, it cannot expect adherence to Confucian ethics—which have dominated Chinese society for centuries—to be wiped out overnight. During the last ten years the Peking theoreticians have therefore made a serious effort to dress up Marxist ideology in Confucian terms and generally to reinterpret Chinese civilization in a manner that would show a close affinity between Marxist and Confucian thought.

Reinterpreting the Sage

Liu Shao-ch'i, for example, the veteran theoretician and President of the Chinese People's Republic, finds that there is much in common between communism and Confucianism. In his book entitled *How to Be a Good Communist,*[1] he states:

Our Communist Party did not drop from the heavens, but was born out of Chinese society, and . . . every member . . . came from this squalid old society of China and is still living in this society today. Hence our party members have more or less brought with them the remains of the ideology and habits of the old society.

He then goes on to argue that Confucius and Karl Marx held similar views of man's capability to transform himself. Communists, he is saying in effect, are capable of improving themselves through self-cultivation and thought remodeling; he urges that Marxist "sages," such as Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin and Mao, be used as models in the Confucian manner; every Communist can become a Marxist "sage" if he fully develops his "class consciousness."

It is essential for a "good Communist," Liu goes on, that he possess Communist ethics. And what is Communist ethics? It is the Communists' undertaking "to reform mankind into the completely selfless citizenry of a Communist society . . . to liberate the whole of mankind . . . and to build a happy and beautiful Communist world in the end."

Unfortunately, the "interests" of the proletariat, committed to "liberate mankind from oppression," are in fact the interests of the Communist Party bent on building a regimented society where the utter subordination of individual interests to that of the party constitutes the highest criterion of moral behavior.

In describing the "good Communist" in his book, Liu Shao-ch'i then proceeds to make heavy use of Confucian morals and maxims. The "good Communist" can both love and hate people; he can deal with his comrades in a "faithful and forgiving" spirit, and put "himself in the position of others. . . . He will never do to others anything he would not like others to do to him. . . . He will grieve long before the rest of the world grieves and he will rejoice only after the rest of the world has rejoiced." Being selfless, he can bear hardships and overcome difficulties. Therefore, "he is able to possess the greatest firmness and moral courage, which riches cannot corrupt, poverty cannot alter and force cannot suppress."

But in spite of frequent reference to traditional concepts of self-cultivation as propounded by Confucian classics, Liu Shao-chi, as well as other Chinese Com-

[1] English-language edition, Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1952.

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munist theoreticians, has failed to acept the moral restraint of Confucianism. The Communist leaders use Confucianism for tactical reasons rather than for moral or intellectual guidance. This is fully borne out by the continuous violent Communist assaults on the "old social system" and exhortations that people cut themselves off from "old concepts inherited from the past."

Needless to say, Confucianism and communism have little in common, and to the extent that Liu Shao-ch'i and other Communists use Confucian ideas, they only misinterpret them and thus betray China's cultural heritage. A few examples picked at random from the vast materials appearing in the gagged Chinese press will serve to illustrate this contention.

On Filial Piety

In the Confucian tradition, the family is the center of life, and filial piety constitutes the bond of perfection. But the Chinese Communists denounce the family and brand filial piety as the "source of all evils." Faced with this problem, Cheng Shui-chih, a student of Anhwei Medical College, wrote a letter to the Peking paper *Chung-kuo Ch'ing-nien Pao*[2], soliciting "enlightenment."

Upon his return home during the winter vacation, Shui-chih explained, his widowed father, friends and neighbors insisted that he take a wife capable of managing household affairs. But Shui-chih refused to accept their suggestion, firstly because "as a student, I cannot settle down without getting distracted in my studies," secondly, because "I have not got hold of a girl I love, who can double as a capable housekeeper," and thirdly, because "plunging into marriage would jeopardize happiness in one's whole life." His refusal invited angry remarks from his relatives and friends, who branded him an "unfilial son." This accusation weighed heavily on his mind and hence he wrote the letter to find a way out of his mental agony.

The reply to Shui-chih's letter, contained in the same issue of the publication, hailed his refusal as a "good idea" and encouraged him to "stick by his decision." While agreeing that "to support one's father and take care of younger brothers and sisters is the duty of a son or an elder brother," the author of the reply pointed out that "the need for your having to study and also to take care of your family presents really a contradiction," and that by "showing concern for your family . . . you should live up to what is expected of you."

[2] February 12, 1963.

So far so good. The last paragraph of the reply, however, in which an attempt is made to incite the son against his father, reveals the essence of Communist Chinese "morality":

> **So-called "filial piety" can be traced to society under the system of private ownership; its influence originally affected both the clan system and the family. In the feudal society, "filial piety" was held as the most basic moral yardstick. Parents could demand from their children whatever they liked and tolerated no objection whether they were right or wrong. . . . Such a feudal way of thinking has long been discredited by us. . . . In our socialist society . . . we must strongly object to the imposition of unreasonable demands. Revolutionary youth should never yield ground to old ideas and should always be bold in asserting their rights.**

On Marriage

By the standards of Confucian ethics, marriage is a sacred institution, but the Chinese Communists have spent every effort to weaken the marriage tie and subordinate family life to party goals. As a result of regime policies, millions of families have been scattered: children are being sent to community nurseries; aged parents live in "homes of respect for the aged"; families are moved into barracks, and in some localities husband and wife must live in separate dormitories.

The Communists' view of family life is determined by their insistence that it is the party that must draw the primary loyalty of all citizens, and traditional family obligations are being officially denigrated and subverted wherever they might compete with loyalty to the party or labor discipline. These considerations explain also the recent massive drive to dissuade Chinese youth from marrying young. The following extracts from an address delivered last May at Peking University by the educationist Teng Ying-ch'ao vividly illustrate the party's attitude:

> **Young people should put off marriage . . . (and those) who are not yet married can lay a foundation for their own ideological remolding. One must not treat the matter [of marriage] with levity or rashly, nor should one be influenced and corrupted by such bourgeois ideas as "love is more important than anything else" or "marriage first," for they may lead one to violations of law and discipline, sacrifice of one's career, and the road of self-ruin.**
>
> **When choosing a mate, one should principally and basically consider the political education, thought, and moral qualities of one's prospective spouse . . . [while] pure pursuit of youth, good looks, position and wealth is obviously a reflection of bourgeois thought. There may be love or marriage at first sight . . . but such marriage and love are unreliable. There are in the relations between a husband and his wife problems of life as well as ideological**

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struggles and political struggles . . . and to consolidate the relations between husband and wife, it is necessary for both parties to exert ceaseless efforts for improvement and the solution of contradictions within the family by means of "unity-criticism-unity." Do not chain yourselves to the small circle of your family . . . and combine your personal life with the political life, and your social activities with the cause of laboring people! In short, although marriage, children, and family problems are personal problems, they are nevertheless closely related to the interests of the state and to the long-range interests of the individual and children. . . . We cannot, therefore, deal with them in isolation from other problems.[3]

On Life and Happiness

Turning now to more general aspects of the Chinese Communist outlook on life, we may note again efforts of official propaganda to correlate Communist doctrines with Confucian and traditional Chinese ethics. Yet, as we shall presently see, the two outlooks are very different indeed.

[3] *Chung-kuo Ch'ing-nien Pao*, May 30, 1963.

"The Party Nature of the Proletariat"

The rightists consider it to be a "great crime" and "disrespect for the six relationships" if a decent citizen or a revolutionary cadre denounces counterrevolutionaries among his relatives or draws a political and ideological line against his reactionary family. What do they mean? The decent citizen and the good cadre are doing entirely the right thing in the interests of socialism, otherwise they will fall prey to counterrevolutionaries or the reactionary classes. What is wrong with drawing a clear dividing line between the enemy and ourselves? But the rightists, who resist socialism, who show hostility to the Communist Party and try to restore the old system, are defending the hostile elements when they denounce our citizens and cadres for "great crimes" and "showing no respect for the six relationships." Therefore, in the interests of socialism and in the interests of the working people, true revolutionaries must draw a dividing line against and sever connections with all sorts of hostile classes and hostile elements in matters of class stand and feelings. This is the elementary political quality that should animate our Communist Party members. This is also the party nature of the proletariat, as well as an expression of the class nature and human nature of the proletariat.

—From Kuan Feng, "On Human Nature and Class Nature," Hsueh Hsi, September 3, 1957.

The traditional concepts include, firstly, a spirit of "goodness" in life; second, a spirit of *jen* (love of humanity); and, thirdly, a rational approach to happiness. On the other hand, the Communist view of life and happiness, with its emphasis on continuous ideological struggle, scorns values such as love and goodness. An examination of a few letters published earlier this year in *Chung-kuo Ch'ing-nien Pao*[4] provides eloquent testimony on this score.

Thus a certain Kao Wen-chi, a participant in the forum "What Concept of Happiness Should Youth Cultivate?", feels that "man lives for the purpose of struggling and creating things, and not for enjoying the comforts of life and consuming things. . . . We should consider labor and struggle the main content of our life." In contrast, the ancient classics reflected hedonist ideas on life. Wrote Yen Chu, who probably lived between the times of Mo Tzu and Mencius: "There is a man whose policy is not to enter a city that is in danger, not to remain in the army. Even for the great benefit of the whole world, he would not exchange one hair of his shank. . . . He is one who despises things and values life."[5]

Chung Shou, another participant in the forum, similarly felt "that the suffering of hardships [was] . . . a kind of happiness," and thought that "the basic characteristic of the proletarian class . . . is its way of looking upon arduous struggle undertaken for the happiness of mankind as a kind of joy in life. Labor creates the world . . . and labor therefore should become the main content of the life of mankind." Another correspondent, Tan Yi-keng, expressed the thought that "the happiest man is one who is dissociated from things appealing to the baser instincts of man, and who is able to lift himself out of the fetters of material comforts," contradicting thus some important Confucian ideas on life. The noted Chinese scholar Yi Ching had said in his *Great Appendix*:

For the universe, the most essential is life. For the sage, the most precious is the state. That which maintains the state is man. That which maintains the people is wealth. The administration of wealth, the education of people, and the prohibition of wrongdoing are his righteousness. (Sec. II, Chap. 1.)

Yu Huan, a Peking university student writing for the forum, adduced a "collectivist concept of happiness." Emulating the ideas of China's "new generation" hero Lei Feng, to whom "the attainment of communism all over the world" was his greatest happiness, he saw in

[4] No. 9, May 1, 1963.
[5] *Han-fei-tzu*, Chap. 50.

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"the happiness of the collectives the greatest happiness of the individual." This notion of imposing an ideology on people comes under criticism in the Chung Yung or Doctrine of the Mean, traditionally attributed to K'ung Chi, the grandson of Confucius. It is there stated: "All things live together without injuring one another, all courses are pursued without collision with one another." (Chap. 30.)

While Hui Yuen of Hunan, too, wanted "to continue the revolution and struggle for the attainment of communism, the great ideal of our common happiness," Li Ming-te of Hopei, in a somewhat more self-seeking vein, wrote that "to achieve fame and proficiency" means happiness. "If one could be credited with unique scientific inventions and discoveries, or new scholastic attainments, one would be famous and achieve distinction. With honors, position and higher pay, one would be respected everywhere. Would this not be one's greatest happiness?," he argued. Yet this road to happiness has also been repudiated by ancient Chinese classics. We find in the works of Chuang Tzu: "When you do something good, beware of reputation; when you do something evil beware of punishment; follow the middle way and take this to be your constant principle." (Chap. 3.)

On Religion

The Communist war against religion, which for centuries has been the mainstay of Chinese civilization, is a carefully planned scheme to destroy traditional Chinese society. When we speak of religion in China, we usually refer to three great traditions of very different character: the philosophical Confucianism, the charlatanic Taoism, and the metaphysical Buddhism. The Chinese people venerate all three masters and worship them together as the Trinity of sages, without regard to their inconsistencies.

Confucianism is not a religion, but a philosophy and a system of ethics whose teachings have been acknowledged to be true and its rules of moral conduct to be binding by the Chinese people. Taoism began originally as a philosophy and only later developed into a religion as a result of an attempt to produce a popular creed in competition with Buddhism. The Taoist cult borrowed much from Buddhist theology and rituals, but embraced also a rich reservoir of popular beliefs which induced it to sponsor divination, witchcraft, fortune telling, astrology and even alchemy. Buddhism, finally, is a metaphysical religion of boundless depth with its "Ten Commandments" enforced by the doctrine of retribution acting upon the soul in passage through numberless stages of existence. All three of these traditions have fed the amalgam of popular beliefs which is the living religion of the masses of China. They believe in an intimate and mutual relationship between various gods and spirits and human beings, and they derive comfort from their faith.

The Communist doctrines on religion not only run counter to the public beliefs, but endanger the people's sense of security and permanence. Since it is important therefore to know the Chinese Communist attitude towards religion, it may be useful to quote from a recent article published under the title, "I No Longer Believe in Gods", in *Jen-min Jih-pao*,[6] the official party organ:

> Over the past several thousands of years, due to certain inexplicable phenomena and the influence of the ruling class, the idea of the existence of an imaginary lord—God—has gradually taken shape in man's mind. The position of God remained unchanged throughout the time of history, whether the Ch'in dynasty was replaced by the Han Dynasty or the T'ang Dynasty was replaced by the Sung Dynasty. Many people lived in superstition, generation after generation. . . .
>
> Only after the founding of the new China, with the heightened consciousness of the masses and the universalization of culture and education, was an unprecedented effort launched to wipe out superstition. . . . The superstitions, stemming as they did from previous social conditions, are on their way out under present social conditions. . . . But superstitions are also a part of feudal backward thinking. As a matter of habit, certain people still have room for the gods in the deep recesses of their hearts. Their dormant superstitious ideas "spring back into action" once the right moment comes during certain periods of time or in certain places.
>
> How can a conception like this be eradicated? . . . Comrade Mao Tse-tung once said: "Idols are put on an altar by peasants and they will take them off in due course of time. No outside interference is needed to help them in this regard." This tells us that the consciousness of peasants is the thing needed to wipe out superstitions. . . .
>
> Elimination of superstitions is a tough job of a long-term nature. But its long-term nature should be no reason for our not taking it as an urgent task and thus giving up propaganda on atheism. Just because of its toughness, we should universalize scientific knowledge to make the peasants consciously clear their minds of the images of gods. China is a vast populous country with gods accepted differently by different people. However, with the elevation of the cultural level of the people, the day will at last come when all gods will be sent away to the "Heavenly Kingdom," with no place left for them among mankind.

It is clear that the Chinese Communists cannot tolerate religious freedom and that it is their policy to destroy all religious traditions, substituting a monolithic Communist ideology. They have already taken rigid

[6] April 4, 1963.

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measures to suppress the growth of religious faiths in China, and the religious groups which are still functioning are nothing but fronts used to control popular beliefs. The anti-religious activity of the regime, however, seems not to have had the desired results, since religious activities and ideas may be controlled or suppressed, but never completely eradicated. And so also the traditional thought patterns, influenced by the teaching of ancient sages, cannot be easily corrupted by Marxist ideology or Maoist doctrines. The Chinese endeavor to maintain the continuity of their tradition in which all things are in harmony and in accord, and they do not take easily to the extremism exemplified in the violence of Communist doctrines on life and morality.

* * *

During the past decade, the Peking regime has conducted a systematic indoctrination campaign to convert the Chinese population to the new ideology. It has repeatedly declared that it is its long-term goal to develop a new type of society firmly based on the ideas of Marx, Lenin, Stalin and Mao. The enormity of its task must be measured by the fact that the ideal Marxist man stands at the opposite pole from the man brought up in Confucian tradition and ethics.

With the entire foundation of Chinese society now shaken to the ground, the future of China holds no promise except uncertainty. It is thus premature to predict whether the Chinese humanistic traditions will be able to withstand the onrushing tide of Communist ideology. It is certain, however, that absolute control and suppression of human instincts and sentiments on a wide scale is still virtually impossible, even under China's totalitarian regime. The Communist government may be able to silence temporarily its internal opposition by brainwashing and aggravating the guilt feeling of the intellectuals, but it cannot destroy the stubborn autonomy of mind that persists in strong individuals.

Chinese Vignettes

By Michael Freeberne

So it went on, round and round, alongside the lovely lake, in the quiet sunlight—not angry or defensive, but our minds never meeting because our terms of reference and vocabulary and concepts were so different.

—Felix Greene, *The Wall Has Two Sides*, London, Jonathan Cape, Ltd., 1962, p. 228.

THE STUDENT OF contemporary China must of necessity read an enormous volume of material from the Chinese mainland press. As a rule this is fairly intractable, stolid, and humorless, yet occasionally one runs across items which—however seriously intended by the Chinese authors—arouse an almost perverse amusement in the Western reader. This may be because, in the latter's frame of reference, they smack of the droll, the unusual, the incongruous, the naive, the ludicrous, even the macabre; or it may be simply because the writer *does* take himself so seriously. Other items, while not particularly amusing, are of interest because they cast light into some of the peculiar and less explored byways of the present-day Chinese Communist scene.

The somewhat random manner in which the materials are presented will no doubt please neither the sociologist nor the political scientist. Nevertheless, inasmuch as they reveal the unparalleled degree to which political forces permeate the very fabric of contemporary Chinese society, there may be in them something of

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value and interest to those working in both these fields, as well as to the Sinologue who allows himself the luxury of inquiring into the complexes of the post-Manchu period. The author is not concerned with finding fault or making value judgments. Rather, the present article is meant primarily to be an exploration into the nature of some of the materials that must be assessed by the student of Communist China.

* * *

MOST OF THE anti-Western propaganda that is encountered in the mainland press is calculated to inspire almost any reaction other than amusement in the Chinese reader—be it fear, anger, or hatred towards the "capitalist world," or chauvinistic pride and patriotic fervor. Even when there is a rare attempt at humor, it is usually so crude, heavy-handed, and grossly distorted that the reaction it produces is hardly likely to be a healthy "belly laugh." Yet, the very brashness and naiveté that characterize many of the propaganda statements frequently strike the Westerner as comical. Take, for instance, the following commentary on a passing remark by President Kennedy, the archenemy of the "socialist camp":

On January 23rd Kennedy attended the American Dairy Business and Nutrition Conference held in Washington and made a speech. He promised the dairy business magnates that henceforth milk would surely be provided at every dinner and banquet in the White House. . . . The dramatic climax came only near the end of his speech . . . [when] the President raised a glass of milk and drank it in front of his audience. That was the purpose of his going up to the rostrum and making a speech. . . . On the question of milk alone, there are plenty of comic things which might well be included in a "Selection of Comic Stories" of the West. See, the billionaires who can afford to have milk "at every dinner and banquet" (and incidentally let their cats and pet dogs have it too) try to pauperize the broad masses of working people by every possible means in pursuit of high profit. . . . When they are frantically expanding armament and making preparations for war, and they need to create war hysteria, they encourage man-made nucleomitophobia to spread rampantly, letting people know how radioactivity is already "threatening normal life in the United States." But when they want to sell their milk, they have to try "to find ways and means to set people's minds at ease regarding the question of radioactivity." Under the capitalist system, which is characterized by irresoluble contradictions, such jokes cannot be avoided.[1]

Anti-American cartoons commonly appearing in the Chinese press are more often venomous than they are funny. Capitalizing on such topics as the U-2 incident, the Peace Corps, or United States policy towards Cuba, they are as a rule crudely executed, bitterly harsh, and completely lacking in subtlety. Even the occasional humorous item is as a rule vitiated by gratuitous and heavy-handed comments. Take, for example, a drawing by Jack Chen in the English-language *Peking Review*,[2] which pictures a top-hatted but otherwise naked youngster seated on a chamber-pot while reading *The Wall Street Journal* (see illustration). The accompanying "Pen Probe," entitled "Getting the Idea Young," reads:

Veteran Wall Streeters are looking forward to the day, say about the time Caroline takes over the Presidency, when every baby with a piggy-bank will be a little capitalist. In the 100-percent American nursery, when baby gets fractious, Mummy will say: "Come, Johnny, U. S. Steel's got a lollipop for you! Come and cut the coupon!"

The "probe" then cites a report in the London *Economist* concerning the growing popularity of stock-market speculation among American youth and goes on to quote a passage from the *Communist Manifesto* denouncing bourgeois worship of "naked self-interest" and "callous cash payment." It ends with this final thrust:

Cartoon by Jack Chen

A Chinese View of American Youth

—From Peking Review, June 1, 1962.

[1] *Hung Ch'i* (Red Flag), March 1, 1962.

[2] June 1, 1962, pp. 15-16.

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Now it [the bourgeoisie] wants to put a double-entry ledger into every cot.

What started out as a relatively funny bit of social satire ends up as yet another sententious slogan.

* * *

TURNING TO THE domestic scene, there is an almost inexhaustible variety of stories in the press about outstanding efforts or achievements by individual citizens. Many of these homely parables tell of some act of patriotic self-sacrifice or service to the cause of "socialist construction," usually with a political moral such as the infinitely richer life Chinese citizens enjoy thanks to Communist leadership. Their amusing quality for the non-Chinese reader very often stems from their quaintness and the extreme earnestness with which they are told.

One such story appeared under the intriguing title, "Why I Consented to Baby's Dad's Sale of Castor Beans to the State." Purportedly written by a woman member of a commune in Shansi province, it told how her family had planted some castor beans, in addition to corn and other vegetables, on their own private plot. They harvested 67 catties of beans, of which her husband suggested that they sell 50 catties to the state "in support of industrial production." The wife at first was angry and wanted to keep all the beans for the family, but her husband finally got his way by reminding her of their poverty-stricken life before 1949.

"But for the good leadership of the Communist Party and Chairman Mao," he told her, "where would our happy life be today? When we have surplus grain and oil-seed, we should sell them to the state to help industrial construction."[3]

Another of these "case histories," this time about the achievements of a young chemical engineer, incidentally manages to paint a rhapsodic picture of current Chinese industrial progress and to conjure up a vision of a bright and abundant future:

When you are in a general store and are so attracted by the beautiful plastic articles that you are reluctant to leave, when you see fishermen, with a pleasant and confident smile, casting their tough yet easily manageable nets of translucent plastic into the blue sea, when you stretch the wings of your imagination and fly into the future world of plastics [where you will be] living in plastic houses and driving plastic cars, do you know that most of these things are made from polyvinyl, which is called the "king of plastics"? Three years ago, the manufacture of polyvinyls was still a blank sheet of paper in our country. For the sake of drawing a beautiful picture on this blank sheet, comrades of the Canton Plastics Factory strenuously racked their brains and carried out hard work. In this effort, Chang Ke-lan, an engineer who was formerly an ordinary worker, has made outstanding contributions.

The story then outlines Chang's life and tells of the "experience, bravery and wisdom" which he gave to the development and production of polyvinyls.[4]

* * *

A GOOD MANY of the "success stories" published in the newspapers are about persons who belong to one or another of the various national minorities, thus serving to emphasize the Communists' devotion to political equality and equal opportunity for all the country's different nationalities. The deeds that are related are often trivial enough in themselves, but the stories sometimes have a colorful, "schoolboy saga" quality about them, as in the case of the following account about a young Communist soldier, Lung Hsien-chen.

According to the newspaper story, Lung Hsien-chen's father and grandfather were both famous hunters of Yi nationality, and from the time he was seven years old he used to go into the forests with his playmates and shoot birds with bow and arrow and destroy wild beehives with stones. By the time he was twelve, he had learned to shoot deer with a gun and to lasso antelopes. He would climb up steep cliffs to pick ginseng or to catch goats. When the crops ripened, he and his father would set up a bamboo stall in the middle of the fields and keep watch for more than twenty days at a time. They collected stones as big as a fist, and Hsien-chen would throw these in order to scare away birds in the daytime and beasts at night. In this way his arms and legs became thoroughly trained. By the time he was thirteen, he could walk more than 100 *li* over the mountains carrying a large pumpkin, and with an axe weighing some ten catties (about 13 lbs.) he could chop heavy logs.

In 1955, when he was sixteen, Lung Hsien-chen was allowed to join the People's Liberation Army. His imagination was fired by stories of the war against Japanese aggression, and he made up his mind "to train himself hard in grenade-throwing in order to defend the dear motherland." Skipping ahead a few years, the story continues:

Hearing that an outstanding grenade-thrower of a certain infantry regiment could throw a grenade 76 meters and had never missed a target one meter in diameter at a distance of 30 meters, General Liang Chung-yu went to pay him a special visit. It was a winter day, but the subtropical

[3] *Ta Kung Pao,* February 11, 1962.

[4] *Nan-fang Jih-pao* (Canton), March 10, 1962.

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Unfurl the Burlap!

The news published by this newspaper today about Comrade Peng Chang-tsung, worker of the Hsiehhsin packing station in Shanghai, who consistently practices economy in the use of burlap for packing, has once again provided us an important revelation: in carrying out socialist construction we must attach vital importance to and fully develop the socialist activism of the broad masses.

Peng Chang-tsung, an ordinary worker, does not work for personal glory nor for material gain, but only to conserve state property. He submitted proposals to high-level organs for economizing the use of burlap and made serious efforts to put his rational proposals into effect in the end. This shows the high socialist consciousness of an advanced worker who has become a master of the state, and also the socialist activism which gives full expression to such high socialist consciousness.

—People's Daily *(Peking)*, Oct. 20, 1963

sun was still hot, and Lung Hsien-chen was already perspiring on the training ground. Lightly grasping the handle of a grenade, Lung ran fast for a few steps, then stretched one leg out behind him, straightened himself up and let the grenade go. It flew farther and farther away with a whistling sound. A moment later, a black object fell with a thud on the other side of the training ground. . . . The distance of the throw was exactly 78 meters! The general could not stop praising Lung's extraordinary strength, and the comrades who were watching also extolled him as one who had acquired genuine skill through training and whose "arm was as powerful as a gun."[5]

* * *

BESIDES EQUALITY for those belonging to the national minorities, other common themes of "success stories" are the greater ease with which the humblest Chinese citizen today can better his position and the new-found status of political and social equality that the Communist regime has accorded to women. All three of these elements are combined in a story about a former maidservant of Shui nationality who, after the Communist "liberation," rose to become a deputy county head in Kweichow province:

Daughter of a landless peasant, Meng Shih-hua was sold to a rich family as a maidservant at the age of 13, after her father had been disabled as a result of a ruthless flogging by his landlord. Later she ran away and married a poor peasant, and the couple fled to the mountains, where they made a living by cultivating small plots on the hillsides. After the liberation she returned to her native place, and her family received a plot of land. She was elected chairman of the peasants' association in her village . . . [and] joined the Communist Party in 1954. Formerly illiterate, she has acquired a middle-school education in the provincial institute for nationalities. Meng and her husband, who works in the county food bureau, now lead a happy life with their school-age child. In Kweichow eight women of minority nationality now hold posts as county heads. One-fifth of the 20,000 government functionaries of minority nationality in the province are women.[6]

* * *

MATERIALS DESIGNED to inculcate proper Communist political attitudes, social values, and moral standards in Chinese youth are understandably abundant in mainland newspapers and magazines. The bulk of these commentaries, as one might expect, are extremely serious, moralizing, and exhortatory in tone—and make rather tedious reading. The nation's youth are constantly being urged to live up to the precepts laid down in Liu Shao-ch'i's *How to be a Good Communist* and to cultivate the revolutionary traditions of hard work, frugality, and self-sacrifice in the larger interests of the whole community:

[As] we are now still in a difficult period of creation [and] our county has not yet shaken off the state of "poverty and blankness" . . . we young people cannot as yet enjoy the fruits of the labors of our forebears, but should with our own hands build our motherland into a prosperous and strong power, [for] it is a traditional virtue of our people to work hard, living simply and frugally, and fighting amid hardships . . . we should not live extravagantly and wastefully and should not make the enjoyment of animal comforts our chief aim.[7]

But from time to time there are snippets of a lighter nature. A Chinese newspaper editorial on the subject of sportsmanship, as summarized in a Reuter's dispatch from China, offers a striking example:

Chinese sportsmen have been told that disobeying referees or taking a "rough attitude" towards them "reflects bourgeois ideas in sport" and must be "resolutely opposed." Crowds have been warned not to shout at referees if they disagree with them, but to make their criticisms to "the appropriate departments concerned" after the match. These instructions came in a recent editorial in the official "Sports Daily" (*Tiyu Pao*). . . .

Refereeing, the editorial said, was a "work of much glory," but this meant that the State, the players and the crowds were entitled to make "strict demands" on how it

[5] *Jen-min Jih-pao* (People's Daily: Peking), March 29, 1962.

[6] New China News Agency (NCNA) report, February 28, 1962.

[7] *Chung-kuo Ch'ing-nien Pao* (China Youth News: Peking), March 17, 1962.

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was done. The first of these demands was "justice without prejudice to either side." The editorial said:

"The results of the players' long-term study and hard training are supposed to be reflected objectively during matches or competitions. The players care very much whether they win or lose—which we consider only natural. If the referees do their work unfairly and cause an incorrect result, this might diminish the players' enthusiasm and even cause dissatisfaction among players and spectators."[8]

* * *

THE PROPRIETY or non-propriety of Western-style dancing as a form of recreation for Chinese youth has also been the subject of some fascinating discussion in the party press. Replying to a letter from a reader, one newspaper had this to say:

Besides work and study, one must have amusement and rest. It is quite important that one should know how to play and rest. Dancing is a proper kind of amusement. Whenever possible, offices should hold dance parties on weekends and holidays, so that comrades may have fun together. There is no harm in doing so. . . . But this does not apply to the practices of those who, using the holding of dance parties as a pretext, perform such unwholesome dances as the "twist" and the "tile dance." Such practices should be corrected.[9]

Evidently, the rather permissive attitude expressed in this and similar editorial comments disturbed some of the more zealous party members. A factory worker in Kaifeng, Honan province, registered the following protest in a letter to the editors of the Communist Youth League's central organ:

Several days ago our factory gave a dance party, practically city-wide in scope. In order to take part in this activity, some young people of the factory practiced dancing through the night on the eve of the party. It was said that the dance party was really "unprecedented" in scale, so much so that some people keen on dancing but without admission cards were ready to crash the gate, if necessary. A number of roguish youths got into the party in one way or another, and they looked for opportunities to step on other people's feet when some of the young women were reluctant to dance with them. When they were dancing, they also made a number of unsightly movements.

I am against this type of dance party. I think that a place for dancing can very easily become a place for propagating bourgeois ideas and for amusement appealing to baser instincts. At the same time, some young people become quickly addicted to dancing once they know the steps, and their feet shuffle whenever they hear dance music. I have come across people who spend three to four evenings practically every week dancing. Others working on the night shift will dance until well after 11 p.m. before going to work at midnight. Although these people are physically present in the workshop, they are mentally still at the dance party, and their legs are still aching. Can we say that this will not affect one's work and health? I think that a young person, in the flush of youth and with a strong desire for knowledge, should energetically study politics and apply himself to his vocational pursuit, instead of becoming addicted to dancing and wasting his precious time.[10]

To this the editors diplomatically replied:

As one form of dancing at social gatherings, social dancing was developed from folk dancing in Europe. Originating from labor, dancing has become an art for expressing, through bodily movement, a person's life, thought and sentiment. At a dance party held for a festival or on a weekend, when we dance to the rhythms of good music, we amuse ourselves and find relaxation, besides improving understanding and friendship between comrades. Like singing and watching stage shows, dancing is therefore a proper form of cultural and recreational activity and can be approved.

The editors, however, hastened to concur with the letter-writer's condemnation of "roguish elements":

In the past social dances were looked upon by the bourgeois class as one means of seeking debauchery and degenerate living. When participating in this kind of activity nowadays, we should be particularly careful and vigilant. Our dance parties should be wholesome and proper. We should boycott any attempts at roguish behavior and amusement . . . appealing to baser instincts that are intended to impair our Communist morality.[11]

It isn't clear, of course, whether those Chinese youngsters who have read this exchange have drawn the proper lessons, and learned to distinguish between "roguish" and "wholesome" dance steps.

* * *

IN CONNECTION WITH the teaching of proper morals to Chinese youth, Richard Hughes, China correspondent of *The Times* (London), has provided an amusing account of a novel Chinese Communist experiment in combatting juvenile delinquency. Summarizing the story as it appeared in the mainland press, Hughes' report said that youths of the Yaitou commune, in Shantung province, had been damaging commune property, cutting down standing corn, and tossing lighted firecrackers into the midst of the penitents at self-criticism meetings. Their leader, 16-year-old Yueh Pao-kuei, had perfected a trick of "stealing peaches at night and imi-

[8] Dispatch by A. Kellett Long, in *Evening Post* (Wellington, New Zealand), December 5, 1962.

[9] *Nan-fang Jih-pao*, October 4, 1962.

[10] *Chung-kuo Ch'ing-nien Pao*, January 8, 1963.

[11] *Ibid.*

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tating the grunting of a pig when footsteps approached, so that the innocent and useful hogs in the commune pens were blamed for his depredations." After the honor-roll of model overtime workers had been "wickedly defaced," the local committee of the Young Communist League decided to intervene. First, they tried to steer the delinquents into routine reading, writing, and dancing, "but the errant lads showed little interest and many slipped away to insincere pranks." Then the League reformers tried an initial program of Chinese folksongs. After this communal melody, it was found that the boys were "receptive to the normal curriculum of culture, education, party morale and love of labor."[12]

The story brings to mind George Orwell's *Animal Farm* and the work of Minimus, the poet:

> Had I a sucking pig,
> Ere he had grown as big
> Even as a pint bottle or as a rolling pin,
> He should have learned to be
> Faithful and true to thee,
> Yes, his first squeak should be
> "Comrade Napoleon!"[13]

* * *

IMPROVEMENT THROUGH criticism is one of the favorite techniques of the Chinese Communists, and the range of traits or practices singled out for criticism in the press is extremely broad. The Chinese Communist Youth League organ, for instance, has inveighed against the habit of reading other people's letters without their consent, noting that young comrades seem particularly curious about their acquaintances' love letters. "The curiosity of young people," says the journal, should be channeled in other directions "and developed in the exploration of knowledge and the search for truth, and should not be allowed to interfere with others' private affairs."[14]

Garbled transmission of telegraph messages has also been among the targets of a more serious kind of press criticism. According to a Canton newspaper, the Lienhuashan Fishermen's Commune in Kwantung province received a message from the seagoing motor fishing boat Nanshui, then in port at Taishan, reporting a daily catch of 1,520 *tan* (over 100 tons) of fish. The cadre who received the message was "carried away with joy" at such an unprecedented catch but, after calming down, began to suspect an error:

> He said to himself, "If a boat caught over 1,500 *tan* of fish a day, it would sink under the weight." Accordingly, he rang up the Shihlou Post and Telegraph Office to check the figure. The reply he received was: "We have checked . . . the message is correct." His sense of responsibility [then] impelled him to ask the Post and Telegraph Office to check the figure with the place from which the message had been dispatched. With the reply came the corrected message: "a daily catch of 15-20 *tan* of fish." So, 1,520 *tan* was wrong. This was indeed a case in which a small bit of carelessness resulted in a huge mistake . . . The number of mistakes in telegrams is intolerable. In March, the Lienhuashan Fishermen's Commune received a total of 26 messages from fishing boats far away, and as many as 14 of them had mistakes.[15]

Criticisms of inferior or defective products are quite commonplace. One complaint in a Canton newspaper said that when a packet of biscuits sold by a local store was opened to be eaten, some of the biscuits were found to be speckled with "reddish spots of cockroaches' eggs, and those without eggs were dotted with pockmarks and looked like the left-overs of half a catty of biscuits after a big feast by the cockroaches." The same newspaper simultaneously published a complaint about some fire-extinguishing powder that had been distributed to various government offices and had been found, upon examination, to have become compacted and useless. "In the event of emergency," said the report with commendable restraint, "fire-extinguishing powder of such quality would certainly make things worse."[16]

Undue displays of extravagance are also apt to attract critical attention in the press. There has been, for example, a vigorous campaign against the "vainglorious" extravagance of large wedding feasts. "While good food can add something to the celebration of weddings," said one newspaper comment, "to serve only tea and candies does not necessarily detract anything from it."[17] In another instance, the offering of too many prizes for a boat race to be held in celebration of China's National Day evoked the ire of the press. The first prize reportedly comprised one roast hog, 16 chickens, 120 catties of fish, two jugs of spirits, six cotton T-shirts, and one banner; the lesser prizes aggregated no less than 10 hogs, 92 fowl, 850 catties of fish, 84 catties of pork, 19 jugs of wine, 24 cotton T-shirts, and 66 towels. "Such cases," declared a Canton newspaper, "should draw the serious attention of the leadership at all levels."[18]

It would seem, too, that concern over individual "expense accounts" is not limited to capitalist societies, judging from the following Chinese newspaper comment:

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[12] *Sunday Times* (London), February 18, 1962. Passages in quotation marks are from the Chinese news story.

[13] 1953 edition, p. 63.

[14] *Chung-kuo Ch'ing-nien Pao*, July 10, 1962.

[15] *Nan-fang Jih-pao*, April 14, 1962.

[16] *Ibid.*, September 15, 1962.

[17] *Ibid.*, April 6, 1962.

[18] *Ibid.*, September 29, 1962.

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While every one of us is working energetically for the cause of socialist construction, Kung Ke-Kuang is "eating" socialism. On many occasions, on the pretext of attending meetings, he went to Peking by air and, while there, stayed in a deluxe hotel, toured the city in a small motor car, and bought various kinds of tonic for himself—all at the expense of his company.[19]

* * *

TO CONCLUDE this random survey with a couple of items in the scientific field, a significant article is found in the party theoretical journal *Hung Ch'i* (Red Flag) under the title, "Some Rustic Suggestions Concerning the Chain Development and Composite Utilization of *Ailanthus Glandulosa,* Castor-Oil Plant, Castor-Oil Plant Silkworm, and Parasitic Bee (*Entomophaga*)." The article describes how certain insect pests (including winter night-moths, bollworms, and sugar-cane and rice-paddy caterpillars) can be eliminated not only by using chemicals but also by the "more convenient and effective method of employing the red-eyed parasitic bee (*Trichogramma evanescens*)." The article goes on to say:

The scientific research work of utilizing living things for the prevention and control of insects should attract the attention of all. If in future this kind of research work can be carried out in close conjunction with the popularization and rearing of castor-oil plant silkworms, it will for sure play a universal role in the elimination of insect pests and the increase of agricultural production. This work can be carried out on a large or small scale. It can be carried out in the commune, and special bee factories can also be established.[20].

Finally, a note of interest to the medical profession. An item in the *Peking Review* tells us about Dr. Cheng Ping-yi, a 74-year-old specialist in the treatment of severe cases of hunchback, who has written three works summarizing his fifty years of successful practice:

Dr. Cheng's patients are camels, the kind with two humps called Bactrian camels. Large numbers of these camels still pull ploughs and carts and act as desert transport in China's arid northwest.[21]

[19] *Ibid.*

[20] *Hung Ch'i,* March 16, 1962.

[21] *Peking Review,* July 13, 1962, p. 17.

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Economic Problems and Prospects

EDITORS' NOTE: The articles below deal with two of the basic problems that chronically plague the Soviet economy. In the first Messrs. Smolinski and Wiles analyze the inherent contradictions in the Soviet planning system that have forced the leadership into a perennial swing between centralizing and decentralizing measures, and that lately have impelled a wide range of reform theories, here evaluated. The second article, by Imogene Erro, reviews the most recent cycle of promise and retreat on the consumer goods front.

The Soviet Planning Pendulum

By Leon Smolinski and Peter Wiles

THERE HAS BEEN growing recognition in the USSR during recent months that the present planning system is a serious bottleneck which could impede further economic growth and technical progress.

According to an estimate by the well-known mathematician, Glushkov, Vice-President of the Ukrainian Academy of Science, under existing methods the volume of planning tends to increase at least as the square of output. Unless the planning system is drastically reformed, Glushkov predicts that the amount of planning work will have to increase 36-fold by 1980, requiring the services of the whole adult population of the USSR.[1] This is, of course, an oblique way of saying that the output targets on which the whole ambitious program of "building communism" is based will not be met unless new planning methods are adopted.

Academician A. Dorodnitsyn concurs: the task of planning Soviet industrial production is some 1,600 times more complex now than it was in 1928, but planning methods have remained largely unchanged. While anyone knows, he says, that a giant hydroelectric station such as Krasnoyarsk cannot be built with spades, not everyone grasps the fact that "such a complex economy as ours cannot be directed with the aid of abacus, paper and pencil."[2]

An enormous army of employes, exclaims another famous mathematician, Professor L. A. Liusternik, is busy collecting and processing economic data—and the techniques at their disposal are exactly the same as in the Muscovite government offices (*"prikazy"*) of the

Already familiar to readers of this journal, Mr. Wiles is a leading British authority on the Soviet economy and author of The Political Economy of Communism *(Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1962). Mr. Smolinski is Associate Professor of Economics at Boston College and a specialist on Soviet economic organization.*

[1] *Literaturnaia gazeta,* Sept. 25, 1962, p. 1.
[2] *Izvestia,* May 15, 1963, p. 3.

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НОВЫЙ АТТРАКЦИОН



— Лабиринт построили, а как теперь выйти?

Caption above: "NEW ATTRACTION." *Below:* "They built a labyrinth—now how do we get out of it?"

—From Krokodil (Moscow), June 10, 1963.

17th century, except that the pencil has replaced the quill-pen.[3]

Glushkov's predicted multiplication of planners is inconsistent with the traditional Soviet denials of any such tendency. Published Soviet statistics show an actual decrease of administrative personnel in recent years, but they are not too conclusive: a substantial proportion of data collection, record-keeping, bookkeeping and other paper work in industry, *e.g.,* is normally performed in shops by foremen and other people classified as production workers. Also, enterprises may find it expedient to report some administrative personnel under other labels. In any event, there is other evidence from Soviet sources that counters the official statistics: according to one recent estimate, 6.1 million were engaged in the administrative apparatus (*apparat upravlenia*) alone, and of these one-third were in statistical and accounting work—a category said to have been on the increase "in recent times."[4] An article published in December 1962 mentions that "the size of the apparatus of planning and control" has increased by roughly 50 percent "within the last seven years."[5] Another source reports that the number of employes of supply organizations, above the enterprise level, increased by some 100,000 during the years 1958-62.[6]

And, according to the Labor Research Institute, the share of engineers, technicians and salaried personnel (*sluzhashchie*) will rise from 13 to 32 percent of the industrial labor force within the next two decades, presumably even after account is taken of the large-scale introduction of electronic computers, accounting machines, etc., during that time.[7]

Stalin's Heritage

The present Soviet planning system came into existence under the first Five-Year Plan, some three decades ago, and reflects the historical situation then prevailing—in particular the reluctance of the central planners to delegate power, and the shortage of competent, politically reliable plant managers.

[3] Article in *Trudy nauchnovo soveschania primenenii matematicheskikh metodov v ekonmischeskikh issledovaniakh i planirovanii,* Academy of Science of the USSR, Vol. I, Moscow, 1961, p. 165.

[4] M. Kuzin, in *Ekonomicheskaia gazeta,* March 2, 1963, p. 13.

[5] N. Kovalev, in *Voprosy ekonomiki,* No. 12, 1962, p. 102.

[6] P. Karpov, in *Ekonomicheskaia gazeta,* May 4, 1963, p. 14.

[7] D. Rogovich, in *ibid,* March 16, 1963, p. 29.

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While the Soviet plant manager is designated as *the* boss (*edinonachalnik*) in his establishment, in fact his relation to Moscow is more like that of a foreman to the production manager in Western enterprise. Specifically, output goals, product assortment and destination and date of delivery of each product are centrally planned. In addition, the manager has to meet centrally fixed targets for the total wage fund, for the number of workers and wage rates paid to them, for production costs, profitability, labor productivity, capital savings, capital investment, and introduction of new technology. Finally, various subordinate targets may be facing him, such as material saving, economy of working capital, socialist competition for fulfilment of particular tasks, mobilization of workers for harvest and sowing campaigns outside his enterprise, and the like.

Even a casual glance at this incomplete list causes wonder. How on earth can a manager function (and in most cases function successfully) under such multiple constraints? And, bearing in mind that there are today some 200,000 industrial establishments in the Soviet Union[8] producing roughly 20,000,000 commodities, how on the other hand can the central planning agencies cope with the prohibitive task of planning and administering all these multiple success indicators for every enterprise?

Concerning the Stalinist past, part of the answer is that the refinements were neglected. A limited number of industries and, within each plan, one success indicator, the output goal, enjoyed an absolute priority in actual practice. If output plans for these industries and establishments were met, this was all that counted: "The (output) plan fulfiller is always right" (*pobeditelei ne sudiat*). Thus, in fact though not on paper, managers were permitted to play, in a somewhat informal manner, the role assigned by the English economist Alfred Marshall to the capitalist entrepreneur: that is, they could to some extent disregard the plans dictating *how* to produce, and combine factors of production in proportions they deemed necessary for success in the overriding consideration, the output goal. Other targets —profitability, production costs, etc.—often played the role of shock absorbers. And, on a nationwide scale, low-priority industries played a somewhat similar role.

AS FOR THE central planners, too often they made no attempt to reach the planned targets at the lowest possible cost. Indeed, as pointed out by Professor A. Birman, under Stalin the tendency "to achieve the desired results at any cost, instead of being condemned, was rather encouraged."[9] The planners' whole effort was merely to make their allocation of resources consistent—*i.e.*, to make output goals accord with the inputs provided, whether in a particular enterprise or in a whole industry. And even this elementary consistency was indifferently pursued. Quite regularly more output was demanded than the inputs allowed (so-called "planners' tension," a by-product of which was the stimulus to effort).[10] Plans, quarterly, annual or five-year, were almost never punctual. Innumerable subtle improvements were neglected.

Until recently official descriptions gave no idea of the number of exceptions and loopholes possible in the planning procedure, while at the same time they grossly understated the complexity of the administrative structure. Thus right through the Stalinist period, if latter-day sources are to be trusted,[11] industry of very minor importance, coming under the authority of local soviets, was not in fact "planned" by these soviets but took orders from wholesale organizations—in other words, from the consumer. Similarly, commodities in little demand and those produced in excess of plan have in recent years, and perhaps for longer, been disposed of through the wholesale organizations for whatever price they would bring.[12] Thus on occasion there is no command economy at all. But on other occasions it burgeons into a nightmarish complexity: the number of intermediate offices with command or consultative status, through whom indents for important materials must pass, is sometimes indefinitely large. A recent source cited the case of a factory whose properly documented indent (*zayavka*) for ballbearings weighed 200 kilograms and was sent to and processed by 14 agencies.[13] Stalin has often been described as Genghis Khan with the telegraph: as creator of the planning system, he figures here as Kafka with an abacus.

In the more rational and self-critical temper of the present day, all these defects and inconsistencies are up for questioning. The low-priority industries and enterprise targets, the old shock absorbers softening the impact of planning errors and miscalculations, have disappeared. In particular, as far as the plant manager is

[8] Counting census establishments only. The total number of all enterprises and agencies in the economy is roughly estimated at 2 million. (*Planovoe khoziaistvo*, No. 3, 1963, p. 13.)

[9] *Ekonomicheskaia gazeta*, June 15, 1963, p. 6.

[10] See, for example, A. Birman's description of this practice —which he calls "planning the output of (hot) air"— in *Kommunist*, No. 12, 1961, p. 91.

[11] See Peter Wiles, *Political Economy of Communism*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1962, pp. 171-72.

[12] Wiles, *op. cit.*, pp. 178-80. On the other hand, many semi-damaged, semi-saleable commodities are simply destroyed.

[13] *Ekonomicheskaia gazeta*, March 30, 1963, p. 7.

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concerned, all success indicators are equally important: if any one of them is not met, the factory fails to get its bonus. This makes the manager's task more difficult than it was under Stalin. So is the planner's.

The Growing Complexity of Planning

As shown by Academician Dorodnitsyn, the number of interrelationships among objects of economic planning grows in proportion to the square of the number of objects themselves. For example, in drawing the plan for the Soviet machine-building industry, which turns out 125 thousand types of commodities, the planner must take account of over 15 billion (or, 125,000 x 125,000) relations among these various products.[14] The forthcoming standard industrial classification of *all* industrial products being manufactured in the USSR is to include some 20 million items,[15] which (using the arbitrary rule of squares, which is quite likely an understatement) implies some 4 quadrillion relationships.

Nor is this the end. Dorodnitsyn does not mention explicitly that the complexity of planning grows also with the square of the number of establishments: a single commodity produced in a hundred establishments is likely to involve more calculations and decisions than a hundred commodities produced in one. The number of industrial "census" establishments alone has grown from 30,000 to over 200,000 under the Five-Year Plans.[16] It continues to grow rapidly, partly as the result of technical progress which favors vertical disintegration of industry. A formerly "universal" factory, producing all parts and components of a particular machine under one roof splits up and gives rise to narrowly specialized plants engaged in subcontracting. For example, a modern radio-spectrometer, a relatively simple device, consists of 264 components produced by 150 separate factories.[17] But the bureaucratic procedures needed to coordinate the resulting transactions are the same as those used in the coordination of, say, huge shipments made by giant steel mills. No wonder Soviet planners are said to be drowning in "a paper ocean."

Moreover, planning has become more complex not only in the purely quantitative terms of the volume of paper work involved. The demands of modern industry are rising with equal rapidity with respect to the quality of planning—the speed of information flows, the precision of commands, their consistency.[18] The consequences of planning errors and delays become more costly, and some of the traditional Soviet shock absorbers fail to operate under the new conditions. For example, automation makes a factory far more sensitive to shortages of supplies and of spare parts resulting from planning errors. The traditional Soviet remedy of "storming" (*e.g.*, overutilization of capacity during the last ten days of the month to compensate for underutilization during the first twenty) is inapplicable in an automated plant. The modern trend toward subcontracting has similar effects. The smooth performance of the radio-spectrometer factory just mentioned depends now on the combined successful performance of its 150 suppliers as well as on the accuracy, realism and precision of the central plan which sets in detail the origin and delivery of each shipment.

In practice, of course, the volume of planning done on the central level is not as prohibitive as might appear from these figures. In fact, the Gosplan USSR prepares plans for output of only 18,000 commodities, or less than one-tenth of one percent of the number actually being produced. This is due to the fact that the planners move, for most commodities, on a rather high level of aggregation, leaving the actual product mix within the broad categories (the breakdown by type, size, color, etc.) partly or wholly to decentralized decisions. Even so, the sovnarkhozes (regional economic administrations, about which more later) and factory executives bitterly complain about the needlessly detailed plans, which include saltcellars, herring plates, ashtrays and plastic collar stays of various varieties on the same footing with tractors and steel, and which—in meat packing, for example—even get down to output targets for such items as raw gall, condensed gall, pancreas (subdivided into salted and frozen), etc.[19]

The Extremes are Better than the Middle

It is thus obvious from the administrative point of view that planning must be decentralized if it is to exist at all. It always has been, and still is: the center draws up a general skeleton and the subordinate bodies put flesh on the bones. The (fluctuating) degree of decentralization, and the structure and nature of the intermediate hierarchy it entails, are matters of high political controversy to which we shall return, but they are of surprisingly little economic interest. Confining ourselves still to economics, it is plain that such technical plan-

[14] *Izvestia*, May 15, 1963.
[15] *Ekonomicheskaia gazeta*, May 4, 1963, p. 17.
[16] *Trudy nauchnovo soveschania. . . , supra*, p. 150.
[17] *Ekonomicheskaia gazeta*, Nov. 10, 1962, p. 19.
[18] G. Kh. Popov, "Elektronnaia sistema ekonomicheskoi informatsii," *vestnik moskovskovo universiteta*, Vol. VIII, No. 5, 1962, p. 21.
[19] *Ekonomicheskaia gazeta*, Nov. 10, 1962, p. 8, and *Kommunist* No. 12, 1961, p. 91.

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ning desiderata as consistency and punctuality are compatible with, even possibly favored by, decentralization.

One planning function, however, is very seriously disfavored: the rational allocation of resources. From this point of view decision-making should be *either* central *or* peripheral; a mixture is bad. A simple case is where planning decisions are devolved upon the sovnarkhoz. Suppose that two neighboring sovnarkhozes both use the established criteria of central planning correctly in view of the resources and needs of their territories. They will both produce racing bicycles for boys, and compete to sell them in a third sovnarkhoz. Either perfectly centralized planning, or a free market into which no higher body than an enterprise entered, would have resulted in only one sovnarkhoz specializing in such bicycles. The only way in which two independent sovnarkhozes could effect the same result would be for them to establish a perfect inter-sovnarkhoz market and compete in it, like very large firms. In other words, they would have to look beyond the "needs and resources of their own territories" when they made their computations. Or of course they could sacrifice their independence to a central computer.

Whichever solution they adopted, they would have to use it all the time and in exhaustive detail. It would be useless, for instance, to have an inter-sovnarkhoz market in some such broadly defined commodity as "steel," or to accept orders concerning "steel" from the central computer, while filling in the details oneself. For economic life does not consist in making "steel": it means making racing bicycles for boys, or steel tubes for racing bicycles for boys. In such narrow categories are things bought and sold, over immense distances: and in such must they be planned.

The same is true if the subordinate unit we are considering is the enterprise, not the sovnarkhoz. The story of the nails is classic, indeed it is across this *pons asinorum* that the economist enters the field of sovietology. A factory was making nails, and its output target was expressed as a number of nails. In order to avoid excessive centralization all other details were to be settled by the factory. So it made the nails as small as possible. To remedy this the planners re-expressed the target in terms of a weight of nails. So the factory made them as large as possible. Then the planners abandoned decentralization and handed down a plan for kinds of nails, each of a different weight, and a number for each kind. But clearly an alternative improvement would have been to decentralize all decisions in a competitive market.

Now an electronic market is not yet a serious possibility. The masses of information that must be currently, punctually and accurately fed into the computer—essentially the demand and supply curves for all commodities—are simply not available.[20]

Nevertheless, as things are, centralized planning can correct the most obvious irrationalities of decentralized planning. It also has ideology to commend it. Decentralized planning, on the other hand, is administratively far less cumbersome. So it should not surprise us that the pendulum swings, and has always swung, between the two.

The Reform Movement in General

In brief, Soviet economic planning and administration appear to be overcentralized and undercoordinated. While the number and complexity of decisions and choices involved in planning has grown considerably since the 1957 reforms, the apparatus available for their making and implementation appears to have become less operational. The organizational blueprint of the Soviet economy represents at present a crazy quilt of agencies organized according to several principles: territorial (sovnarkhozes, economic regions, republican gosplans); functional (such as state committees dealing with automation, technology, labor, etc.); and production (all-union and republican ministries, state committees in charge of priority industries such as the chemical, and, since November 1962, the Communist Party itself). While the newly created Supreme Council of the National Economy (Vysshii Sovet Narodnovo Khoziaistva) may coordinate the conflicting pulls of these agencies to some extent, the power conferred upon it to intervene at all levels of decision-making may actually tend to compound the confusion rather than eliminate it. No wonder Professor A. Birman, an outspoken critic of the present system of economic administration, proposes, as the first prerequisite of any improvement in its functioning, that:

> **. . . first of all one ought to determine, in a precise and concrete manner, the respective functions, rights and mutual relations of all economic agencies: enterprises; regional economic councils (sovnarkhozes); local councils; planning, financial and banking agencies at various levels (local, republican, all union); state committees and ministries. . . . Then, it is absolutely necessary to establish the principle of reciprocal responsibility [in these relations]: Experience has shown that lack of legal re-**

[20] Indeed if Dorodnitsyn is right (as quoted above), it is just possible that the volume of required information is growing faster than the capacity of communications systems to gather and transmit it. In this view—not in our opinion plausible—the electronic market will remain forever a pipe dream.

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sponsibility on the part of higher authorities toward the enterprise and lower echelons gives rise to uncoordinated planning and causes great harm to the national economy.[21]

An editorial in *Ekonomicheskaia gazeta* seconds Birman:

When a worker breaks a machine component worth one ruble, he is held fully responsible for the damage done. But a planning executive may (and often does) make millions of rubles go with the wind by taking a wrong decision, and no one will bring him to account: this is taken for granted.[22]

There may be some legal and ethical justification for such a measure but one wonders whether it would not work economic havoc. The reluctance to take responsibility and to innovate manifests itself even at present, and making the planners legally responsible for the unpredictable consequences of their decisions might strengthen this tendency; this would hardly be desirable, given the fact that innovation is a crucial determinant of growth in the modern Soviet economy.

A clear-cut delimitation of the various agencies' spheres of activity and responsibility, while necessary and overdue, would at best be a makeshift. There is a widespread demand for more radical reforms, and some of the proposals reach to the very foundations of traditional practices and theories. Since many such schemes have already been discussed in this journal,[23] and a full presentation of others would require too much space, we do not propose to describe them in any detail but shall limit ourselves to a general appraisal of the issues involved.

One might, at first sight, tend to lump all would-be reformers together and contrast them with the opposing bureaucrats. Indeed, there is a common ground on which the reformers all meet. They are dissatisfied with the deficiencies of the traditional system of incentives and success indicators; they are in favor of bringing prices closer to actual factor cost; finally, virtually all of them eulogize electronic computers and have high expectations concerning their potential as a tool of economic planning.[24]

Centralizers and Decentralizers

Apparent similarity conceals, however, deep-seated differences of opinion, especially as regards the degree of centralization.

At one extreme of the spectrum we find proponents of a complete computerization who, as described by Professor A. Birman, would like to trace in economic plans "each pin, each motion a worker makes,"[25] to calculate their effectiveness and plan them in physical terms, preferably without the use of money prices. The approach of reformers of this persuasion would amount to harnessing the computers to the task of preserving and immeasurably strengthening the present centralized system.

Such a person is Professor M. Fedorovich, of the Moscow Engineering Economic Institute named after

[21] A Birman, in *Planovoe khoziaistvo*. No. 3, 1963, p. 16.

[22] *Ekonomicheskaia gazeta*, Jan. 19, 1963, p. 2.

[23] See in particular Alec Nove, "Revamping the Economy," No. 1, 1963, pp. 10 ff.; Gregory Grossman, "The Soviet Economy," No. 2, 1963, pp. 32 ff.; Harry G. Shaffer, "Ills and Remedies," No. 3, 1963, pp. 18 ff.

[24] Unanimity in this respect may be related not only to the computers' actual usefulness but also to the fact that it was allegedly Mr. Khrushchev himself who was responsible for their introduction (cf. *Izvestia*, March 25, 1963, p. 2).

[25] *Ekonomicheskaia gazeta*, March 30, 1963, p. 7.



Caption lower left: DUEL
Labels on documents read "Inquiry" and "Reply."

—From Krokodil (Moscow), April 20, 1963.

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Ordzhonikidze.[26] He concurs with Glushkov, Dorodnitsyn, and others that the flaw in Soviet planning is its growing inability to receive on time and process a huge flow of information, and on its basis issue accurate and correct commands. But, Fedorovich argues, this criticism is only valid when applied to the techniques currently being used by the planning agencies, and not to the system of centralized economic planning itself. Let us not decentralize, exclaims the Moscow economist; neither let us adopt any uniform indicator such as profitability, as proposed by Liberman. Instead, let us scrap desk calculators and "put our centralized economic planning on electronic rails so that it can cope with the huge amount of information inputs and of planning calculations."[27]

Eventually, the computers themselves, on the basis of algorithms prepared in advance, will provide each sovnarkhoz and each enterprise with the optimum variant of the plan (so that no human decisions will be needed in selecting that optimum), and then during the planning period the computers will analyze and appraise its fulfillment by sovnarkhozes and by enterprises. Fedorovich envisions a uniform, nationwide cybernetic system of centralized economic planning and control in which an enterprise will play merely the passive role of supplying information and obeying the planners.

Ultimately, the computers are to take over more than just the planning near the top: the lower echelon of the economy is to get dehumanized as well. Within the next two decades, Fedorovich argues, the proliferation of automated factories will further facilitate and strengthen centralized planning. Such factories will be carrying out programs fed into them by computers "without direct interference by human beings," since built-in feedback loops will provide them with the ability to adapt themselves to changing circumstances.[28]

Fedorovich's vision of an electronic Leviathan decontaminated from human frailities should by no means be viewed as an isolated pipe dream. Academician Dorodnitsyn, a highly influential mathematician, appears to follow a similar line of thought when he proposes, for the near future, the use of electronic computers and teletypes for creation of a completely mechanized and automated system of planning, control and administration on the scale of a sovnarkhoz.[29]

Slightly less centralist are the planimetricians, such as Kantorovich, the inventor of linear programming. His proposals are consistent with a very far-reaching centralization but differ from the just-mentioned group insofar as they use shadow prices rather than physical efficiency indicators as the criterion of choice. Under full communism, Kantorovich argues,

> **. . . society's whole productive activity will be organized like one big factory, and obviously an optimal plan will be drawn for it. In other words, the boundaries of an enterprise will be widened until they coincide with those of the society as a whole.[30]**

Meanwhile, however, he permits the central planners to determine the final output pattern, and to sell it off to the consumer as best they can, presumably by the same differentiated structure of turnover taxes and subsidies as is used today. This is his obeisance to political decision in central planning. As to his views on decentralization, Kantorovich thinks it would be rational for sovnarkhozes to do the main computations, within a framework laid down in Moscow.[31] In other words, he falls right into the "steel versus racing bicycles" fallacy discussed above.

A MUCH BIGGER STEP toward decentralization is contemplated by E. Liberman who, like Kantorovich, would leave the decision on ends (specifically on the composition and volume of output) with the central planners but decentralize down to the enterprise level decisions on how to attain the ends thus selected, and notably on methods of production. Only the volume and composition of output, destination and dates of delivery would continue to be centrally planned for each enterprise. Given these constraints, the plant manager would be given just one instruction: to maximize the profitability of his enterprise, computed in relation to its fixed and working capital stock. Profits would become the sole success indicator, replacing the present multiple schizophrenia of often conflicting yardsticks; they would also become the only source of incentive payments. Let central planners set the ends, exclaims Liberman, and leave the enterprise free to decide on means.[32]

A price reform would obviously have to precede such a change, if profits were to be economically meaningful, but Liberman does not seem to be too interested in *how* the planners would go about it. He accepts without reservation the central planners' final output pattern and

[26] Fedorovich's views are presented in *Ekonomicheskaia gazeta*. Nov. 3, 1962, p. 39, and Nov. 10, 1962, p. 6; and in *Voprosy ekonomiki*. No. 1, 1963, p. 96.

[27] *Ekonomicheskaia gazeta*. Nov. 3, 1962, p. 39.

[28] *Voprosy ekonomiki*. No. 1, 1963, p. 96.

[29] See *Planovoe khoziaistvo*. No. 12, 1962, p. 57. It will be observed that Dorodnitsyn is not contradicting himself. He argues at all times for more efficient means of planning.

[30] *Trudy nauchnoro soveschania* . . . , p. 82.

[31] L. V. Kantorovich, *Ekonomicheskii raschet nailuchshevo ispolzovania resursov*. Moscow, 1959, pp. 165. ff.

[32] *Ekonomicheskaia gazeta*. Nov. 10, 1962, p. 11.

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price structure without spelling out how they should arrive at them.

A more serious defect is that if all enterprises could choose their own inputs, but all their outputs were planned for them, there is an evident contradiction. For the outputs of innumerable enterprises are not consumer but intermediate goods, *i.e.,* the inputs of other enterprises. If Liberman really means what he says, there could be no output targets for such enterprises, *i.e.,* they could hardly be centrally planned at all.

Let us now compare these two men. Kantorovich is a mathematician and an intellectual, interested in the rationality of resource allocation by planners. Liberman is a business economist and a practical man, interested in administrative efficiency and, above all, incentives for managers. He sees the crux of the problem in persuading the manager to *offer* the right plan in the first place—this is what he makes really profitable. Even plan overfulfillment is less important to him. It is no accident that Kantorovich is greatly more centralistic, for our previous section showed that rationality does indeed demand centralization, while administrative efficiency opposes it. Kantorovich's whole approach could be described as enlightened centralism. He goes out of his way to emphasize that his system of planning through linear programming does not aim at profit maximization, at least not at the enterprise level:

In a socialist enterprise the goal is to obtain an optimum effect for the economy as a whole, *e.g.,* maximum output (*sic*) given the planned amount of resources and supply conditions. This requires a simultaneous maximization of several functions. . . .

Kantorovich contrasts this view with profit maximization, which would involve one function only.[33] Thus his approach differs essentially from Liberman's, who emphatically states that the enterprise should aim at one and only one goal, maximum profitability, and that the addition of even a single extra "success indicator" would vitiate the whole scheme and make him reject it.[34] Kantorovich, on the other hand, warns that one of the reasons why profit maximization cannot be allowed to play a decisive role in a socialist enterprise is that (unlike its capitalist counterpart) it has to heed the effects of its actions on other enterprises' interests. This obviously differs from Liberman's basic principle that "what is profitable for society as a whole should be profitable for each enterprise."[35] In Western terminology Kantorovich takes account of "external economies," while Liberman minimizes them.

Kantorovich is mainly concerned with the price reform and less so with who is going to apply his optimal valuations: the central planning board in computer analogues of actual markets, or sovnarkhozes acting for the board, or enterprises in actual transactions, or some combination of the three. Liberman, on the other hand, is concerned with just that issue: for him the basic unit that decides resource allocation is the enterprise, and the planners' main task becomes to provide the proper incentives which would make the economy move in the direction desired by planners, through parametric adjustments of enterprises.

Pure Titoism, or the abolition of current central planning, whether in the interests of managers or workers' councils, is not overtly represented among the reformers.

Impact of the Politicians

We now turn to the pure politics of centralization versus decentralization. In doing so we enter an almost totally separate world. In the quarrels about sovnarkhozes *vs.* ministries, army *vs.* party, steel *vs.* chemicals, etc., we are in the realm of the Central Committee. We read *Pravda* not *Voprosy ekonomiki,* Fainsod not Nove. Khrushchev can fill several pages of *Pravda* without mentioning the names of Liberman and Kantorovich. We point to what connections there are between these worlds in our conclusion.[36]

Since December 1956 there have been many organizational changes. Indeed they have followed upon one another so fast as to prove the unimportance of all particular systems. The regime is plainly the complete master of the administrative structure, and changes it virtually at will. Only three elements have hitherto survived all change: the party, the central planning organ and the enterprise. Indeed, of these only the enterprise remains recognizably identical.

These constant changes reveal certain conditions that Khrushchev has been concerned to ensure:

1) that the structures of the party and the state correspond to each other, to facilitate control by the former;

2) that there be as little "bureaucracy" as possible;

3) that the economy remain in some sense centrally planned.

Point (1) has a long history. Even before 1928 the role of the party in the economy was an issue. Trotsky

[33] *Trudy nauchnovo soveschania.* . . , p. 81

[34] *Ekonomicheskaia gazeta,* Nov. 10, 1962, p. 11.

[35] Cf. *Voprosy ekonomiki,* No. 8, 1962, p. 105.

[36] This section and the one following were previously published by the authors in the Ost-Europa Handbuch, *Sowjetunion* (Tübingen, 1963).

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favored a strong and indepedent state machine; and this is why Lenin accused him of being "too interested in administrative questions." In the NEP period Zinoviev and Kamenev, then on the Left, wanted the party to control the economy. Burkharin, Rykov, Tomsky and the administrators stood for and obtained a somewhat independent state machine. The party was not in fact run by Zinoviev and Kamenev but by Stalin, who was preoccupied with personal aggrandizement and left the state alone. But when by 1929 Stalin had disposed of all his enemies and relaunched central planning, the question presented itself somewhat differently. Both party and state were now the merest transmission belts of dictatorial power but they had, after all, separate functions; should not their hierarchies correspond so that the party might better control the state? The matter was discussed at the 17th Party Congress in 1934.

From 1919 until 1928 the state economy had been run largely on the *"territorial" principle:* the country was divided into large areas each governed in economic matters by a "council of the national economy" (soviet narodnovo khoziaistva, or sovnarkhoz) which mediated orders received from a Supreme Sovnarkhoz in Moscow. The territorial sovnarkhoz had absolute control over light industry, local transport, construction and agriculture in its area; however, in heavy industry, rail transport and defense output enterprises took their orders directly from an office in the Supreme Sovnarkhoz. Under "war communism" this administrative structure had been a great inconvenience, but under the NEP any overlapping of jurisdiction was tolerable since there was little planning.

In the first and second Five-Year Plans a logical centralization took place, with a general switch to the *"production" principle* hitherto applied only to heavy industry, rails and defense—*i.e.,* a *glavk* (chief committee) in a ministry took over control of the output and distribution of a particular product all over the country. But the party, like any political party, was organized on the "territorial" principle. The extreme discontinuity between the "territorial" party and the "production" state was attacked at both ends.

In 1934, on the suggestion of Kaganovich the "territorial" principle was revived for agriculture and for unimportant "local" industry and construction. These came under, not separate sovnarkhozes, but the regular local government organs. The major republics (except the RSFSR) sprouted gosplans, and certain activities of intermediate importance were declared "union-republican," with control split between Moscow and the republics. At the same time the offices of the Central Committee of the party, previously organized on the *"functional" principle* (personnel, propaganda, and so on), were reshuffled to accord with the "production" principle (heavy industry, light industry, agriculture, etc.).

In 1939 Zhdanov induced Stalin to restore the Central Committee bureaus to their old "functional" pattern, giving two reasons. First, a unitary personnel bureau was necessary so as to put the right party worker in the right job, irrespective of his "production" experience; secondly, there had been too much petty supervision by the party over the economy—the party should not get bogged down, for example, in the search for spare parts. In 1948, however, Stalin—at Malenkov's instance—restored the bureaus to the structure of 1934.

IMMEDIATELY AFTER Stalin's death Malenkov and Beria increased the size and power, and diminished the number, of the ministries in a move to make the state more independent. This tendency was resisted by Khrushchev, working from his base in the Secretariat of the party; at the time he did not raise the issue of party supremacy but merely attacked bureaucracy. During 1954-56 his power—along with that of the party—increased mightily, and agriculture, where politics is always vital and Khrushchev has special expertise, slipped almost irretrievably into his grasp.

However, Khrushchev's secret speech on Stalin's crimes, and its consequences in Poland and Hungary, weakened him so much that there was a veritable "technocratic counterrevolution" in December 1956. The Central Committee met without publishing any speech of his (a rare event): the basis of discussion was a report by two pure technocrats, and the session resulted in a resolution very greatly strengthening the Gosekonomkommissia, the state body that was then the current manager of the economy. The Gosplan, at that time in charge of perspective planning, was left alone, but the Gosekonomkommissia was reinforced to include all the most influential technocrats—not a party *apparatchik* among them—and constituted into a sort of economic cabinet half independent of the Council of Ministers. Power was also decentralized down to individual ministries, republics and other state bodies. Although the party was not directly altered, this was the high point of state independence since the days of Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsky.

In 1957 Khrushchev counterattacked and won—not by tinkering with the CC bureaus or splitting up the ministries but by thoroughly restructuring the state on the "territorial" principle. This was the most revolutionary of all changes hitherto mentioned. The Gose-

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konomkommissia was reduced in power and renamed. Thirty economic ministries—nearly all of them—were abolished. The sovnarkhozes were revived and put in control of all activities except agriculture, as well as the public utilities and light industry already subordinated to local government. These new sovnarkhozes were much smaller than the old ones; there were about 104 of them, approximately one for each oblast (province). The effect was drastically to emasculate the state machine, and to hand over power in the economy to the party's obkom (province committee) secretary. In short, the small sovnarkhoz was a very different agency from the large sovnarkhoz corresponding to no territorial unit of the party, which logically could escape from party control as easily as could a "production" principle ministry.

Of the obvious administrative inefficiency of this system of multiple economic councils we speak below. Here it is important to see that it sprang from a particular tradition in the Communist movement—the principle that the party, the repository of all dynamism and orthodoxy, must allow no other organ to overshadow it. The opposite view is that the revolution has to settle down and accept expert advice, even to some extent the rule of law. As Lenin complained against Trotsky, so Khrushchev struck down first the security police (Beria), now the state economic machine, and later the army (Zhukov). The view is not necessarily a left-wing one: for Lenin was more moderate than Trotsky,[37] even if Zinoviev stood to the left of Buckharin, and Khrushchev stands perhaps a little to the left of *his* opponents. Nor is the view a Stalinist one: for to Stalin party and state were equally his footballs, and so too were security police and army—the great tyrant did not care through what mechanism he governed. It is no accident that Malenkov and Kaganovich, who in 1948 and 1934 had personally restructured the party to correspond with the state, and who had both borne again and again direct responsibility of a purely state character, violently opposed the reforms of 1957.

The Structure Since 1957

Unlike the earlier sovnarkhozes, these revivals were not meant to bring about decentralization. Decision-making powers granted to them were fairly limited even at the outset and were mainly obtained at plant managers' expense. The sovnarkhozes were to play the part of transmission belts rather than of spark plugs. Nevertheless they were allowed to reallocate supplies and machinery among enterprises and industries, to make some investment decisions, and to reapportion some funds.

The period 1957-62 saw a graduated erosion of these rights. Very soon the sovnarkhozes were accused of using their powers to promote local interests, of neglecting extra-regional delivery plans, of diverting supplies and investment funds into branches serving local needs at the expense of national interests. In a series of decrees, their rights were drastically reduced. On April 24, 1958, and May 22, 1959, they were ordered to give priority to extra-regional deliveries; and on January 22, 1959, their authority to reallocate supplies and investment funds was taken away and vested in the republican councils of ministers and gosplans, an important centralization measure.

The sovnarkhozes' small size may have been a political advantage in 1957, but it was an economic liability. Problems of marketing, automation, regional planning, even large investment projects were beyond their horizon. Centralized agencies created since 1957 were to cut across the sovnarkhozes' boundaries and to assure the coordination of their activities along territorial, functional or industry lines.

Such agencies include the state committees attached to the All-Union Council of Ministers and to the Gosplan, in charge of such nationwide problems as automation or development of a particular high-priority industry. Their number has greatly increased since 1957, and they have increasingly shifted from advisory to planning and decision-making capacity.

The so-called republican sovnarkhozes were established in June and July 1960 in the three largest Soviet republics: Russia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan.[38] They control the plan fulfillment by the sovnarkhozes of the given republic, coordinate their activity, issue operational orders to them, and have the right to suspend their directives. The creation of the republican sovnarkhozes amounted thus to a further centralization; but in fact they acquired their main powers—such as the allocation of material supplies—not from the sovnarkhozes, which had few powers left to give up in any event, but from the republican gosplans. Interestingly enough, the republican sovnarkhozes' branch subdivisions, the chief industrial administrations, appear to duplicate roughly the functions of the former ministerial glavks abolished in 1957: another step backward in the uneasy effort to reconcile the territorial and production principles of administration.[39]

[37] Who to be sure believed in experts, and had a certain contempt for the party, but did not advocate, as did the more moderate "statists," the rule of law.

[38] *Vedomosti Verkhovnovo Soveta SSSR*, July 4, 1960.

[39] P. S. Romashkin, in *Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo*, December 1960.

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The republican sovnarkhozes were to serve the purpose of short-term operational planning and administration. The creation of the seventeen "large economic regions" in May 1961 (plus two independent administrative areas, *viz.* Byelorussia and Moldavia) was to facilitate long-range planning and major developmental policies affecting movements of population, shifts in industrial location, development of mineral resources and major agricultural areas, etc. The councils make recommendations to the republican and all-union gosplans, concerning such nationwide problems as optimum location of industry, interregional specialization, and regional planning of capital formation. Their role is not to be affected by the reforms of November 1962.[40]

A vast superstructure of coordinating agencies has thus been imposed upon the base of the sovnarkhozes. But who would coordinate the coordinators? To quote Liberman, "a multitude of authorities have made their appearance, often issuing uncoordinated orders."[41] The main sufferer, as will be shown below, has been the enterprise.

THE NEXT MAJOR revisions came in 1962. They appeared to express the growing political power of Khrushchev, which was interrupted in the summer by the agricultural crisis (rise in retail food prices, June 1) and the decision to put missiles in Cuba (Raul Castro's visit in July). The withdrawal of the missiles evidently strengthened Khrushchev's hand and enabled him—against some opposition—to reform the party in November much as in March he had reformed the state.[41a]

The March reforms affected only the state's organization in agriculture, so they hardly concern us. The agricultural powers of the raion (district) government were transferred to new "territorial kolkhoz-sovkhoz or sovkhoz-kolkhoz production administrations" (p.a.'s). In November the logical follow-up took place in the party: the party committee at the raion level was abolished, its agricultural concerns going to new p.a. party committees. But if this was logical, other changes in the party structure were strange in-

[40] *Ekonomicheskaia gazeta*, May 28, 1961, p. 2, and Feb. 2, 1963, p. 11.

[41] *Voprosy ekonomiki*, No. 8, 1962, p. 105.

[41a] That Khrushchev was a rather reluctant supporter of the Cuban adventure cannot be proven. It seems indicated, however, by his failure to make a public speech on any issue from June until October—a remarkable circumstance. The withdrawal of Soviet missiles from Cuba—clearly opposed, *e.g.*, by the Army journal *Krasnaia svesda*—suggests a reassertion of his authority in October.

—Твое счастье, что казенное добро тянешь. А то всыпали бы...

Рисунок Е. ВЕДЕРНИКОВА

—You're lucky it's public property you're hauling. Otherwise you'd get one hell of a beating. . . ."

—From Krokodil (Moscow), July 10, 1963.

deed. The p.a. party committee was set up as a basic party unit whose officers are elected from below: the constituency consists of all party members in the p.a. area concerned with agriculture. Those who live in the countryside, but are concerned with other matters, form the constituency of a different basic party unit covering a still larger area: the zonal industrial-production party committee. The party committees in towns are untouched, and therefore most party members are unaffected. But the oblast (province) committee, or obkom, is divided into two quite independent committees, one for agriculture, one for everything else. Even at republic level the party, united into one committee, nevertheless forms two bureaus with great operational independence.

Though strange, this is perhaps not absurd. For at the same time, the sovnarkhozes were raised to sensible size and their number was reduced in the ratio of 2½ to 1, thus depriving the obkom in any case of much of its function and authority. This particular reform was only a matter of time: that administrative monstrosity, the small sovnarkhoz, had not figured in Khrushchev's original plans,[42] and had clearly been a political gesture to the obkom secretaries, whose

[42] *Izvestia*, March 30, 1957.

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support he had needed in 1957. One awaits, of course, the formation of party committees at the level of the new sovnarkhozes. The only real new monstrosity is the huge zonal industrial-production party committee, covering selected people in many raions. The oft-proclaimed motive of the November reforms is to give the party greater control over the economy, and the original feature is the basic restructuring of the party on the "production" principle in order to achieve this aim. Khrushchev adduced many data to prove that agricultural preoccupation had been clogging the machinery of the party, and the reform will surely have the paradoxical result of releasing much party energy for industry. Whether industry will benefit thereby is an issue on which we may differ with Khrushchev.

Other changes in November were less important. A separate long-term planning body was retained (previously Gosekonomsoviet, now Gosplan). But current central management (previously Gosplan) was split into an industrial and a construction branch, and all subordinate sovnarkhozes lost control over construction to new local construction trusts. Thus the "production" principle crept back into the state organization as well as the party. The central industrial body was appropriately named Sovnarkhoz SSSR and given authority over all sovnarkhozes. The new central construction body was formed out of the old state Committee on Construction (Gosstroi), much strengthened. Other less powerful state committees on this and that had been founded since 1957, and more were founded now. This merely confirms common sense: the "production" principle cannot be discarded.[43] Mostly "this" and "that" concerned some branch of production—thus the state committee is the ghost of the old ministry.[44]

The "production" principle achieved one further victory: a special bureau was set up in the Central Committee of the party for chemicals and light industry. This is a characteristically Khrushchevian touch: the full weight of important party officials is thrown behind those branches of industry that interest him most.

In March 1963 still another basic change was effected with the creation of a new Supreme Council of the National Economy of the USSR (hereafter called VSNKh). The VSNKh has charge of industry and construction, and is subordinate only to the Council of Ministers: it has considerable independent power. Directly subordinate to it are the Gosplan, the Sovnarkhoz SSSR and Gosstroi, and the more important state committees (principally defense and technology). The less important state committees are subject to Gosplan and Gosstroi in the cases of industry and construction respectively.

The March reform had at least three purposes: to downgrade the importance of the party vis-à-vis the state, to keep planning centralized, and to enhance the influence of the military. It was in all three respects a blow at Khrushchev, many of whose reforms of the previous November were overturned or outflanked. The VSNKh, of which there had been no hint in November, is in many particulars similar to the strengthened Gosekonomkommissia of December 1956, which Khrushchev personally had struck down in 1957; its first chairman, Dimitri Ustinov, is a figure from the arms industry without much pure party experience. Among other signs that Khrushchev was bested, his new favorite, the chemical industry so much exalted in November, was put under the control of a mere state committee subordinate to Gosplan, not directly under the VSNKh; and the all-union Gosplan and Gosstroi were given explicit authority over republican gosplans and gosstrois, previously denied them. The March meeting itself was not officially a session of the party Central Committee, as in November, but a joint session of the party CC and the Council of Ministers (in both cases plus invitees). No speech by Khrushchev was recorded in connection with the meeting, and *Pravda* gave the decisions minimal coverage compared with the immense publicity accorded to Khrushchev in November. Neither *Pravda* nor of course the decrees themselves said one word about party control over the economy.

In sum we return in March 1963 to the situation after December 1956; agriculture remains the bailiwick of Khrushchev and the party, the rest of the economy is in the hands of "statist" technocrats. This is surely not a stable situation now, anymore than it was then.

The Toad Beneath the Harrow

How has the *enterprise* fared through all these vicissitudes? From its viewpoint, the creation of the sovnarkhozes in 1957 was a centralizing measure. It would even have been so apart from all changes in formal rights and duties, simply because a sovnarkhoz is geo-

[43] An early instance of this same technical inevitability was the strengthening of the Gosplan in 1958. The planning for many commodities previously handled by all-union ministries had to be turned over to Gosplan, since the sovnarkhozes were utterly incapable of planning any commodity on a national scale. Powers of current management were shifted wholesale from the sovnarkhozes to the Gosplan.

[44] Khrushchev recently revealed that some of the state committees in charge of various industries are headed by the ex-ministers of the same industries. (*Izvestia*, April 26, 1963.)

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graphically nearer than a ministry, and so can exercise closer control. It was only between Gosplan and the sovnarkhoz as the intermediate body that there was, if anywhere, decentralization. Various rights granted to the plant managers by the Bulganin-inspired decree of August 9, 1955,[45] in the fields of production, financing, and investment decisions were in 1957 largely transferred to the sovnarkhozes.[46]

It was also the enterprise that bore the brunt of the subsequent recentralization measures at upper levels, as the decision-making powers granted to the sovnarkhozes were gradually transferred to republican ministries and gosplans, state committees, etc. The plant manager, who before 1957 had been confronted, as a rule, with just one boss—the minister—now has to satisfy the often conflicting demands of several agencies. Thus, the manager of a telephone equipment factory complains that

> . . . [the plant is] simultaneously directed by the chief administration, the sovnarkhoz, the VSNKh [*i.e.*, the Sovnarkhoz of the RSFSR created in 1961], until recently the Gosplan SSSR, and, in addition, five state committees, two all-union ministries, and so forth. They all believe that the factory should work according to their plans. . . ."[47]

In addition to output and assortment goals, these sundry agencies determine separately the enterprise's planned targets for employment, wage fund, labor productivity, cost reduction, capital saving, investment, and technological innovations. As Liberman puts it:

> . . . a multitude of echelons of command have appeared, issuing orders which often lack coordination. This makes necessary excessive and costly work at alterations and revisions of plans.[48]

But revised targets themselves may be uncoordinated: for example, it has become common practice to raise an enterprise's output goal without granting it additional funds or supplies, and then penalize it for "overspending" by withholding the bonus even though the output plan has been met.

The effectiveness of the bonus payments, the main incentive at the planners' disposal for getting the enterprise interested in plan fulfillment, is greatly weakened under the new conditions. The plant manager, confronted with a growing proliferation of often conflicting plans, orders and directives, has to meet all the planned targets before the enterprise qualifies for the incentive bonus. And even if he meets all the stipulations, the bonus may still be withheld:

> . . . the enterprise's incentive fund may be taken away from it and used for the sovnarkhoz's needs unrelated to the enterprise in question, and no objections are heeded.[49]

No wonder, then, that the number of enterprises and sovnarkhozes failing to meet planned goals has been reported on the increase.[50]

Conclusion

In this welter of cross-currents it is difficult to chart one's way ahead. The *party* will not allow complete decentralization, first on obvious ideological grounds, secondly on the very rational ground that *laissez-faire*, according to all human experience, subserves many goals well but not those of growth and defense. Inclining towards complete centralization, the party will nevertheless look askance at it, for that means experts with formulas and computers, or a kind of victory for the state. The party must therefore be reckoned as a force, and probably a decisive one, favoring broadly the status quo.

Between the ruling party group and the higher state officials there is disagreement on the issue of the exact hierarchy of command. In 1953 (consolidation of ministries), 1956 (Gosekonomkommissia) and 1963 (VSNKh) the government officials have come out for a more independent state, which, however, they have each time equated with more centralization than was agreeable to the party. That is, naturally, because they are *higher* state officials: they want an attractive promotions pyramid. But we may doubt whether they would welcome total centralization; for that, with its computers, would cut out human judgment, and substitute junior mathematics graduates for themselves. In fact, the lunatic fringe of extreme centralizers is to be found among *engineers* (Fedorovich), ever and in all countries prone, in their innocence of administration and economics, to technocracy.

Economists cover the whole spectrum of opinion. Doubtless there are some secret Titoists as well as those we have mentioned. These would be theoreticians, as are the centralizers like Kantorovich. The chief mod-

[45] *Direktivy KPSS i Sovetskovo pravitelstva po khoziaistvennim voprosam*, Vol. 4, Moscow, 1958, pp. 451-59.

[46] V. Razorenova in *Planovoe khoziaistvo*, No. 1, 1961, p. 20; see also *Planovoe khoziaistvo*, No. 3, 1963, p. 12.

[47] *Ekonomicheskaia gazeta*, January 5, 1963, p. 11.

[48] E. Liberman, "Planirovanie proizvodstva i normativy dlitelnovo deistvia" (Production planning and long-term norms,) *Voprosy ekonomiki*, No. 8, 1962, p. 105.

[49] *Ekonomicheskaia gazeta*, April 13, 1963, p. 36.

[50] Khrushchev has revealed that in some sovnarkhozes 25 to 65 percent of enterprises fail to meet output goals (*Pravda*, Nov. 20, 1962).

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erate decentralizer is a business economist (Liberman), and that is natural too, for like all business economists he is interested in incentives and administrative practicability. Prices and rationality are for intellectuals.

Enterprise managers feel like, indeed are, state officials. They supported these latter in the fight against sovnarkhozes in 1957. But they want considerably more decentralization than higher state officials, because they want power for themselves. Absolute decentralization, however, with the free market that goes with it, threatens every manager of an enterprise that is or hopes to be subsidized. We suspect that the typical manager is rooting for Liberman.

Technical necessity rules out the Fedorovich dream of a computer-run economy for many years to come (there is not as yet the remotest possibility of its being efficiently, let alone rationally, administered); but all other variants are left in play. *Rationality* demands either total centralization or total decentralization. The requirement that *incentives* pull in the proper direction is Liberman's very own problem, and the best solution to it is either his own, or still greater decentralization. The movement towards *full communism* points in just the opposite direction.

No wonder Khrushchev is more interested in foreign policy and agriculture!

And What of the Consumer?

By Imogene Erro

THREE YEARS AGO Nikita Khrushchev surprised the Soviet people with promises of rapid increases in consumer production and a rapidly rising standard of living. The Soviet consumer industries, he said, would successfully fulfill the goals of the Seven-Year Plan (1959-65) and within five more years would outstrip the United States in production per capita. Then the USSR would enjoy the highest standard of living in the world.[1] However, despite Khrushchev's efforts throughout this period to make good his promise, no outstanding achievements toward this goal can be counted. Indeed it now appears that the promise has been virtually abandoned; perhaps it has been shelved for use at a more opportune time in the future.

To begin with, Khrushchev's concern for consumer welfare in recent years presents a striking contrast to his position at the start of his regime in 1954, when he denounced Malenkov's pro-consumer policy and supported instead an overriding priority for heavy industry. His apparent about-face in 1960 was all the more interesting in view of the fact that just the summer before Khrushchev had made his first visit to the United States. Obviously impressed by the enormous gap in the levels of consumption in the two countries, he began almost immediately to alter his earlier position by paying serious attention to Soviet living standards.

To implement the program, a series of official actions were taken to increase the production and assortment of a whole range of consumer goods. The first steps included issuance of a textile decree, a consumer durables decree, and other such measures. Khrushchev also sponsored actions to step up the modernization of retail trade facilities, to expand consumer services, and to increase the rate of investment in consumer production.[2] He even went so far as to suggest that depriving the people of material goods for so long a time had retarded the country's industrial development.[3]

Perhaps the peak of the Premier's enthusiasm was reached about mid-1961, as reflected in his suggestion at the British Trade Fair in June that it was now possible

[1] *Pravda*, May 6, 1960.

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[2] For further discussion see I. Erro, *Trends in the Soviet Production of Consumer Goods*, Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the U.S., Washington, D. C., 1962.

[3] *Kommunist*, No. 1, 1961, p. 14.

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for the rates of growth of light industry to equal those of heavy industry in future development.[4] Shortly thereafter the mood began to change. Either because of strong political opposition or because of conflicting demands on the economy—or perhaps both—some modification of Khrushchev's consumer policy appeared to be taking place. By the end of 1961 the impetus toward acceleration of consumer production had been lost and an eclipse of the consumer program was clearly apparent. The 22nd Party Congress, which convened in October, moved to reestablish the old priorities by the adoption of resolutions favoring heavy industry. Even worse for consumers were warnings that demands for the nation's defense might further limit light industrial production if "complications in the international situation" should arise.[5] In what apparently had been a sincere effort to narrow the gap in consumption between the Soviet Union and Western countries, Khrushchev had been overzealous, and efforts to speed up improvements in the consumer's lot had fallen short of the goal.

Consumer policy thereafter remained unclear until early this year, when the Soviet people were told outright that often-promised increases in consumer goods would be delayed. On February 27, 1963, Khrushchev gave a dispirited speech in his home constituency of Kalinin in which he made an emotional appeal for popular understanding about failures in consumer production, linking them directly with the demands of the defense industry. Had the international situation been different, he contended, he could have made good his earlier promises to consumers.[6]

Declining Rates of Growth

Official data for Soviet light industry indicate, however, that despite the blunt and rather sudden admission of failures to the public, the troubles in consumer production in fact had been accumulating for some time, particularly since the end of 1960. The rate of growth for almost all major commodities of light industry have declined each year since 1959, scarcities of raw materials have resulted from the failure of agriculture to keep pace with the demands of industry, and restraints on capital investments have slowed the construction of new facilities. In view of these multiple strains on light industry, Khrushchev may have been giving notice that goals for some important types of consumer goods will not be reached.

[4] Reported in the *New York Times*, June 29, 1961.

[5] *Pravda*, Oct. 19, 1961.

[6] *Ibid.*, Feb. 28, 1963.

Fulfillment of the seven-year goals for major consumer commodities is, indeed, virtually impossible without a major push, in view of the performance of light industry and other related industries thus far in the plan period. After four years of work toward the achievement of these goals (*i.e.*, through 1962) total production of textiles, for example, had increased in physical quantity by only 14 percent, whereas an increase of 40 percent during the entire period 1959-65 would be required to meet the goals. Furthermore, only very small increases over 1962 production are projected in the 1963 plans for key commodities in light industry, making it clear there is no immediate improvement in sight for Soviet consumers.[7] Indexes of physical production for some of the major commodity groups of light industry actual and planned, are as follows:

	Textiles				
	Cotton	*Wool*	*Linen*	*Silk**	*Total*
1958	100	100	100	100	100
1959	106	108	110	95	106
1960	110	113	116	96	111
1961	111	117	110	97	112
1962	111	121	108	111	114
1963 (Plan)	114	121	N.A.	112	N.A.
1965 (Plan)	133	165	132	176	140

* Including fabrics of rayon, synthetic fiber, and natural silk.

	Footwear and Clothing				
	Leather Footwear	*Knit Outerwear*	*Knit Underwear*	*Hosiery*	*Sewn Garments*
1958	100	100	100	100	100
1959	109	107	110	104	110
1960	118	115	118	109	119
1961	124	121	122	113	127
1962	128	128	130	N.A.	132
1963 (Plan)	129	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
1965 (Plan)	144	164	195	146	168

SOURCES: Derived from production data in *Narodnoie khoziaistvo SSSR v 1961 godu, passim*, and *SSSR v tsifrakh v 1962 godu, passim*. Plan data are from *Pravda*, Feb. 28, 1963, and Feb. 8, 1959.

Insufficient Capital Investment

Paralleling the decline in the rates of growth of production, light industry has shown a poor performance in its capital investment program. Achievements in investment for the first three years of the Seven-Year Plan were notably unimpressive. In 1959, actual investment in light industry increased by only 1 percent. The following year a reported increase of 9 percent reflected a short-lived attempt by Khrushchev to boost allocations

[7] *Ibid.*

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to "speed the development of light industry," but this effort was not sustained. Because of mounting difficulties, particularly in procuring machinery and setting it in operation, there followed in 1961 an absolute decline in the amount of funds invested, as shown below:

	Reported Annual Investment (*Million Rubles**)	Index (1958=100)
1958	625	100
1959	631	101
1960	681	109
1961	671	107

* Ruble values are given in new rubles as established by the Soviet currency reform of January 1, 1961. A nominal rate of exchange based on the gold content of the respective currencies is 0.90 ruble to US $1.

SOURCE: *Narodnoie khoziaistvo SSSR v 1961 godu*, p. 545.

A further indication of the failures in light industry is the rise in investment in construction projects that have been begun but have not been completed. According to official data, investment tied up in unfinished projects in light industry rose from 282 million rubles at the beginning of the plan period to 420 million in 1961, an increase of almost 50 percent.[8] To cope with this problem of increasing investment without payoff in terms of production, the number of plants scheduled for construction was reduced, and emphasis was shifted to the expansion of existing plants and to the modernization of machinery and production processes.[9]

Shortages of Raw Materials

Expansion of the production of textiles and clothing has been limited by shortages of raw materials—mainly agricultural but to a lesser degree chemical. While in

[8] *Kapitalnoie stroitelstva v SSSR*, Moscow, 1961, p. 67.
[9] *Ekonomicheskaia gazeta*, May 12, 1962, p. 26.

Khrushchev's About-Face on Consumer Goals: 1960-63

PROMISES

We are setting the following task: after implementation of the Seven-Year Plan (1959-65), to catch up within five years, and then to outstrip, the United States in per capita consumption of consumer commodities including textiles and footwear . . .; we shall in the immediate future reach the production and consumption level of the United States, the wealthiest country of the capitalist word, . . . and then we will enter the open sea in which no comparisons with capitalism will anchor us.—*Speech to the Supreme Soviet, May 5, 1960* (Pravda, *May 6*).

. . . we shall transfer part of the capital investment to agriculture and light industry. Communism cannot be built only by offering machines and ferrous and nonferrous metals. It is necessary for people to be able to eat well, dress well, and have housing and other material and cultural conditions. This is not a revision of our general line but rather a sensible use of our material potentialities. When we were in an encirclement of our enemies . . ., we economized everything. . . . Now the situation is different. —*Speech to the Academy of Social Sciences, Jan. 6, 1961* (Pravda, *Jan. 25*).

Now we consider our heavy industry as built; so we are not going to give it priority. Light industry and heavy industry will develop at the same rate.—*Statement to correspondents at the British Trade Fair in Moscow, May 20, 1961 (quoted from the* New York Times, *June 29*).

RETRACTIONS

Our enemies [want us] to channel additional big allocations for the development of animal husbandry at the expense of industry . . . and defense. . . . We cannot do this. —*Speech to Cuban students in Russia, June 3, 1962* (Pravda *June 4*).

We must live like a good housewife, who ably decides what to buy and when. . . . Naturally it is not pleasant for us to waste the labor of many people . . . on the production of means of destruction. . . . [But if we reduce funds for defense] . . . will the people praise us for this? —*Speech at the Grivita Rosie Plant in Rumania, June 19, 1962* (Pravda, *June 20*).

Of course, had the international situation been better, had it been possible to achieve agreement and to shake off the burden of armament, that would have multiplied the possibilities for a further improvement of the economy and for raising the welfare of the people. . . . On the one hand, one would like to build more enterprises producing consumer goods. . . . On the other hand, life dictates the need to spend enormous sums on maintaining our military might. . . . The time will come when . . . we shall have clothes for every occasion . . ., but you must be patient; wait awhile and you will have everything. We can't make everything at once. It is impossible. The wish alone is not enough. —*Election speech in Kalinin, February 27, 1963* (Pravda, *Feb., 28*).

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1961 Soviet output of all types of textile fibers was 6 percent above the output level of 1958, production in 1962 dropped to a level only 2 percent greater than in 1958, as shown below:

	Production of Textile Fibers (*Thousand Metric Tons*)	Index* (1958=100)
1958	2,380	100
1959	2,450	103
1960	2,420	102
1961	2,530	106
1962	2,430	102

* Primarily because the base year (1958) was an unusually good crop year, the index for production of textile fibers shows a smaller increase than does the index for production of fabrics shown above.

SOURCE: Production data are from *SSSR v tsifrakh* for 1961 and 1962, *passim.*

The principal problem in light industry results from an insufficient production of the basic fiber, cotton, which makes up almost 60 percent of the total output of textile fibers.[10] Lags in production of rayon and synthetic fiber compound the problem. The use of these chemical fibers as substitutes for natural fibers has fallen far short of planned achievement, and at present they account for only about 10 percent of the total production of fibers.[11] Soviet officials recently have made efforts to stimulate both of these lagging programs, although measures appear to be too little and too late to affect the seven-year goals for light industry. Production of cotton received special attention in the recent decision to increase the delivery price to cotton-growing collective farms by an average of 20 percent and to state farms by about 12 percent.[12] Whether this increase in cost will be passed to consumers in the form of higher prices for cotton textiles or be absorbed within the industry or within the turnover tax is not known. A retail price increase to cover this cost, if levied equally on all cotton textiles, would be comparatively small—probably less than 5 percent.

[10] *SSSR v tsifrakh,* Moscow, reports for 1961 and 1962.
[11] *Ibid.*
[12] *Pravda,* March 28, 1963.

TO SUM UP, the Soviet record in light industry suggests that Khrushchev's consumer program reached its climax in 1961 and has since undergone a continuing decline in priority, even though consumer production continues to achieve modest gains. Since Khrushchev's speech of February 27, 1963, official policy relating to consumption has shifted heavily toward subjects of welfare and consumer services, whereas references to production of consumer goods show an element of restraint. For example, May Day solgans this year dropped the "Catching Up with the US" theme and instead promised continued improvement in welfare. Shortly afterward, a lengthy report on consumer welfare, addressed to the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR, emphasized the role of public services but touched only briefly on consumer goods, and then mainly in reference to improvements in quality and assortment.[13] In turn, the republic Supreme Soviet issued a resolution exhorting officials of light industry to seek out "hidden reserves" and to utilize existing machinery and equipment more efficiently; the resolution also called for a greater effort by heavy industry to support the needs of consumer production.[14]

In brief, recent Soviet developments, viewed against achievements in light industry during the last four years, suggest that consumers can expect little in the way of substantial gains in the near future. Although there are indications that the regime is attempting to find ways to improve the consumer outlook without cutting into the defense program and/or heavy industry, most of these measures are in the nature of bootstrap operations.

In the future as in the past, such efforts undoubtedly will be accompanied by a barrage of official propaganda designed to reassure the consumer that all possible is being done on his behalf. It must be obvious to the Soviet citizen, however, that hopes born of official promises of the "highest living standard" in the world must once again be displaced by prolonged waiting.

[13] As reported by Radio Moscow, April 8, 1963.
[14] *Sovetskaia Rossiia,* April 6, 1963.

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Television in the USSR

By Wilson P. Dizard

IT IS EVENING in Moscow. After the supper dishes have been cleared away, families gather before their television sets, which occupy an honored place in their apartments, often displacing the samovar. Across the city, larger groups gather to watch television in Komsomol and workers' clubs. The same scene is repeated outside the metropolis, in ramshackle wooden halls crowded with farm workers, their faces turned upward to the television set perched on a platform above their heads. The screen lights up, holding forth the promise of an evening's entertainment and relaxation.

The first program of the evening is a special tribute to Zoia Kosmodemianska, a partisan fighter of the "Great Patriotic War," on the anniversary of her death. A photograph of the heroic *Komsomolka* appears on the screen, followed by a narrator standing against the backdrop of a studio curtain. He is the first of several speakers who will extol Kosmodemianska's deeds. She volunteered for the front in the darkest days of the German advance, he explains, and later was hanged as a spy by the fascist invader. Her last words were: "We will defeat you!" She is an immortal example to the children of the Moscow school named after her and to the workers of the machine-building factory where she worked before going to the front. In commemoration of her death, the Komsomol members at the factory have taken a pledge to overfulfill their production quota. More speakers follow, saying the same thing, and the program ends.

Next comes a light entertainment program called "Around the Fireplace." The setting is an ornate room with heavy drapes and leaded-pane windows. Some popular songs are presented by a group of spirited singers and dancers, and the highlight of the show is a violin solo by a visiting French artist. When she finishes, the announcer expresses the hope that her appearance will strengthen the bonds of friendship between the Soviet and French peoples.

Moscow viewers are now invited to watch a documentary film about a new steel mill at Rustavi, in Georgia. The film opens with views of the mill's impressive exterior and then moves indoors, where brawny, mustachioed Caucasian mountaineers are pouring steel. "They are struggling to fulfill and overfulfill the plan," the film's commentator says. "They are proud to bear the title of 'Communist Brigade of Labor'." The scene now shifts from the mill to the adjoining workers' housing area, to children in school and at play, and then back to the mill again as the commentator gives a concluding assurance that the workers will press on in the never-ending battle to give the party and the people more and more high-quality steel.

There follows the popular "News Relay" program. Tonight it offers a special treat—a visit to the apartment of the distinguished composer, Aram Ilich Khachaturian. The audience is first introduced to Olga Lepechinskaia, a slim, pretty announcer who will interview Khachaturian from a studio at the Moscow television center. The scene shifts to the composer's apartment, where the camera finds him seated casually in a large chair, wearing a smoking jacket. He responds easily to Miss Lepechinskaia's questions about his work, then walks over to the piano to play excerpts from his recent compositions. After some further conversation about his collection of musical clocks, the interview ends.

The television evening comes to a close with a summary of current news events, heavy with details of a new plot by West German fascists to undermine world

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peace. After the news, television sets are switched off in the farmers' halls, the workers' clubs, and in private homes. It is not difficult to imagine a home viewer turning to his wife and saying: "Imagine that! There was Lepechinskaia talking directly over the wire to Khachaturian in his apartment, and we saw them both. How wonderful televison is, that we can see such things while sitting in our own apartment!"

Television for the Masses

This enthusiasm and wonder are doubtless shared by millions of viewers in scores of cities across the Soviet Union. Television is the newest and most popular mass medium in the country, already reaching an audience of 40 million people daily. By 1970, television will be available to almost all Soviet citizens. There are at the present time about 130 transmitting stations, plus 220 smaller relay centers, serving some nine million receivers.[1] The current Seven-Year Plan sets targets of 200 transmitting stations and over 15 million receivers by 1965. These projections, like most Soviet economic goals, have to be taken with caution, but there is little doubt that the Soviet government has decided that nationwide television is important enough to justify the heavy capital investment involved.

The Soviet Union has had television facilities since 1938, when experimental transmissions began in Moscow, using equipment purchased from the Radio Corporation of America.[2] Television operations were suspended during the war but were resumed on a limited scale in 1946. For a number of years thereafter, little was done to expand TV broadcasting facilities partly because of more pressing economic needs and partly because Stalin and his associates did not appreciate the potentialities of the new medium. That leaders presumed to be pastmasters in propaganda should have had such a blind spot may seem strange, but it is understandable in terms of the party's historic bias in favor of the written word, particularly the press. It has been said that even if television had been an important medium of communications in Stalin's day, he would have confined its activities to reproducing daily editorials and articles from *Pravda.*

IT WAS ONLY after Stalin's death in 1953 and the liberalization of Soviet policies restricting consumer goods production that television really began to develop in the USSR as a mass medium. Even when the increased emphasis on consumer goods was later cut back again, the output of television sets continued to expand, and their increasing availability became one of the few tangible evidences of the new liberality of the regime. In 1959, when prices of many luxury items were raised, the cost of television sets was actually lowered. The market is still by no means saturated, and even in the cities those who have sets of their own are in the minority. There are, however, enough sets in workers' clubs, hostels, and other public places to make television viewing a fairly common experience for the inhabitants of the larger cities.

Notwithstanding some audience criticism of programs, television is clearly a popular form of entertainment in the Soviet Union—a welcome diversion and means of relaxation in a society where these things have been in chronic short supply. The very fact that Soviet citizens can now enjoy it is, by itself, of propaganda value to the regime since it symbolizes for the public the gains of the post-Stalin period.

The policy of making television more widely available has gone hand in hand with a change in Soviet domestic propaganda methods since Stalin's death. By and large, this change reflects Khrushchev's insistence that while the party line must remain inviolate, it should be presented to the people in as palatable a form as possible. The result has been a noticeable effort to produce livelier propaganda products. Newspapers and magazines are appearing in new formats which can almost be called sprightly in comparison with the leaden-footed efforts of the Stalin era. The film industry has been revived after an almost total collapse in the last years of Stalin's rule, and radio broadcasting has generally been made more interesting.

Television, too, benefited from the change during the late 1950's. Far from being restricted to the transmission of *Pravda* editorials, Soviet television programming emphasized sports and cultural subjects, often presented in a light or mildly instructional vein. Although normal precautionary steps were taken to see

[1] Current figures are from a "Radio Day" article in *Pravda,* May 7, 1963, by Mikhail A. Kharlamov, Chairman of the State Committee for Radio and Television.

[2] Soviet historiography claims that a Russian biologist, P. N. Bakhnetev, transmitted the first television images in 1880. A more substantive Russian claim is that Boris Rosing, of the St. Petersburg Institute of Technology, designed the first television system using a cathode-ray tube as a receiver in 1907. See *Radiotekhnika i electronika* (Moscow), No. 11, November 1957, for a survey of the technological development of television in the USSR. An English translation of the survey is contained in *A Survey of Soviet Communications Electronics,* Paul E. Green(ed.), Lincoln Laboratory Group Report 34-76, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Mass., September 1958.

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that the medium did not violate any ideological norms, there was little apparent effort to exercise close control of programming and to exploit television more assiduously as a propaganda weapon. There were no news programs on Soviet television until 1957, and then only once daily.

Any assumption, however, that television would somehow escape being made a cog in the Soviet propaganda system would have been naive. During the late 1950's, the regime took a fresh look at the new medium and decided to upgrade its propaganda role. Accordingly, the Seven-Year Plan (1959-65) called for an expansion of facilities which, if fulfilled, will give Soviet television a larger daily audience—somewhere in the neighborhood of 125 million—than that of all the other propaganda media combined, excepting radio. Clearly this "entertainment medium" is meant to do more than entertain.

Resolutions and Directives

The first detailed definition of television's role in Soviet society was spelled out in two resolutions adopted by the party Central Committee during 1960. The earlier of these directives,[3] issued in January, ordered changes in the form and content of all party propaganda so as to emphasize the need for greater effort to build up Soviet world power, and outlined the parts that the various mass media would play in this new drive. The newspapers were again given pride of place among the media, but for the first time television received special mention. Its role was more fully detailed a month later when the Central Committee issued a special resolution defining the functions of television and radio.[4] The resolution opened with a sharp attack on "soft" trends in television programming:

Television presents new opportunities for the daily political, cultural and esthetic education of the population, including those parts of the population seldom reached by mass political work. The Party Central Committee believes, however, that it is being far from adequately used to propagandize the achievements of the Soviet people in political, economic and cultural life and to exhibit Soviet man, the builder of communism.

The Central Committee's litany of complaints about the utilization of television covered a wide field. Programs were "dull" and "unconvincing"; reporting of socialist achievements in the provinces was "rare and generally handled unskillfully"; television production was badly organized; and, above all, not enough was being done to propagate the party line. The resolution decreed a series of reforms, ranging from a proviso for more "propaganda on healthy living" to the requirement that special children's programs be broadcast by every television station at least one hour a day. But the most important effect of the directive was to apprise Soviet television managers that their primary assignment was an ideological one.

THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE'S comments were addressed principally to the organization responsible for the overall direction of Soviet radio and television—the State Committee for Radio and Television Broadcasting, attached to the USSR Council of Ministers. Responsibility for the bulk of actual television operations is dispersed among the local stations, which have considerable autonomy in adapting their programs to regional needs. This practice is explained in Soviet literature as a reflection of the "Leninist policy of equality among the many peoples inhabiting the Soviet Union".[5] However, aside from the desirability of tailoring programs to particular audiences, such as virgin-lands workers and different national groups, another practical reason for allowing local stations substantial operating autonomy is the lack of countrywide relay facilities for transmitting Moscow-originated programs. Although such facilities are expanding in European Russia, progress will be much slower in the central and eastern areas. (The target date mentioned by Soviet commentators for a full linking of the system is 1980.) Exchanges of films, kinescopes and magnetic-tape programs between stations have also been minimal, although this deficiency is undoubtedly being remedied since it was a major object of criticism in the Central Committee's February 1960 resolution.

Local autonomy in television programming, however, does not mean any relaxation of centralized ideological control, which is the function of the State Committee and the party apparatus. Since the issuance of the 1960 resolution, party organizations have had a more clearly defined responsibility for overseeing the ideological content of local television programs. In spite of this, a relatively small percentage of Soviet

[3] "On the tasks of party propaganda in present-day conditions," Resolution of the Party Central Committee, January 9, 1960, *Pravda*, January 10.

[4] "On improving Soviet radio broadcasting and on further developing television," Party Central Committee resolution. *Partiinaia zhizn*, No. 4, February 1960.

[5] S. V. Kaftanov and others, *Radio and Television in the USSR*, Moscow, August 1961, p. 30 (available in English under this title, Library of Congress, Washington, D. C.).

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"Trials and Tribulations" of Soviet TV Owners

It is difficult and not very pleasant to return to what has been once, or more than once, printed in a newspaper article. But what can you do when the circumstances demand that you pick up the pen again? . . . Certain correspondence appeared in No. 28 of our weekly. It was entitled "From a factory conveyer . . . for an Overhaul" and dealt with television sets, those elegantly finished, exciting devices equipped with levers, keys and panel boards, which entered our lives as an indispensible and precious means of culture and human contact.

However, we also told of the trials and tribulations that befall those who own these means of spiritual culture. Not all were fortunate enough not to know the road to the "first-aid station"—the television repair shop. Many, in fact millions, of owners of these expensive gadgets are compelled to get out the "overhaul warranty" almost on the first day, and then schedule their spare time between regular trips to the repair shops of the Moscow Television Trust and consolation talks in the family. . . .

A friendly and moderate criticism was voiced, advices were given, and proposals were advanced. Finally, the first letter was received by the editors, then a second, a third. . . . We have a pile of responses and replies from readers who hold receipts issued by repair mechanics. . . .

After the article was published, we had a visitor, an elderly, quiet man—Lawyer Comrade Benenson. He left the following communication, which in our opinion deserves particular attention on the part of the Ministry [of Communications] and the Television Trust:

"On September 20, 1961, Technician Comrade Osipov (Repair Shop 24) repaired my television set, and in April 1962 my room was filled with smoke. Technician Comrade Zalkind responded to my call and discovered in the set a do-it-yourself safety device which, it appeared, was responsible for burning out the power transformer, causing the picture tube to cease functioning. In response to my complaint to the Ministry of Communications requesting that the overhaul be performed at the expense of the repair shop which installed the safety device, I received a reply on July 9 from the Television Trust asserting that the 'bug' was made and installed by myself. This is nonsense, as I know nothing about the inside of a TV set and never open mine. . . . It is difficult for me to understand why I cannot get any protection of my rights from the Ministry of Communications. Instead, I am accused of a swindle."

Perhaps this is not enough, so let us turn to another letter. The author's name is Leybutin; he is an ordinary Moscovite and TV set owner. . . .

"I had to call a technician from the repair shop on Ostankinskaia St. four times. A technician, sometimes two, would come, do something, take two or three rubles, and depart. The television still wouldn't work. The last time they said that the picture tube had to be checked. They took out the block and left it on the table. The next day I took time off from my work, spent two hours in bringing the mechanism to the atelier, and three days later went back to pick it up. They refused to take into account the amounts paid by me for previous overhauls and would not even check their records. . . .

"The following day a technician arrived, put in the picture tube, and changed another tube. Two days later a tube burned out, and there was again no picture. . . . The cycle is now apparently complete; the set will have to be taken to the atelier all over again, which will probably cost another ten rubles. . . ."

The optimism [of the Ministry of Communications] will disappear completely if we acquaint our readers with yet another letter sent in by comrade Prikhodko, who lives in Krasnopresensky Raion. He is disappointed with the "Temp-6" that he owns. The plant and TV repair shop workers run from him like the devil from frankincense.

"I called a mechanic from our repair shop. He came, dusted the inside of the set, installed one of my own safety devices, soldered a contact, and calculated his own fee at two rubles. One week later the set was out of order again."

Such are some of the "cases." And if there are millions of such cases, then they must reflect the real situation, which the Ministry of Communications refuses to recognize.

—From an article by V. Matveiev, "Television Service Problems," Ekonomicheskaia gazeta (Moscow), October 27, 1962.

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television programming has thus far been directly political in content. At least two-thirds of any Soviet newspaper is generally devoted to political news and commentary, and about a third of radio output is in this category.[6] The proportion of directly political programs on television is somewhat smaller than on radio, although a strong ideological thread runs through most of the broadcast material, particularly the news.

News—With a Difference

In the earlier days of Soviet television, news programs consisted mainly of the unadorned reading of bulletins from TASS, the official news agency. In recent years, however, they have become more varied, making greater use of news-film prepared especially for television. The Moscow station telecasts three news shows daily—two fifteen-minute segments and a half-hour show at 10:30 p.m. The three programs are made available to stations on the growing relay network, all of which are required to rebroadcast the half-hour evening program.[7] Local stations supplement the Moscow-originated news programs with special political features of their own. The titles of these features are frequently indicative of their propagandistic flavor: *e.g.*, "We Shall Filfill the Seven-Year Plan Ahead of Schedule," "Lenin's Ideas are Becoming a Reality," "Listen to Advice from Scientists, Comrade," "Through Heroic Labor, We Shall Carry Out the Grandiose Communist Assignment." Many are straight "talks," featuring "guest appearances" by workers who are successfully fulfilling their production quotas. Although available evidence on the preferences of Soviet viewers is meager, it indicates that such programs are generally not popular. On the other hand, filmed and on-the-spot documentary reports of Soviet economic, scientific and social achievements seem to be well received, probably because they present visible proof of national progress. Television has, for example, been particularly effective in reporting Soviet space feats—one of its triumphs having been the first transmission of a live sequence from an earth-circling manned satellite in August 1962.

But while Soviet viewers may get dramatic pictures from space, they see very little of the terrestrial world outside their own national borders. There are occasional program exchanges with television stations in the Communist-bloc countries of Eastern Europe, carried out through the Soviet-sponsored Intervision network, the Communist counterpart of Western Europe's Eurovision system. In February 1963 the Russians completed the last link in their television hookup with the East European bloc countries—Albania, however, being excluded. There are increasing indications, moreover, that the regime is considering the propaganda advantages of direct Soviet television connections with non-Communist areas. Since April 1961 programs have been exchanged with West European countries via Finland, which is a member of both the Eurovision and Intervision networks; and Soviet commentators have recently been talking of possible international television exchanges relayed by Soviet space communications satellites similar to the American "Telstar" and "Relay" satellites. The prospect of demonstrating Communist achievements and power to the rest of the world by live television broadcasts must certainly be tempting to Soviet propagandists, but they also have to face the less pleasing prospect that such international programming would undoubtedly be reciprocal, requiring the presentation to the Soviet public of foreign transmissions giving an uncensored view of life beyond Communist borders.

Entertainment and Instruction

What impels most Soviet viewers to switch on their television sets is not so much the desire to be informed of events as it is the desire to be entertained. Thus, the bulk of Soviet television broadcasting consists of either light entertainment or mildly instructional programs. Most stations have special programs for women (*e.g.*, "For You, Women"), for children ("Tales by Grandmother Television"), for farmers ("Seminars for Corn Growers") and other groups. Quiz programs are popular, as are sports events. Most stations carry a heavy schedule of live sports programs.

Features for children have received considerably greater attention since the 1960 Central Committee resolution requiring all television stations to schedule one hour of such programs daily. Even before that, however, the State Committee on Radio and Television Broadcasting had set up a special editorial office in January 1957 to prepare programs for children designed to instill "a spirit of high Communist awareness and a profound sense of devotion to the party, the homeland, and the substance of communism."[8] There is little that is frivolous or time-wasting in the children's television hour. Programs for the very young often

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 36.

[7] Interview with Juri Fokin, chief of Moscow television news broadcasting. Robert Lewis Shayon in *Saturday Review* (New York), June 9, 1962.

[8] Kaftanov, *op. cit.*, p. 71.

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feature puppet shows intended to illustrate the themes of Soviet morality. For older children, the range of subject matter is wider, placing greater emphasis on their coming adult responsibilities. Special attention is given to the problem of choosing a career—a "choice" which in Soviet society is actually only partly theirs. The stress here is less on the individual's vocational inclination than on the obligation to elect a career meeting the needs of the party and state.

For foreign observers, the most impressive aspect of Soviet television programming is the large number of current plays, dance productions, and motion pictures presented by local stations. Soviet commentators often cite this as evidence of the superior cultural tone of TV broadcasting in the USSR compared to that in "capitalist" countries. In 1958, for instance, the Moscow stations presented over 80 plays produced especially for television, in addition to 60 others from the repertoires of Moscow theatrical companies. In one 15-month period, the Riga station televised the entire repertoire of that city's theatrical companies.[9]

There have been reports of protests by managers of theatrical and film enterprises against the excessive exposure of their productions before the non-paying television audience. On the other hand, the director of the Leningrad television station has complained publicly of his inability to obtain films from the local Film Distribution Trust until they have made the round of the local cinemas, although the Trust is supposed to make all new films available to television stations within two months after their release. The Leningrad station director further complained that local theater and opera companies were not living up to their commitment to permit the telecasting of one of their productions every three months.[10]

DESPITE SUCH FRICTIONS, Soviet viewers enjoy a substantial fare of new theatrical and film entertainment. Their preferences are for light entertainment and costume plays, both of which are presented in sufficient quantities to evoke official complains that television's cultural programs do not measure up to the standards set by the party. In a critique of 86 dramatic productions televised by Moscow stations, a commentator in the leading party magazine *Kommunist* complained that only 29 of these dealt with present-day topics and that even less attention was being devoted to plays about "our wonderful contemporary—the builder of Communist society."[11]

Although audience preferences are not an overriding factor in Soviet television programming, as they generally are in Western countries, they are nevertheless given a measure of consideration. Television station directors rely on letters sent in by viewers as a guide to audience interests and reactions. (The Moscow station reported receiving more than 56,000 letters in

[9] G. Kazakov, "Finding programs to meet television's voracious needs," *Kommunist*, No. 8, June 1959.

[10] I. Yermakov, "On the screen and behind it," *Leningradskaia pravda*, December 2, 1959.

[11] Kazakov, *op. cit.*

SERVICE WITH A SMILE

—Was it you who called for television repair?

—From *Krokodil* (Moscow), June 20, 1963.



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1958.) This correspondence seems to have some influence on programming, particularly on the planning of what might be called public service programs. The official Soviet survey of television claims, for example, that viewer suggestions prompted the inauguration of programs of instruction in sewing, music, and the care of television sets.[12]

Although official Soviet writings generally claim the existence of a demand among the television audience for more programs on political and ideological matters, actual evidence of such a demand is meager. In 1958, for instance, the Moscow station sponsored two conferences to discuss ways and means of making television programming more interesting, with the participants selected from among viewers who had written letters to the station. Many suggestions for better programming were put forward by the conferees, but significantly only a single individual at each conference recommended more political programs.

The strongest criticisms of Soviet television usually appear in the party press and are frequently directed at the poor quality of programs. "Artistically weak" and "trite" were the terms applied to television productions in a Radio Day editorial in *Pravda,* which charged that "the wealth of possibilities of our television is poorly utilized."[13] Foreign observers have made similar criticisms:

> **When they are not transmitting a film, the Russians are photographing a stage play or a radio lecture or a concert or a dance performance as if the function of the medium was merely to make visible what was previously only heard or read. . . . Everything is taken straightforward and head-on, with no manipulation of angles, or lights, to create fluidity and surprise, no feeling at all of the special idiom of television.[14]**

This general mediocrity can be explained in part by the deficiencies in equipment of most Soviet television studios. Its root cause, however, is the hobbling of creative artistic imagination by the requirement of ideological conformity in everything that is seen or heard by the public. Soviet producers and directors shy away from any attempt at innovation that might invite attack by the authorities or by the party press. This constricted atmosphere may well explain why Soviet television has not attracted the small group of talented film directors who have been involved in the effort to achieve at least a partial restoration of the best traditions of Russian cinematography.

In recent years, the non-Communist world has witnessed the great impact of television on political and social affairs. To what extent will it have a comparable effect on Soviet society? The answer to this question lies shrouded in the mists that envelop any attempt to assess the mass media in a totalitarian regime. However, the subject is one that deserves attention along with others relating to the current rapid pace of change in the Soviet Union.

Problems for the Future

There is, first of all, television's already impressive role as a major mass medium in Soviet society, in terms of both its geographical spread and the size of its human audience. Although there are as yet fewer than ten million sets in use, there is little reason to question the official Soviet claim of a television audience of forty million persons. A great many sets are in public places where the viewing audience can run to a hundred or more persons, and the audience ratio for home receivers is also high. Thus, "the blue screen"—as television is known colloquially—is becoming an increasingly important source of news and entertainment for Soviet citizens, particularly in the larger cities where it has already begun to surpass radio as the leading medium.

One of television's foremost effects will be to give Soviet citizens a greater awareness of their own vast country. Although the unity of the peoples of the USSR has been a perennial propaganda theme since Lenin's day, it has never had as effective a propagator as the television screen, with its ability through film and live transmissions to bring a panorama of the whole nation into workers' clubs and home parlors. Television should prove an influential force in this regard, particularly when the transcontinental relay link is completed in a few years.

In the coming years, it is also possible that Soviet television viewers may be permitted more frequent glimpses of the world beyond Communist borders. Although the regime can be expected to exercise careful control over the pace of television exchanges with non-Communist countries, the fact that it has already set in motion a number of such projects may be a hopeful sign. The most significant of these projects is the developing plan for cooperation with Western Europe's Eurovision network.[15] Similar US-Soviet plans, origi-

[12] Kaftanov, *op. cit.*, p. 137.

[13] *Pravda,* May 7, 1959.

[14] Marya Mannes, "A Word from our sponsor—the Kremlin," *New York Times Magazine,* March 5, 1961.

[15] In July 1963, a special agreement covering a wide variety of program exchanges was concluded between the British Broadcasting Corporation and the USSR State Committee on Radio and Television.

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nally agreed to in 1958, have languished, but in December 1962 the two countries signed an agreement providing for joint experimentation in space communications. A logical step in the implementation of this agreement would be the inauguration of television exchanges via satellites. Finally, there are the intriguing possibilities inherent in a plan put forward by American scientists in 1961 for a space communications satellite with a television transmitter powerful enough to beam programs from any part of the world directly to receivers in the Soviet Union or any other country.[16]

THE MOST INTERESTING aspect of television in the USSR is perhaps its increasingly important role as a link between the Soviet rulers and the ruled. The rapid expansion of television facilities indicates that the regime has decided to make it a major instrument of ideological indoctrination. However, the available evidence suggests that, in fact, party leaders are still not fully exploiting the medium. They have not ignored it; on the other hand, they have not accorded it a crucial role in their propaganda strategy.

In large part, this is due to the traditional Soviet belief in the primacy of the press as an ideological and agitational weapon. Although television addresses itself to more people on any given day than all the daily newspapers combined, it is difficult to imagine the director of the Soviet television network participating in the party's inner circle as so many *Pravda* editors have done in the past. The view that television is not to originate but merely to repeat what has already been said by the press and the local party agitator has been deplored in a revealing statement by a Soviet television official:

Television has not always found support with everyone nor has it been properly appreciated by everyone. . . . It is sometimes considered more important to issue a small pamphlet in 10,000 to 15,000 copies than to televise a program on the same topic. There are those who feel that delivering a lecture on television is not particularly important, that it is a far more responsible task to speak in a hall that accommodates 300 to 500 persons. After all, you can count the number in attendance and the number of questions asked. It seems somehow not the thing to do, after a television lecture, to write that it was heard by six to eight million people and that hundreds of questions were asked in various places, sometimes in letters sent scores and hundreds of kilometers.[17]

There is much here that explains the wariness with which party officials seem to regard television. Reliance on personal contact, on being able to answer the question directly, is an important part of the old-line pattern of Soviet propaganda and agitation. Television eliminates this element: it can be controlled at its source, but not in the millions of homes and clubs where it is received. The guiding hand of the Agitprop organizer is not present to lead the discussion and to resolve hesitations. This is a psychological weakness in the view of the old-line party bureaucrat who has had it drilled into him that the goal of propaganda and agitation is to eliminate any possible doubts about current socialist reality.

The officials' fear that television may get out of hand ideologically has yet to be justified: not even during the most turbulent intellectual controversies that have rocked Soviet cultural life since the death of Stalin has television played anything but a passive and obedient role. Yet this is not to say that it does not pose an ideological threat to the regime. Its propaganda value may be considerable—but so, too, may be its potential as a faithful mirror of everyday reality. It is this quality, potentially threatening the very foundations of Soviet ideology, that will no doubt impel the party to persevere in its efforts to confine television's function largely to that of just another transmission belt of cut-and-dried ideas and emotions.

[16] *New York Times*, November 7, 1961.

[17] Kazakov, *op. cit.*

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Five Views of Soviet Reality

Rapport fra Sovjet, by Jahn Otto Johansen. Oslo, Aschehong, 1963.
Die Russen sind anders: Mensch und Gesellschaft im Sowjetstaat, by Günther Specovius. Duesseldorf and Vienna, 1963.
Russian Panorama, by Kumar P. S. Menon. Bombay, Oxford University Press, 1962.
Neue Wege Sowjetischer Bildung und Wissenschaft: Methodische und organisatorische Probleme, by Arnold Buchholz. Cologne, Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1963.
The New Face of Soviet Totalitarianism, by Adam B. Ulam. Cambridge, Harvard Univ. Press, 1963.

Reviewed by Robert V. Daniels

ONE OF THE MORE ENLIGHTENING propositions of Marxian sociology—not fully appreciated by the dogmatists of Leninism—is the concept of tension between social base and political superstructure, as the economic and social relationships of a society evolve and outgrow a system of political authority and doctrine which can only fight a rear-guard action against the forces of history. With a little imagination it is not hard to apply this analysis to the self-styled Marxist society of Soviet Russia today. More and more observers of the Soviet scene, whatever their particular standpoint, have been underscoring the paradoxical picture of a society experiencing manifold economic and cultural development but frozen politically by a system of dictatorial rule that has so far successfully resisted all pressures to alter its own fundamentals.

There is a substantial school of thought—neo-Marxist, it might be called—which holds that the leaping strides of economic and educational progress in the USSR are bound to undermine the Communist Party dictatorship and bring about a trend toward individual freedom and liberal democracy. Such a prognosis has been expressed by people as different as Issac Deutscher and Allen Dulles. Unfortunately, this position is dubious in the extreme. In the first place, the Marxist law of political response to economic change may not be an axiomatic truth. In the second place, even if industrialism does have natural political consequences, there is room for doubt that these lie in the direction of unqualified liberalism. "Germany under Hitler," notes Günther Specovius, "was more than enough proof that the pursuit of ideological goals by a totalitarian regime, and a highly developed industrial society, are not mutually exclusive." The plain historical fact, often overlooked by modern optimists, is that individual freedom and liberal democracy in their highest Anglo-American form are the fruit not of industrialism but of pre-industrial commercial society. Industrialism, with its premium on complex organization, specialization, discipline, and authority, is more likely to undermine freedom than to promote it. This seems particularly true where, as in Russia and points East, the pre-industrial development of freedom was weak and industrialization itself is pursued with special rapidity.

We would probably understand Soviet communism better if we freed ourselves altogether from the 19th-century premise that politics depends on economics.

Mr. Daniels is Professor of History at the University of Vermont (Burlington, Vt.) and has written extensively on the evolution of Soviet and international communism. His books include The Nature of Communism *(New York, Random House, 1962) and* The Conscience of the Revolution: The Communist Opposition in Soviet Russia *(Harvard University Press, 1960).*

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History offers suggestions enough that a political system can remain intact for a long time even when it is socially and economically archaic. West European feudalism perpetuated itself for centuries after its original military functions of defense had been outlived. The Communist bureaucracy may do the same. We might, in fact, consider the possible validity of political determinism in history, where the given system of political power shapes and directs social and economic change to its own benefit. The 19th-century picture of governments reflecting the interplay of economic forces may be valid only within the context of a particular political structure—the liberal one. Under modern totalitarianism, there is great reason to doubt that the old axioms hold up.

Of course, a real assessment of Soviet political and social change can only be made by empirical study, to weigh the realities and prospects of change on the one hand within society and on the other within the political system. The progress of industry, technology, and education in the Soviet Union has been examined by many perspicacious observers, of whom the authors under review here are all notable representatives. All of these five have devoted a major portion of their attention to the question of new social forces and new thinking in relation to the old political structure and its old ideology. Despite the diversity in their national backgrounds and points of emphasis, there is a pronounced pessimistic consistency in their final evaluation.

THREE OF THE BOOKS considered here are reports by traveler-observers, all with long or repeated first-hand experience in the Soviet Union, each addressing his national audience with a wide-ranging description of Soviet life. Two of the authors—the Norwegian Johansen and the German Specovius—are remarkably alike, both in their background as talented journalists of the post-World War II generation and in the style of their undogmatic probes into the realities of Soviet life.

Jahn Otto Johansen is the roving foreign correspondent of the Oslo daily *Morgenposten,* as well as a trained political scientist. His brief "Report" derives from several extended stays in the USSR since 1960, and from his remarkable capacity to mingle with Russians and sample their opinion. Much of the prevailing Western view of Soviet society is underscored in Johansen's close-up—the change in the younger generation, revolting mainly against boredom, and the vacillations of the leadership, hesitant to relax but desirous of popularity. Ideology is losing its vitality, the revolutionary spirit is waning—but, Johansen cautions, there remains an element of unyielding, quasi-religious dogmatism in the party's thinking that makes it ready to risk intellectual sterility for the sake of keeping control. On the other hand, control now takes odd forms. Johansen reports the existence of a secret edition of *Dr. Zhivago* printed by the Soviet authorities for the preparation of their own spokesmen.

Günther Specovius is a native of Hamburg who writes for *Die Zeit* and has made himself a Soviet expert through four years of steady labor on the truly enclycopedic volume which he has just completed. He combines historical background, present detail, and personal experience in a masterful topical exposition of the social, political, economic and cultural life of the Russians. Like Johansen he recognizes a "change in style" of the Soviet dictatorship and a measure of widened intellectual freedom, but no change at all in the political fundamentals. If anything, the situation may be intellectually worse because of the Khrushchev regime's disposition to utilize massive ideological persuasion in preference to the more purely bureaucratic controls and terror of Stalinism.

That the German's matter-of-fact and detached approach so closely parallels the Norwegian's is perhaps testimony to the extent to which North Atlantic pragmatism is finally percolating into the quondam romantic land of Hegel, Nietzsche, and Hitler. Arnold Buchholz's specialist summary on Soviet education is no less sound in approach, and in fact the entire West German contribution to sovietology is as a whole a monument to rational and objective social science. It is rather left to the Indian Ambassador to sustain in some measure the romantic image of heroic Soviet achievement.

KUMAR P. S. MENON is a career civil servant who served as India's Ambassador to Moscow from 1952 to 1961, with concurrent accreditation to Warsaw and Budapest. His *Russian Panorama* he describes as "a travelogue and not a political memoir," from which his political observations are largely excluded. Menon prefers a human approach: "By training and temperament, I am enthralled by the beauty and history of the places I visit and the charm and oddities of the people I meet rather than by the statistics and indices of production and distribution."

Writing with a poetic literary gift, Menon organizes his experiences geographically, to give his readers a series of vivid descriptions of every major Soviet region. He is interested in local color and enthusiastic over admirable accomplishments: buildings, climate, theater,

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literacy, are all matters for marvel or praise. The achievement of nearly universal literacy, even in Central Asia, offers to Menon a striking contrast with his own country under British rule.

The fact that Menon is not especially concerned here with political criticism (except in his passages on Hungary) makes some of his passing comments all the more striking. Soviet trains fail to move as fast as the Indian; "medicines were good and cheap, but wrapped in paper packages of which an Indian village astrologer-physician would be ashamed." In a wide range of services, amenities, and consumer goods supplies, the representative of underdeveloped India is startled by Soviet backwardness. Political indoctrination enters briefly in Menon's account of how Radio Moscow instructs its audience in such culturally elevating subjects as the art of handshaking: "Thus the Moscow radio strives hard to make a Soviet citizen a better man and a stauncher Communist. Whether it actually does so or whether its paternalist propaganda drives a man to join the ranks of Nibonichos—a term coined to denote those who care for neither God nor Devil (*ni bog ni chort*)—is a question which I cannot answer."

A VERY DIFFERENT BOOK from the three travelers' descriptions, but nonetheless paralleling some of their conclusions, is the brief new survey of Soviet education and scientific activity by Arnold Buchholz. Buchholz has been following developments in this area for many years, and here brings his work up to date with particular attention to the 1958 reforms of education and the reorganization of the administration of scientific research in 1961. Essentially the same problem underlay these two moves, and it is reflected in the other works under review as well: How can the Soviet regime obtain the maximum advantage of a technologically trained society, and at the same time avoid the menace of independent thought, the danger of learning and inquiry that develop an autonomy of their own? Khrushchev's answer to this problem is to bury learners and scholars in the practical application of knowledge; to immerse school children in the "polytechnic" experience that it is hoped will erase the traditional Russian barrier between thinking and working; and to guide research, under the firm hand of the new "State Committee for the Coordination of Scientific Research," along the paths of maximum practical application and minimum unessential speculation. At the risk of intellectual stagnation, the state's bureaucratic controls over learning and education are not only kept intact but grow ever more complex.

ALL OF THE various steps—concessions, demands, inducements—taken by the Khrushchev regime in the sphere of thought and everyday life are summed up in Adam Ulam's collection of articles as the "new face" of Soviet totalitarianism. Professor Ulam, of the Harvard Department of Government, is well known to readers of *Problems of Communism*. In this series of enlightening essays on the nature of the Soviet system, published at various times since the advent of Khrushchev, Ulam works out one of the few satisfying interpretations of the actual meaning of Marxism. He proceeds on this basis to show why the Soviet regime is compelled to maintain the controls so lamented by the other commentators mentioned here.

Marxism, Ulam argues, was originally one form of what he holds to be the characteristically "anarchist" response to the beginnings of industrialization anywhere. As such, Marxism is most attractive in developing countries at an early stage of the industrial revolution, and this is why Marxists won control in Russia and China. The trouble comes once the Marxists are in power—they absorb the responsibilities of national power-politics and industrialization, and convert their ideology into an instrument and justification of totalitarian rule in the pursuit of those responsibilities. They must have education and production, but they can tolerate none of the freedom that would facilitate either of these goals, for then the essentially meaningless "shell" of the ruling ideology would become transparent. The more the country progresses, the less meaning the ideology has, and the harder the party must work to keep its justifications intact.

In his last two essays, here published for the first time, Ulam goes into the most recent problems of the Soviet ideologists—the campaign against "revisionism," the problems of destalinization at the 22nd Party Congress, and the impact of the Sino-Soviet split. It is certain that the open Chinese-Soviet break of June and July 1963 has come as no surprise to him, for he makes it clear that nothing is less tolerable to the Soviet leadership than any challenge from within the movement that threatens the brittle doctrinal authority.

There is no disagreement among any of the commentators reviewed here on the reality of the post-Stalin "thaw" and the change in the methods of rule under Khrushchev. As an unnamed Russian told Johansen about the regulation of art: "Under Stalin they sent the painters to Siberia. Today, at the worst, it is their pictures that are sent there." By ruling less tightly, however, Khrushchev may actually rule more firmly. There are no signs of the party dictatorship being undermined by any of the limited concessions that have been made.

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Soviet ideology is emotionally dull and logically weak, but Soviet bureaucratic controls over public thought and expression have lost little of their effectiveness.

Yet in looking toward the indefinable future, it might be wise to keep in mind the ultimate consequences of an earlier intellectual "thaw" that commenced in the gloomy days of the Iron Tsar Nicholas I. One can only conclude that it would indeed be something new in history if the Communist Party dictatorship were to succeed in perpetuating its control over all the effects of the economic and cultural changes which it has imposed upon the Soviet peoples.

Creative Imagination in the Soviet State

From Gorky to Pasternak: Six Writers in Soviet Russia,
by Helen Muchnic.
New York, Random House, 1961.

The Cult of Optimism,
by Walter N. Vickery.
Bloomington, Ind., Indiana University Press, 1962.

A History of Soviet Literature,
By Vera Alexandrova.
New York, Doubleday, 1963.

Reviewed by George Gibian

HISTORIANS OF 20TH-CENTURY Russian literature generally face the problem of how to narrow this subject to manageable size. Some have overcome the difficulty by restricting themselves to a single theme cutting through the body of Soviet literature—such as the model character, studied by Rufus Mathewson in his excellent book, *The Positive Hero in Russian Literature;* others have written about the literary politics of a given period (Harold Swayze, *Political Control of Literature in the USSR, 1946-1959*) or the drama in a chosen year (Norris Houghton, first in *Moscow Rehearsals,* and again, more recently, in *Return Engagement*). Still another approach is represented by works which concentrate on a small number of authors. Thus Ernest Simmons, in his *Russian Fiction and Soviet Ideology,* has given us a comprehensive account of the lives and major works of three writers—Leonid Leonov, Mikhail Sholokhov, and Konstantin Fedin.

This last method is outwardly closest to that employed by Miss Muchnic, who discusses in the six chapters of her book—each of which is a substantial independent study—six major Russian writers of this century: Blok, Mayakovsky, Gorky, Leonov, Sholokhov, and Pasternak. She limits her subject further by focusing throughout her study on the conflict between the individual writer's creative vision and the demands made upon him by the ruling political elite; where no such conflict took place—the writer having embraced the official social cause—Miss Muchnic examines the effect of such political participation on the individual's creativity.

The author subscribes to no single critical approach, but utilizes whatever method seems most appropriate in the context of the question she is investigating. She gives the salient points of a writer's life when they are relevant to his production as an artist; there are excellent *explications de texte;* occasionally she brings to bear her deep knowledge of French, German, and English literature in order to offer insights which only comparative literature can yield (as in her pages on Russian and Western Symbolism.)

Miss Muchnic's book is an eclectic and undoctrinaire work about the fates of writers working under the supervision of a totalitarian party bent on changing the nature of society in Russia. It is written with the general reader, not the specialist, in mind. Accordingly, the author's method is to begin with elementary facts and ideas, presuming no knowledge whatever on the part of the reader, and then, having prepared the

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ground, to find her way to more and more complex analyses. Particularly in her two best chapters (on Blok and Pasternak), her sophistication and literary insights leave most existing studies of Russian literature far behind.

Two of the six writers whom Miss Muchnic studies, Maxim Gorky and Leonid Leonov, devoted themselves to the service of the Communist cause and, in the author's opinion, failed to produce works of high merit, although she exempts from her condemnation Gorky's autobiography, his reminiscences of Tolstoy and Chekhov, and some early stories. His novels, she concludes, are verbose, boring, and deficient in the *sine qua non* of a novelist—an understanding of human psychology. Gorky's own admissions of his shortcomings are touching. He confessed in a letter to Romain Rolland in 1933: "I have written ponderously in the extreme, tediously, and altogether—badly." It is ironic that Gorky, a well-intentioned humanitarian, should have been "prevented from making the most of his unquestionable gift by his very zeal for men."

The author has particular contempt for the "solemn commonplaces" of Leonid Leonov's opinions. His novels show "a progressive relinquishment of the personal vision, of independent speculation. . . . If one sees him as having been persuaded by the enticement of a popular philosophy to reverse his views and interests, one is also bound to recognize that what he gave up never constituted that imperative necessity which rules genuine artists." These are harsh words. Max Hayward, in his introduction to *Dissonant Voices in Soviet Literature* (New York, 1962), takes a different view, suggesting that Leonov, "undoubtedly motivated by a feeling of duty towards his generation," may have been "intrigued by the special problems of writing within the cramped confines of socialist realism and . . . may well have regarded his work in these conditions as a kind of *podvig* (spiritual feat) in the Russian Orthodox tradition. . . . Not everybody could enjoy the relative luxury of silence."

In any case, Vladimir Mayakovsky, who also tried to serve "the Revolution" as best he could, had more to lose than Leonov. He himself wrote that he "stepped on the throat of his own song," striving in the 1920's to suppress the elegiac impulse in him that demanded expression and substituting instead simple paeans to Soviet ideals. His service to the political cause resulted in some good poems, but in the end Mayakovsky "made himself a tragic hero; and endowed literature with the eloquent utterance of his pain and his will." His efforts to write the poetry which "the age demanded" were only partly successful. His occasional lyrical, personal poems of the 1920's (*e.g.*, "Letter to Comrade Kostrov About the Nature of Love" and "About what? About this?"), and the lines composed before his suicide in 1930 remain his most valuable achievements.

PROFESSOR VICKERY'S *The Cult of Optimism* is in many ways the antithesis to Miss Muchnic's book. While she deals at length with six major authors spanning the entire era of Soviet rule, Vickery has studied the works of a large number of writers published mainly in the years 1946 to 1958. And while Miss Muchnic concerns herself with works of literature in their totality, including questions of structure, content and artistic achievement, Professor Vickery has delved primarily into the attitudes expressed in the writings and the cobweb of literary politics that conditioned their appearance. *The Cult of Optimism* is thus the latest available survey of the Soviet literary situation from the end of World War II, through the repressive era of "Zhdanovism," the Thaw and the year 1956, to the seesaw developments of the years that followed the Hungarian Revolution.

The books discussed by Professor Vickery include Ehrenburg's *Thaw,* Dudintsev's *Not By Bread Alone,* the stories of Granin and Yashin, Pogodin's *Petrarch's Sonnet,* and other writings representing the period. Most of this literature has already been discussed elsewhere, including the anthology, *The Year of Protest,* edited by Professor McLean and Professor Vickery himself. In fact, whole parts of *The Cult of Optimism* read like the introductory sections, in extended form, of *The Year of Protest*. The greatest value of the later book seems to lie in the fifth chapter, which traces the literary debates of the years from 1955 to 1957, and in some of the concluding points in the two final chapters. The author shows convincingly the deleterious effects on writers of the official insistence on a facile optimism (the point of the title of the book), and in an interesting aside he suggests that some of the intellectuals who turn away from the party may gravitate towards a cult of the people (*narod*) reminiscent of 19th-century Russian populism. Quite rightly, he also pinpoints lightness and humor as a significant new element in the literature of the Thaw.

Unfortunately, the book is marred by an occasional donnish excess of caution, which leads the author to qualify or balance his assertions to the point of depriving them of all but platitudinous import: "My own view is that every society and nation, and sometimes even a locality, does tend to breed its own brand of vice and virtue but that no social order, however allegedly advanced, is likely to succeed totally in eradicating human frailty" (p. 120). What started out as a prom-

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ising remark ends in a disappointing generality. Nevertheless, apart from such academic hedging and an occasional failure to define terms (*e.g.,* "Stalinism," or "healthiness" which the author invokes on pp. 11, 76, and 168 as a literary criterion), Professor Vickery's is as good an analysis of Soviet literary politics and theory as one could wish for.

However, now that we have his study, in addition to Swayze's *Political Control of Literature in the USSR, 1946-1959* (which to a great extent overlaps Vickery's book) and various earlier works, a moratorium could perhaps be declared on books about Soviet literature as non-literature. On page 154, Professor Vickery states:

Apart from such writers as Pogodin and Yevtushenko, who state explicitly in their works that life is complicated and many-sided, there are many who try to convey this same impression *by their handling of characters and plots. But this is a literary phenomenon that lies outside the scope of the present inquiry.* (Italics added.)

Is not this admission, however, also an admission of failure? It is a great virtue of Miss Muchnic's book that she does include "literary phenomena" within her province, for their omission may imperil the validity of those discussions that concentrate on Soviet literary politics and theory. It may well be in the very "handling of characters and plots," in narrative devices, in tone, point of view, language and style that the essence of Soviet literature will be sought and found by future critics.

Upon a recent rereading, this reviewer has found the major works discussed in Professor Vickery's books far more monotonous than they seemed at the time of publication and incredibly dated after roughly a decade since their composition. Most of them share certain common characteristics: they are topical, and ephemeral. Indeed, they lack that "handling of characters and plots" which imparts to a literary work permanent quality. There are, on the other hand, works written in the late 1950's which, it now seems, will not be so quickly eliminated from living literature—stories, for instance, by Kazakov, Nagibin (the personal Nagibin, not the story-*à-thèse* author of *Light in the Window*) and Aksionov—to mention only prose writers. Their emergence may become the significant event of Soviet literature in the late 1950's; and no inquiry which leaves literary phenomena outside its scope will bring us to their doorstep.

STUDENTS INTERESTED IN RUSSIA have long been in deep debt to Vera Alexandrova. Her articles appearing almost every month in the New York *Sotsialisticheskii vestnik* (Socialist Courier) have regularly called attention to whatever of significance was happening in Soviet literature. Miss Alexandrova seems to read everything that is published in the USSR, and in her articles she unfailingly puts her finger on the crucial paragraphs and dialogues of the writings she reviews. Many interesting novels, plays and poems, over which no noisy controversy arose in the Soviet press, might have gone unnoticed and unstudied outside the USSR if Vera Alexandrova, with her unerring eye for the important, had not referred us to them in her reports.

For a long time, this reviewer and others have been wishing that a publisher would translate a selection of Alexandrova's columns (perhaps with some additional connective material) and publish them as a book for the benefit of those who do not read Russian and cannot profit directly from her articles in *Sotsialisticheski vestnik*. Instead we now have *A History of Soviet Literature: 1917-1962.*

We should be grateful for small favors, but I believe we ought, in this case, to ask for more. Vera Alexandrova's unique contribution lies in her encyclopedic grasp of current Soviet writing. The present book, however, is largely devoted to a survey of Soviet literature from the Revolution onwards. Moreover, instead of giving the English-speaking reader the benefit of Alexandrova's analytic gifts, the book is aimed at an audience on an elementary level: it is a survey, a series of summaries accompanied by simple comments. Of the twenty-four chapters that make up the book, four deal with general developments, one with a group of three writers, and the other nineteen with individual writers—a strangely biographic, reference-book arrangement. Little is added to our knowledge of the major authors (Mayakovsky, Babel, Sholokhov, Blok), who have been discussed at length by other critics. There are only three skimpy pages on *Doctor Zhivago;* Mandelshtam's name is referred to three times, but there is no discussion of his work at all (!). For lack of adequate critical analysis, all of the writers discussed in the book merge into a grey sameness. Is it too much to hope that the publisher will make it possible for Vera Alexandrova to follow this volume with another in which she might concentrate on the literature of the past ten or fifteen years and address an audience of a somewhat higher level?

There are, nevertheless, a few chapters in her *History* which are a genuine contribution. For example, there is an excellent twelve-page chapter (reprinted from *Mosty,* No. 2, 1958) on Paustovski, the author of romantic, haunting stories beloved by millions of Soviet

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readers, who in Gleb Struve's history of Soviet literature is relegated to a brief footnote, and in Marc Slonim's to a paragraph. Also valuable are the chapters dealing with Soviet literature since World War II. Finally, there is a very useful, up-to-date list of Soviet works published in English translations.

ALL THREE BOOKS raise questions about the future. Have circumstances in Soviet Russia changed sufficiently in the last few years to enable Soviet writers to fulfill their artistic potentialities? In our age, regardless of the quite different correlations of art and freedom in previous centuries, writing can become literary art only if a talented writer is free to express an individual view of life. Some of the younger Soviet writers in the late 1950's bear witness that unstereotyped literature is again possible. Recent stories by Vasily Aksionov mingle the fantastic and realistic, make rapid switches of tone, and use the gamut of a narrator's tones of voice. They also excel in freshness of language. Stories by Yuri Kazakov and verse by a whole group of poets similarly indicate that at least in a limited segment of Soviet literary life, despite the recent fulminations of Khrushchev and Ilichev, a renascence of the imagination is taking place.

How the Soviets Fought the War

The Soviet History of World War II: Myths, Memories and Realities,
By Matthew P. Gallagher.
New York, London, F. A. Praeger, 1963.

The Siege of Leningrad, by Leon Gouré.
Stanford, Calif., Stanford University Press;
London, Oxford University Press, 1962.

Reviewed by John Erickson

THE SECOND WORLD WAR, writes Marshal A. I. Yeremenko in his study of "falsified histories," *False Witnesses,* "has left an indelible impression upon the minds of men." The statement reverberates with the obvious, but the platitude is not misplaced. Soldiers turn historian; the historian is in turn mobilized to fight out new battles of words and opinions, serving a variety of causes from salvaged personal honor to national or ideological justification. The miseries and the costly triumphs are rolled out again, inspected and dissected.

Mr. Erickson, of the Department of Government at the University of Manchester, England, has long specialized in Soviet military history. His The Soviet High Command, 1918-1941 *was published by St. Martin's Press, New York, in 1962.*

Vast and engulfing as the Second World War was, and wide-flung as the subsequent literary effort has been, one sector which has persistently gripped the imagination—the Soviet-German or "Great Patriotic War"—has received only marginal academic attention. The soldiers, principally German, have had their say. When the Russians complain that this is *ipso facto* "falsification," and reliance upon these sources merely the compounding of an intellectual and political felony, the reaction is to point to the nature of the Soviet sources. That this is too unsophisticated a response has been admirably demonstrated by Mr. Gallagher in his excellent study of how "indelible" the Soviet experience and retrospect of war have been.

Mr. Gallagher first clears the ground; his study is not concerned primarily with historiography or military history, but with the "psychological and emotional conflicts generated within Soviet society by the mendacious account of the war . . . in Soviet postwar propaganda." He is concerned with the work of the professional military, the historian and the writer; his preoccupation is with the reaction, in varying degrees of contrivance, to military-political fact and propaganda fiction.

In his brief preliminary survey of the operational and command aspect of the Great Patriotic War, Mr. Gallagher comes to grips almost at once with the problem of Stalin's role as a war leader. The postwar adula-

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tion which crusted Stalin's name with the glitter of military genius, and Khrushchev's bitter and scathing denunciation of Stalin in 1956, represent two extremes. The reality Mr. Gallagher sees as something in-between. Certainly Stalin's leadership record was blotchy, although the author perhaps is a mite cautious in estimating Stalin's part in the direction of military operations. During some recent conversations in Moscow with senior Soviet commanders, this reviewer had occasion to verify that Stalin kept firm hold—through direct-link telephone calls—over the critical points or phases of operations, the *Stavka* (General Headquarters) directives to the front command then incorporating his particular decisions or vetoes. Over the final stages of the war in Germany, Stalin watched with unrelenting attention, imposing his decisions as he saw fit.

The "postwar official line" on wartime events Mr. Gallagher views as one of the most audacious enterprises of the Soviet propaganda machine to smother reality. A concatenation of initial defeats in 1941-42 was transformed into a wealth of strategic insight on the part of the Soviet leadership (Stalin). The Soviet military command was bowed rapidly off the stage. The wartime alliance and erstwhile allies were pulverized out of recognition. Historian (Tarlé) and writer (Fadeyev) were made to bend their truths. In a well-documented survey, Mr. Gallagher shows how the military historians, while never wholly abandoning professional judgment, "played a key role" in establishing the military concepts of the "official version" of the war. The professional historians were prevented from undertaking a history of the war as such (in spite of their anticipation), and were confined to a form of diplomatic history.

In the post-Stalin period, new patterns emerged; here Dr. Gallagher mobilizes no small quantity of sources to trace the relative positions of military historian, historian and writer. The historians broke out of their restricted area, the military specialists thoroughly revised the military concepts that had held sway (though not without head-on clashes), and the writers exploited "the year of truth."

There is abundant evidence in this invaluable and and fascinating study that "professional orientation" (in all three groups) prompted visible resistance to the distortion of war history. Thus the grim Stalinist absurdities not only failed in their prime purpose, but themselves generated tensions which are a part of the post-Stalin writing. Mr. Gallagher might have made more of his vital point that the "moral aspect," the "personal, secret conscience" worked to maintain the indelibility of experience. The military have sought to salvage their honor, although a very new phase is the recapitulation of inter-command feuds involving not only Stalin.

In all, *The Soviet History of World War II,* with its precision and insight, has opened up a little known sector of Soviet professional and intellectual turmoil.

LEON GOURE'S ACCOUNT of the siege of Leningrad is similarly a pioneering work which breaks new ground. His detailed comparative documentation from Soviet and German sources is rare in histories of operations in the war, and he also has turned up much original material. Soviet historiography (with but a few recent exceptions) has failed to render justice to the siege, not by distortion but by simple repression. For the 900-day siege of the city is a remarkable episode, made all the more singular since it had been envisaged by neither side.

The author, understandably eager to proceed to the center of his narrative in Leningrad itself, devotes rather less space than might be expected to the initial phase of the disaster to Soviet arms and plans. The lack of preparation for a "siege" had its roots in the Soviet notion that the main threat would come from the north; the idea that the Baltic Special Military District would crumble and expose the southwesterly approach was never entertained. By the same analogy, the Black Sea naval bases lacked defenses on the landward side. Like Leningrad, Odessa had to improvise a defense where the threat was most real. Mr. Gouré provides an excellent picture of how Leningrad responded first to war and then to the rapidly developing danger from the speedy German columns. One possibly decisive factor in the city's successful resistance was the fact that the Leningrad leadership retained full control over the populace, despite nervousness and grumbling. This respect for the authorities was carefully fostered through NKVD agencies and wartime regulations, but patriotism also played its part.

Mr. Gouré has in effect separated his military narrative from that concerned with the organization of the city for siege warfare. This arrangement of the material does mean some break in the early part of the history, but it confers the major advantage that the author is able to concentrate on the successive phases of Leningrad's grim existence. The German failure to take Leningrad in the autumn of 1941 he plainly attributes to Hitler's personal decision (although he carefully weighs such other factors as the increasingly stubborn resistance of Soviet troops, German knowledge of the Soviet intention to offer fanatic resistance against any attempt to take the city, and the importance of Mannerheim's disinclination to join in "the Leningrad

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attack"). Ghastly as was the sacrifice of the Russian "militia" formations *(opolchenie),* and Mr. Gouré demonstrates with what prodigality in human life the defense of Leningrad was shored up, the German attacks were blunted. Soviet improvisation in Leningrad, like that of the British in 1940, was not an unmitigated success; but Mr. Gouré never fails to distinguish between the limitations of a particular policy and the manner in which the leadership managed to retain control.

The German failure to get within medium-artillery range, the lack of depth to the blockade on the eastern side, the "Oranienbaum bridgehead," the gap between Army Group North and the Finns, and the tenuous contact between Leningrad and Soviet territory (via Lake Ladoga) are what Mr. Gouré very properly distinguishes as the operational conditions of the siege. Clamped uneasily and then precariously within this ring, Leningrad was to defy German expectation that it would die a natural if horrible death. How horrible the process of survival was, and how inviting death might have been under these conditions, Mr. Gouré depicts in his chapter "The Dying City." The Red Army failed early in 1942 to break in; Hitler's anticipations of the demise of Leningrad failed to materialize. By the autumn of 1942, Leningrad began to show that it was in "fairly good condition to withstand the siege until . . . January 1944."

There is hardly an aspect of Leningrad life which Mr. Gouré does not probe and weigh. He is judicious in his use of "deserter material," and carefully balances internal against external evidence of siege conditions. He shows that in the last analysis the survival pattern was built on the elements of "firm leadership," "habits of disciplined behavior" and patriotism, a peculiar Leningrad compound that was manifestly lacking in other parts of the Soviet Union under stress. Beyond these basic factors, there is great difficulty in assessing which measure or what instrument of control was of decisive importance. In the crucial matter of food, the Ladoga "Ice road" undoubtedly saved the city from "total collapse." And the intricacies of geography were of no mean significance.

Mr. Gouré has produced a unique and searching study of a sector of Soviet society at war in its own peculiar conditions. The 900 days showed that, like London, "Leningrad could take it." While this was an expression of pride, it was also a recognition, grudging and numb on the popular side, that there was no alternative.

Shadow Play in Indonesia

Indonesian Communism: A History,
by Arnold C. Brackman.
New York, F. A. Praeger, 1963.

Reviewed by Martin Ebon

MOSCOW AND PEKING have cast competing shadows over the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) for a number of years, in fact from long before the current rivalries between the Soviet and Chinese Communists became open and flagrant. Various factors have contributed to this special situation: in particular, the presence of an active Chinese minority in Indonesia and within its Communist movement; the fact that the Indonesian Communist leadership includes in its ranks both men with Soviet training and others who more recently have spent time in Communist China; and finally the geographic position of the Indonesian archipelago, which by modern communications is about equally remote from the Soviet Union and China, and which shares no continental border with the latter (as do Korea, Viet Nam, Burma, and India).

In tracing the development of Indonesian communism, Arnold C. Brackman combines the scholarly care

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of a historian with the readable style of a professional writer. He has covered Southeast Asia for the United Press, the *Christian Science Monitor,* the *New York Times, The Economist,* and other newspapers and periodicals. As a historian he relies heavily on printed source material, but as a journalist he supplements and enlivens it with on-the-scene observations and personal interviews.

Mr. Brackman's volume presents a detailed historical account of the Indonesian Communist movement spanning four decades, yet also manages to untangle several major strands in its development. Most importantly, the author brings out the cynical opportunism of the PKI's gyrating tactics designed to exploit nationalistic and anti-colonial fervor while actually opposing or contemptuously tolerating the "bourgeois nationalist" leaders and groups. Brackman is severely critical of the past policies pursued by the Netherlands towards anti-Communist Indonesian nationalists. At the same time, he believes that President Sukarno has failed to live up to the hopes of his supporters at home and abroad, and that his policy of trying to use the Communists politically has actually redounded to the benefit of the PKI, which has gained much by paying lip service to Sukarno whenever it suited the party's political purposes.

Brackman traces the dizzying shifts in the party's tactics, its blunders and opportunities, its lows and highs. He also supplies the reader with ample background information, making his book a valuable primer on Indonesian affairs in general. The author describes the abortive "Madiun rebellion" of 1948, which some Indonesian Communist leaders had obviously hoped to turn into an indigenous October Revolution, but which was premature, ill-prepared and lacking in popular support. He leads the reader expertly through the labyrinth of internal party politics, provides biographic information regarding the party leaders, narrates the fate of the PKI's shifting political alliances, and shows how the party has grown within a decade from 7,910 to 2 million members.

THE PKI'S RELATIONS with Peking are necessarily influenced by the fact that Indonesia's Chinese population (including Indonesian citizens of Chinese ethnic origin as well as China-born aliens) has contributed much to the party's own leadership and organization. Ethnic pressures have, however, often been anti-Chinese in nature since Indonesia, like other South Asian countries, retains strong sentiments of fear in relation to Asia's "Colossus of the North." In view of these complex currents, it is not surprising that the Moscow-Peking conflict has engendered an internal division within the PKI which remains of paramount importance. This explains the party's seemingly contradictory, or at least carefully balanced, statements on Albania, Red China's invasion of India, and "peaceful coexistence."

With all the attention he devotes to the historic foundations of the PKI, Brackman has written a book that is also extraordinarily timely. He deals extensively with the emergence and current position of Party Secretary-General Dipa Nusantara Aidit, whose tactical skills have enabled the PKI to tread an opportunistic political tightrope at home while preserving a delicate external balance between homage to Moscow and conciliation of Peking in certain matters of tactics and slogans. Last spring emissaries from both Moscow and Peking visited Indonesia in quick succession: Soviet Defense Minister Rodion Malinovsky and Red China's second-ranking leader, Liu Shao-ch'i. Much like President Sukarno himself, Indonesia's Communists speak in terms of extravagant praise for both Peking and Moscow. Financial and other forms of support would appear to come to the PKI from both rival centers in the struggle for worldwide Communist allegiance. In the light of Brackman's findings, it seems unlikely that the Chinese Communists will be able to establish over the Indonesian Communists the kind of hegemony that they appear to have achieved in North Korea.

In spite of the PKI's current slogans stressing nationalist and anti-"neocolonialist" aims, Brackman's book provides overwhelming evidence that this outward posture is purely tactical. Even when the party wavers between Moscow and Peking, it remains a disciplined outpost of world communism, ready to adopt any tactic that will serve its objective of gaining power.

In conclusion, the author quotes one of the fathers of today's independent Indonesia, ex-Premier Mohammed Hatta, who said, "To uphold democracy, then, is a moral duty, for the disappearance of democracy means the disappearance of an independent Indonesia." Brackman's sympathies quite obviously lie with those Indonesian leaders, like Hatta and Soetan Sjahrir, who symbolized the democratic promise during the struggle for independence. Equally obviously, he sees in Communist demagoguery the most dangerous obstruction on the road of Indonesia's progress.

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NOTES and VIEWS

How Strong is Khrushchev? — II

EDITOR'S NOTE: In the September-October issue of Problems of Communism *we presented a discussion by Messrs. Carl Linden, Thomas H. Rigby, and Robert Conquest entitled "Conflict and Authority." Of the three contributions the first two dealt specifically with the nature and limits of Khrushchev's position within the Soviet power structure—Mr. Linden advancing the proposition that Khrushchev has frequently found himself under fire by his colleagues in leading party bodies, with the result that his authority and freedom of maneuverability have been severely restricted, and Mr. Rigby contending that whatever policy disagreements may occur, Khrushchev's position as* primus inter pares *has remained essentially unchallenged and unimpaired. The interest aroused by these articles has prompted us to extend the discussion into this—and possibly also our next—issue. First, since Mr. Rigby's article was in the nature of a rejoinder to Mr. Linden, we present the latter's reply to his critic. The second commentary, by Mr. Tucker, addresses itself to Mr. Linden's original article, and finds itself in basic agreement. Mr. Leonhard's commentary, on the other hand, raises some objections to Mr. Linden's interpretation of Khrushchev's role and position within the Soviet hierarchy. Finally, as a close observer of Khrushchev's rise to power, Mr. Gordey offers some glimpses into the Soviet leader's peculiar ability to identify himself with popular views and aspirations—another clue to his amazing survival through years of political turmoil and in-fighting.*

Facts in Search of a Theory

A Reply by Carl Linden

PROFESSOR RIGBY and I would agree, I think, that the absence of a defined and regularized method for resolving problems of authority and decision-making within the Soviet regime constitutes a "structural" defect which encourages competitive relationships among the top leaders. Where we would disagree is whether Khrushchev has succeeded in insulating himself and his policies from the effects of this instability. Professor Rigby argues, largely on the grounds of Khrushchev's formal positions, as well as from general considerations about the solidarity of "decision-making groups" in any political structure, that Khrushchev is above the reach of effective political opposition. I hold that Khrushchev is not any less a part of the system by virtue of his formal positions—that he is, indeed, very much a part of it and very much a captive of the structural "defect."

Our respective judgments on this matter may, in the final analysis, be traced to a more fundamental difference over the nature and quality of the evidence bearing on our discussion. The question of whether the Soviet leadership can be validly studied in terms of formal power configurations, or whether it must also be studied—as I think it must—in terms of specific policies and personalities, boils down to an interpretation of the evidences of political conflict in the Soviet press. Admittedly, this evidence is not as complete as we would like, but neither is it so limited or undecipherable as Professor Rigby indicates. Nor is it so difficult to identify Khrushchev's basic program and to recognize those policy shifts that represent setbacks for

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it or detours from the original goals.[1] When such setbacks are accompanied by the leader's own allusions to critics at home, conflicting emphases in the press, and differences on key issues reflected in the statements of various leaders, then I think we go astray when we assert that "there is no need to posit an internal tug-of-war" to explain these phenomena. Neither can we escape the issue raised by such phenomena by saying the data is too difficult to interpret. We should not carry Professor Rigby's "appeal beyond the data" so far that the data is lost sight of at the higher altitudes of generalization and analogy.

Professor Rigby made an auspicious start when he enumerated twelve "foci" of internal conflict in the Soviet regime. However, he does not tell us whether these foci are essentially discrete, whether they in one way or another find a common focus in the regime's top bodies, or whether the issues raised by the leader's power and policies give shape to some or all such conflicts.

As Professor Rigby suggests, it is both useful and necessary to measure the data of Soviet politics against generally known political phenomena and our knowledge of other political leaderships. Hence his analogy between Khrushchev and the British Prime Minister. But might it not be more relevant to see a kinship with Machiavelli's usurper prince who, alone and dependent on his wits, treads his way among the petty power-ambitious principalities that surround him?

Even according to Professor Rigby's account, Khrushchev must continually engage in maneuvering, which hardly squares with a stable arrangement of rule. He must constantly be on his guard to prevent aggregations of power around him from raising threats to his own power. No "office" he holds automatically assures him against such threats, though Professor Rigby appears to come close to saying something of the kind. Controversy and personnel shifts at the top levels bear on the leader's continuing effort to sustain or expand his dominance. It is not enough for him to play judge of "who wins" in factional conflicts going on around him. He must lead and have a program. And there is no reason to assume that he is immune to the corrosive effects of major policy failures on his influence and prestige.

KEEPING THESE THINGS in mind, we should not be surprised if we find signs that the leader's authority has been tested and perhaps even questioned by his associates in the crush of the recurrent crises that have afflicted the Soviet party in the past six years. Some might say that every leader has his "bad months," but a bad month is fraught with greater danger for a Khrushchev than it is for a Kennedy or even a Douglas-Home.

Professor Rigby suggests that no Presidium member in his right mind would dare a *first move* against the leader. Yet he goes on to admit that Khrushchev may at times find himself at odds with his colleagues and even, on occasion, may give way on "matters he regards as major issues." But as soon as this happens in the USSR the issue of power lurks in the wings. When a Soviet leader takes to the defensive, he must be on his guard to see that flank attacks in the field of policy do not develop into a frontal attack on his leadership.

I think that Professor Rigby relies too heavily on his institutional calculus when he excludes the possibility that a "recurrent configuration" of opposition to Khrushchev's policies could occur. Here I think we have to go beyond "assumptions" to the data. If the data provide persistent signs of conflict over key issues, then it is time to re-examine assumptions.

Let us turn to some specifics. Professor Rigby suggests that Khrushchev's recurrent attacks on his 1957 rivals are no more than demagoguery and a "prophylaxis" against their becoming a "focus of disaffection," not a real effort to expel them from the party. How does this view square, for example, with the clear divisions at the 22nd CPSU Congress, both among the top leaders and congress delegates, over the expulsion issue and the "crimes" of the "anti-party group"? Why did more than half of the congress speakers refrain from as much as mentioning expulsion, while the others were so vociferously in favor of it? And why did the congress resolution ignore both the clamor for expulsions and the massive attack on the "crimes" of the "anti-party" leaders?

Professor Rigby does not see how the leadership shifts at the time of the U-2 affair could have weakened Khrushchev's position—as I suggested was the case—because these changes "greatly enhanced Khrushchev's personal dominance over the interlocking directorate of central party and government bodies." This conclusion is reached because the Soviet leader, though he gained no new posts, became the only Presidium member to chair the regime's three executive bodies below the Presidium—the Secretariat, the Council of Ministers, and the RSFSR Bureau. If these three bodies were of equal weight as power bases, the argument might hold up better. But if we keep in mind that the Secretariat still remains the most important of the three organs, then the shifts of mid-1960 assume a different aspect.

As a result of the changes between May and July 1960, the Secretariat was cut down by half. The result was that Kozlov and Suslov—both of whom can be identified with more conservative policy views than Khrushchev's[2]—

[1] In addition to Khrushchev's speeches and formal reports, an increasing number of his *zapiski* (policy memoranda) circulated internally for the Presidium's consideration have come to light in recent years. The texts of some have been published, the contents of others have been indicated in various documents, and the substance of still others can be inferred from the texts of speeches published at about the time that the *zapiski* were known to have been circulated.

[2] I discussed this matter in my article but devoted more attention to Kozlov than Suslov. On the subject of Suslov's position consider, for example: his pointed failure to concede

(footnote continued on next page)

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emerged in a relatively more powerful position. In the place of a ten-man Secretariat in which the influence of any opposition would necessarily tend to be diffused, a conservative lineup could now constitute the majority on any issue by the shift of only one vote. Put in another way, Khrushchev's position in the Secretariat was reduced to the point where only his own vote could assure him of a precarious margin of support on any issue which the conservatives wished to contend.

The record of maneuverings and shifts in the Secretariat from 1960 to June this year indicate that it has been a battleground and that Khrushchev has made strenuous efforts to upset the balance established in that body in 1960. The effort appears to have met with a measure of success—partly due to the windfall of Kozlov's illness—at the June CC plenum of this year when Brezhnev and Podgorny joined the Secretariat. It seems hardly coincidental that this expansion of the Presidium-level contingent in the Secretariat paralleled Khrushchev's return to the political offensive at home and abroad.

TO MY CONTENTION that the choice of Kozlov as reporter to the July 1960 plenum on Khrushchev's trip to Bucharest was a sign of his enhanced position at Khrushchev's expense after the May 1960 leadership shifts, Professor Rigby replies that this may as well be viewed as a display of leadership unity in the light of Chinese attacks on Khrushchev at Bucharest. But I fail to see why the latter point contradicts the former. My article had suggested that the Presidium could be unified in presenting a common front to the Chinese, but yet be at odds on how to deal with them—whether to "go slow" or force matters to a head. It seems reasonable that the more conservative members, among whom I include Kozlov, wished to avoid exacerbating the conflict with Mao on the grounds that it would only weaken the USSR vis-à-vis the main enemy in the West.

A striking sign of differences on the issues appeared in Kozlov's bailiwick a month after the July 1960 plenum. The Leningrad party paper failed to endorse the first unmistakable Soviet warning that Communist China might face exclusion from the bloc if it persisted in its course. The warning was contained in an article widely carried in Soviet regional newspapers. *Leningradskaia pravda* (August 23) *alone* among the regional papers deleted that passage in the article most threatening to the Chinese—a passage referring to China's dependence on Soviet military protection and the dangers to which the country would be exposed if it were "isolated."

I do not go along with Professor Rigby's assertion that *"no one"* was more "beholden" to Khrushchev for his position than Kozlov, but don't object to the point that Kozlov would not have entered high places without Khrushchev's "acquiescence." A leader distinguishes between safe bets and calculated risks, and my reading of post-Stalin politics leads me to think that Khrushchev regarded Kozlov as falling in the latter category. Let me briefly indicate why Kozlov was not a creature of Khrushchev like his predecessor, Kirichenko, who worked under Khrushchev in the Ukraine. The Leningrad party apparatus was Kozlov's steppingstone. His selection as First Secretary of the Leningrad Obkom in 1953 and his elevation to candidacy in the Presidium on February 1957 occurred in a period *before* Khrushchev succeeded in ousting his rivals and when their voice carried weight in the selection of new members of the ruling group.

In this general connection, little notice has been given to a hostile encounter between Khrushchev and Kozlov recorded in *Pravda* in April 1955. Kozlov sought to show off a "model" state farm to Khrushchev, who was touring the Leningrad region, as an example of the Leningrad party's progressive agricultural program. Instead of praising the farm, Khrushchev called it a "shameful" display of "irrational" farm management. The episode did not convey the notion that Khrushchev was merely chiding an errant son destined for the No. 2 spot in the regime.

Of course, an important factor in Kozlov's elevation to full Presidium membership in the aftermath of June 1957 was his support and presumably that of the Leningrad party for Khrushchev against the "group." At the same time the Leningraders exacted a price for their aid in terms of expanded influence in the leadership.

The criteria for distinguishing the top figures cited in my article were career associations, political histories, and records on key issues. A basic distinction can be drawn between those whose rise occurred under the aegis or manifest patronage of the First Secretary and those who had become significant figures independently.

But whether we look upon the figures that surround the top leader as protégés, favorites, or titled leaders in their own right, the litmus test of their loyalty must be sought in the firmness of their support for the top leader on fundamental policy and political issues. It is important not to regard political leaders as impervious to change, though more often than not their consistency in outlook is remarkably stable. A man's loyalties can shift (like Shepilov's, "who joined them") and, having reached a high post, a presumed ally may show a flair for independence.

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the doctrinal significance of Khrushchev's MTS reform in his pre-election speech of 1958 (Pospelov, two days later, criticized those who saw only a "practical" significance); his failure to mention either Khrushchev's handling of the Cuban crisis or the "economics over politics" formula in his speech to the Bulgarian party congress in October 1962 (Kozlov likewise omitted both these points in his speech to the Italian congress in December 1962, although Brezhnev mentioned both points in his speech to the Czechoslovak party congress); the doctoring in *Kommunist* of Suslov's speech of January 30, 1962, which was apparently suggestive of some willingness to conciliate certain Chinese attitudes (compare *Pravda,* February 4, with *Kommunist,* No. 3); and his consistent resistance to Khrushchev's efforts to re-open the "anti-party group" issue.

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The "Conflict Model"

by Robert C. Tucker

A VERY IMPORTANT controversy has emerged in Soviet studies in the West. This controversy is not only of theoretical interest but also has practical political bearing, for much may depend upon which of the two conflicting positions is acted upon by Western political leadership. Scholars of Soviet affairs are all agreed that in the Soviet Union political questions of any magnitude are decided within a fairly limited circle of politically powerful persons who may be collectively described as the "leadership," "ruling group," or "elite." However, disagreement exists regarding the *nature of the political process* as it takes place within this ruling elite, especially in the years since 1957.

Some specialists, most notably Mr. Boris I. Nicolaevsky, have always believed that Soviet elite politics is a ceaseless process of conflict behind the scenes, however harmonious it may appear on the surface at any given moment. But the general "model" of Soviet politics that developed in Western sovietology after World War II did not embody this view. While it did not exclude leadership conflict over policy and power, it failed to treat such conflict as a fundamental, normal, and centrally important fact of political life in the Soviet ruling group.

Recently this conventional position has increasingly come under challenge from a minority of scholars who have been developing what may be called a "conflict model" of Soviet leadership politics. It treats political conflict in the ruling group as a constant, and thus explains some of the familiar "zigs" and "zags" of Soviet policy in terms of the struggle between different groups and different policy lines for the ascendancy. This "revisionist" position (if I may so describe it) is represented in Mr. Linden's article, which reviews Soviet politics of the recent past in accordance with the "conflict model." In Mr. Rigby's "Rejoinder" we have, in essence, a critique of the revisionist position in sovietology from the standpoint of the conventional outlook. One great value of the exchange is that it begins an overdue and much needed process of direct critical confrontation of the two divergent positions.

IT SEEMS TO ME that revisionism won this round. Although I am not in accord with Mr. Linden on every specific point of interpretation (for example, I would ascribe a more defensive motivation to Khrushchev's apparently unsuccessful drive for the expulsion of Molotov and others from the party), I consider this article one of the most illuminating and important of recent years in the field of Soviet studies. A closely reasoned analysis based on a great range of factual evidence from Soviet sources, it shows—in my view—a perception of the contemporary Soviet political process that is basically in tune with the realities, whereas Mr. Rigby's reply does not. In what follows, I wish to explain some of my reasons for viewing the Rigby critique of Linden's article as weak and unconvincing.

It may be a sign of the inroads being made by the "conflict model" that Mr. Rigby begins with a long list of focal points of conflict in the Soviet system. Yet it quickly becomes apparent that he espouses the conventional rather than the "revisionist" position, for he rejects two propositions that are fundamental to the latter as presented by Mr. Linden: (1) the proposition that Soviet leadership politics of recent years has turned, in large measure, on a division and conflict between policy orientations that may be termed "Stalinist," "conservative," or "orthodox" on the one hand, and "reformist" on the other, with Khrushchev as a champion of the latter orientation (rather than a "centrist" as Mr. Conquest, for example, makes him out to be); and (2) the proposition that Khrushchev, although he is the top leader and most powerful single Soviet politician, is nevertheless unable autocratically to dictate the policy line of the Soviet leadership and, moreover, has been repeatedly faced with oppositional currents in the leadership that have forced him to retreat, backtrack, mark time, and maneuver. But what grounds has Mr. Rigby given for rejecting them?

He calls the first proposition a "simplified analysis of Soviet politics" based on a "simple dichotomy." Perhaps so, but is it any more "simplified" than analyses of politics in *other* countries according to a "conservative-reformist" dichotomy? Political scientists often work with such conceptual simplifications as general models into which all sorts of refinements, qualifications and complexities need to be introduced. Why should they not do the same in studying Soviet politics if the data indicate (as they seem to) the applicability of such a general model? As if in answer to this question, Mr. Rigby goes on to say that the "simple dichotomy" seems to him "both implausible *a priori* and inadequately supported by the evidence adduced." But why it is implausible *a priori* he does not say, and in what sense the evidence is inadequate he does not explain. Indeed, he says nothing more on this vital issue and devotes the rest of his article to the issue of Khrushchev's power. So I conclude that his rejoinder leaves the first of the two propositions mentioned above completely untouched.

Taking issue with the second proposition, Mr. Rigby pictures Khrushchev—with minor qualification—as a dictator *within* the Soviet regime, a leader in a command position in the ruling group, one who ". . . would not

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tolerate any persistent posture of opposition involving basic questions on the part of *any* of his Presidium 'colleagues,' or any sign of a recurrent configuration of opposition on the part of two or more of them." As one argument for this view, he cites the power of a British prime minister over his own party, as shown in Mr. Macmillan's ministerial "purge" in 1962, and suggests that under conditions of Soviet authoritarianism and one-party government, Mr. Khrushchev's power must certainly be still greater in relation to *his* political associates.

This argument has a superficial plausibility, but it does not withstand analysis. A dictatorship is not necessarily an autocracy, although it *may* be one or, alternatively, may *become* one, as the Soviet dictatorship did in the late 1930's when Stalin, through the *Yezhovshchina,* imposed a reign of terror upon the party. That is to say, a system of government in which the regime stands in an authoritarian relation to the people is not necessarily one in which the top leader stands in an authoritarian relation to the rest of the ruling group. Conversely, the supreme leader in a democratic political system may, at certain times or in certain ways, be in a command position in relation to his own government or his own party; and, paradoxically, he may derive this power over his own political associates in part from the very institutions and practices of democracy. Thus, what power Mr. Macmillan had over the Conservative Party leadership (and we might do well not to overestimate it) derived in part from his ability to threaten Conservative M.P.'s with a general election at a time *not* of their choosing. In the absence of an opposition party and democratic elections in the Soviet Union, Mr. Khrushchev lacks this kind of leverage over *his* party colleagues. Of course, he has other kinds, but we have no right to assume, as Mr. Rigby does, that there is something in the nature of Soviet authoritarianism that gives Khrushchev greater power over other members of the leadership than a democratic political leader has; it could well be that in some ways he has less.

MR. RIGBY GOES ON to draw a general comparison between the "post-1957 Khrushchev" and the "pre-1937 Stalin," arguing that Khrushchev's present position is probably somewhat stronger than Stalin's was then, owing to his (Khrushchev's) "formidable concentration of formal roles," and that Stalin's position, in any case, was strong enough to enable him subsequently to carry out the *Yezhovshchina* (hence Khrushchev's must be comparably great). I would like to point out in reply (1) that Stalin in the early 1930's was not yet a dictator over the ruling group, but was subject to very serious opposition in the leadership—something which Mr. Rigby does not want to admit in the case of the post-1957 Khrushchev; (2) that the argument about Khrushchev's greater collection of formal roles (presumably referring to his being Premier as well as First Secretary of the party) carries little weight since, with the faithful and malleable Molotov in the premiership, Stalin had no urgent need to take over that formal role in order to consolidate his power; and (3) that Stalin's ability to carry out the *Yezhovshchina* successfully was largely due to his having built up, in addition to a formidable personal political machine, a direct personal relationship of control over the secret police that appears to have no counterpart in Khrushchev's Russia, pre- or post-1957. For these and other reasons, Khrushchev's present position appears less strong than Stalin's was in the early 1930's. And this, to repeat, was *before* he acquired autocratic power over the ruling group.

Further, Mr. Rigby appeals to the June 1957 affair of the "anti-party group" as a source of evidence for his view that Khrushchev now "would not tolerate any persistent posture of opposition." He argues that, remembering June 1957, when a hostile Presidium majority sought to overthrow Khrushchev only to be "quickly and decisively defeated," no Presidium member now "could be foolhardy enough to make the *first move* towards the formation of such a grouping."

This interpretation of the June 1957 episode fails to make a vitally important distinction between (a) opposing Khrushchev's policy line and (b) trying to overthrow him. We know (from materials of the 22nd Party Congress, for example) that Khrushchev faced strong oppositional currents in the Presidium throughout the period from the 20th Congress in February 1956 to the middle of 1957, and that he was unable to prevent this. It was only when the Presidium opposition finally took steps to oust him from the top leadership that he ousted the opposition, and I am not sure that "quickly and decisively defeated" accurately describes what happened, considering that the crisis went on for about ten days and that Marshal Zhukov's support of Khrushchev may have played a vital role in the outcome. Viewed in this broader perspective taking in the period preceding it, the affair of June 1957, insofar as it offers a lesson for Soviet politicians, would carry the following meaning to them: It is realistically possible to oppose Khrushchev on important policy issues and to try to force him to retreat on them, but it is dangerous to plot or attempt his overthrow from power.

BUT HOW DANGEROUS? According to Mr. Linden's interpretation, with which I agree, the Khrushchev faction has unsuccessfully tried to punish the ousted oppositionists with expulsion from the party and worse. This, of course, suggests that the Soviet ruling elite would rather not make it *too* dangerous even to seek Khrushchev's ouster and fail in the attempt. But, in any event, the affair of the anti-Khrushchev group carries no implications as to the inadvisability of opposing Khrushchev's policy line in the Presidium (or Central Committee, etc.).

Since an unsuccessful attempt to expel the anti-Khrushchev group from the party implies limits to Khrushchev's power, Mr. Rigby seeks an alternative motivation for the

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revived campaign of vilification against Molotov and the others at the time of the 22nd Congress and after. But his suggestions on this point lack cogency. It seems to me, for example, that since the Soviet system is still a dictatorship, Khrushchev has less need of "convincing the population of the genuineness of his break with the past," which Mr. Rigby suggests as a motive for the revived campaign, than of convincing the ruling elite of the inadvisability of ever again attempting his ouster.

We know from the June 1957 affair and its prelude that the pre-1957 Khrushchev was a *challengeable* leader, if not an overthrowable one. Those who, like Mr. Rigby, wish us to believe that the post-1957 Khrushchev is an unchallenged leader who need not contend with opposition in the party leadership must explain to us just what stable changes occurred in the power structure during or after June 1957 that transformed a challengeable into an unchallengeable Khrushchev. So far they have not done so.

An Anti-Khrushchev Opposition?

by Wolfgang Leonhard

IN HIS INTERESTING article, Mr. Linden has dealt with two closely-related themes, both of which are of great importance to an understanding of the present and future development of the USSR. The first concerns Khrushchev's power position and above all the question whether and to what extent the First Secretary has succeeded during the last few years in realizing his political objectives: the second concerns the occurrence and nature of disagreements in the top party bodies, the course these controversies have followed, and personal groupings they engendered.

It is the central thesis of Mr. Linden's article that Khrushchev's position is by no means as secure as it is sometimes assumed to be. The argument runs about as follows: the power and prestige of the incumbent First Secretary depend to a much larger extent than had been true in Stalin's case on the success of his policies. It is true, to be sure, that in 1957 Khrushchev succeeded in removing the "anti-party group" and in bringing in his own supporters, but this victory was anything but final. Since then, he has had not only to pay continuous attention to the existing power relations in the leadership, but also to contend with serious opposition to the extent of occasionally abandoning his own plans. Furthermore, he tried, without success, to expel his leading opponents from the Communist Party, and he failed to realize, in the form and at the time he desired, his consumer goods program. In both cases, says Mr. Linden, Khrushchev was thwarted by a conservative grouping headed by Kozlov and Suslov. What is more, a number of important personnel changes—primarily those of May 1960 and October 1961—were put into effect against Khrushchev's will and resulted in a weakening of his position. In April 1962, he managed to depose Spiridonov, a protégé of the conservative Kozlov group, and to install his follower, Kirilenko, in the leadership, but in the autumn of 1962 he had to retreat once again before a new offensive of the conservatives. Only in the spring of 1963 (after Kozlov's stroke) and above all at the June Central Committee Plenum did he regain some of the terrain he had lost since May 1960.

In general, the correctness of Mr. Linden's thesis—*i.e.*, that Khrushchev is not an omnipotent ruler as Stalin was, and that in recent years he has had to take into account other forces in the leadership—can hardly be questioned. The frequent changes of position on important questions of domestic and foreign policy must surely be explained not merely by the fact that the Soviet government has frequently been confronted by "unplanned developments," but also by the fact that these "unplanned developments" produced diversity of opinion and even controversy in the higher party bodies and the top leadership itself. Issues such as the question of allocation of resources, destalinization, and the fate of the "anti-party group"—all cited by Mr. Linden—certainly played an important role in the debates. Furthermore, Khrushchev's polemics against "some comrades"—an expression almost always used when the views not just of "some comrades" but of important forces in the leadership are in question—have been so frequent in the past years and have involved so many important issues that their occurrence, to use a traditional Communist expression, could not have been "accidental." In short, the zig-zag course, the polemics, and the often important personnel changes in the leadership must be regarded not only as important indications of serious controversy in the top leadership but also as evidence that Khrushchev has occasionally found it necessary to defer to the views of certain groups in the leadership and to accept modification or postponement of his own aims.

So much for my agreement with some of Mr. Linden's basic propositions. When it comes to some of the evidence he cites, however, and—more importantly—to some of the conclusions he draws from it, we find ourselves at odds. Specifically, I should like to register my disagreement with Mr. Linden's interpretation of Khrushchev's intentions vis-à-vis the "anti-party group," and also with his views on the more general question of the

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form which the controversies have assumed. I find myself particularly unable to accept his view on the existence of well-defined pro- and anti-Khrushchev groups.

AS HIS MAIN EVIDENCE of the relative weakness of Khrushchev's position, we have Mr. Linden's contention that the Soviet leader failed in his attempt to deal conclusively with members of the "anti-party group." "It is virtually certain," writes Mr. Linden, "that Khrushchev regards the expulsion of his fallen foes from the party, and perhaps even their trial, as the unfinished business of his drive for total dictatorial power."

In my view it is not at all certain that this was indeed Khrushchev's purpose. However much I may agree that the various anti-Stalin campaigns and the condemnation of the "anti-party group" were of great political importance to Khrushchev, it strikes me as doubtful that the exclusion of Molotov and company from the party and a court trial for them were Khrushchev's main motive.

The varying views as to what ought to be done with the "anti-party group" became known for the first time at the 21st Party Congress (January-February 1959). Three different positions—or one may call them groups—became evident. One small group, which included Mikoyan and Kosygin, favored a conciliatory course towards the "anti-party" members and clearly tried to soft-pedal the whole issue. At the opposite pole stood another group, to which belonged Ignatov, Podgorny, and above all Spiridonov and Shelepin. The speeches of these leaders were hard and sharp and centered not so much on the political mistakes of the "anti-party group" as on its "criminal attempts" and "conspiratorial activity." It was Spiridonov who, on January 29, 1959, not only described the former Soviet leaders as an "anti-party conspiratorial group," but also demanded their exclusion from the party:

If up to now the members of this group have been severely called to account by the Central Committee of the party, they must be called to account no less strictly and severely before the highest organ of the party, the Party Congress.

Shelepin went the farthest. Speaking at the Congress on February 4, he declared:

It is now clear to everyone how dangerous was the activity of the anti-party group. These people behaved like the Trotskyites and Rightists. . . .

Clearly, Shelepin was recommending that the members of the group be treated as the Trotskyites and Rightists had been in Stalin's time, *i.e.,* placed before a tribunal and convicted.

The third group, however, to which Khrushchev and the majority of the party Presidium (among them Kirichenko, Kozlov, Furtseva, Brezhnev, Mukhitdinov, Kuusinen and Shvernik) belonged, did *not* demand that the members of the "anti-party group be expelled or even tried before a court. Khrushchev and the representatives of this middle orientation also avoided expressions such as "treacherous" or "conspirators," and stressed instead that the "anti-party" people had already suffered political defeat; that they had been "pushed aside," "unmasked," "washed overboard," "ideologically destroyed," "swept away," "thrown aside." Interestingly enough, Shelepin's accusations at the congress were omitted from the *Pravda* report of the speech, even though the Italian Communist correspondent Giuseppe Boffa had cabled the passage in question to Rome, where it appeared in *l'Unità* on February 6. This incident must surely mean only one thing: that Khrushchev and the majority of the Presidium did not share the views of the extremist speakers, and that the Soviet leadership was more interested in politically discrediting the "anti-party group" than in the personal persecution of its members.

THERE IS EVIDENCE that Khrushchev pursued this same policy later on, for example, at the 22nd Party Congress in October 1961. However sharp the accusations connecting the "anti-party group" with Stalin's crimes may have been, the central purpose of the arguments was not expulsion or physical elimination of the accused group, but the fulfillment of certain specific political aims. It may be assumed, first of all, that by his far-reaching condemnation of Stalinist crimes Khrushchev sought to forestall, or at least seriously to hinder, any possible future re-emergence of a leadership group based on the Stalinist tradition.

Secondly, the sharp accusations against the "anti-party group" were probably meant as a serious warning to all the many "little Molotovs" in the party and state apparatus who have often opposed, or at any rate insufficiently supported, Khrushchev's frequent reorganizations and "reforms from above." The members of the "anti-party group" were less interesting to Khrushchev as persons than as symbols of the conservative-dogmatic functionaries *currently* employed (mostly at the intermediate levels) in the party, state, and economic apparatuses. It was to *them* that the accusations were directed; *they* were to be shocked and warned.

Thirdly, it may have been Khrushchev's aim to free modern Soviet communism of the ballast of Stalin's terrorism, to draw a dividing line between the Stalin era and the Soviet regime of today, and to give the party functionaries new hope and impulses that would ease the realization of the leadership's political program. Finally, the settling of accounts with the Stalinist past and the "anti-party group" at the 22nd Congress provided Khrushchev with a suitable platform in his fight against the dogmatic wing of the world Communist movement, as well as in the then already public controversy (October 1961) with the Albanian party leadership and the ever-intensifying conflict with the rulers in Peking.

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A SECOND POINT in Mr. Linden's analysis concerns political disagreements in the Soviet leadership, particularly the manner in which they express themselves and give rise to political groupings. In presenting these differences within the leadership (and they certainly exist, sometimes assuming serious proportions), the author draws a line between two groups: "Khrushchev's appointees," "Khrushchev protégés and supporters," and a "Khrushchev-Brezhnev-Podgorny-Kuusinen coalition on the Presidium level" on the one hand, and "Khrushchev's opponents" or "long-term opponents"—among them, Kozlov and Suslov, Spiridonov (demoted in the spring of 1962), and to some extent Ponomarev—on the other. Khrushchev and his followers are said to have pressed for a sharpening of the struggle against the "anti-party group" and a step-up of consumer goods production, as well as for recognition of the primacy of economics over politics, while the conservatives under Kozlov and Suslov are said to have urged greater emphasis on heavy industry and a harder line on a number of other questions.

It is entirely possible that there was such a lineup over the issues mentioned, perhaps lasting for a very short time, but it would hardly hold true for the entire period covered by Mr. Linden's article—that is, from May 1960 to the summer of 1963. In my view, the divisions in the leadership during this period are typified not so much by a lineup of pro-Khrushchev and anti-Khrushchev groupings as by a tug-of-war surrounding Khrushchev. The protagonists of divergent viewpoints within the leadership were pressuring Khrushchev to espouse their own respective lines and views and trying to draw him to their side so as to enlist the weight of his authority on behalf of their proposals and aims.

This seems all the more probable because it not only would clarify the zig-zag course of Soviet policy in the period in question but also would be consonant with Khrushchev's power position. Khrushchev must have due regard for the pressure of dominant opinion within the leadership and not infrequently must yield to it. On the other hand, in the event that a member of the top leadership consistently opposes Khrushchev's views, stubbornly adheres to his own deviationist stand, and thus takes a genuine "anti-Khrushchev position" (and this seems bound up with an attempt to forge an individual power position for the emerging succession struggle)—in such circumstances Khrushchev appears strong enough, now as before, to achieve the removal or demotion of the rival concerned.

THERE ALSO SEEMS to be hardly enough evidence to show that genuine, long-term groupings having a clear stand on a range of political issues have come into being. It is far more likely that, depending upon the particular issue under debate, *different* opinions and (in some cases) groupings emerge. It may very well be, for example, that one and the same member of the leadership can take a "reformist" position in regard to the handling of economic problems and a "conservative" one on questions of cultural policy. Perhaps variations in the composition of the majority on different political issues of major importance are even the rule rather than the exception, and we should accordingly not think of the divisions in the leadership as being too fixed, enduring, and absolute.

The picture of shifting majorities (manifesting themselves as groupings in the more serious cases) seems the more realistic if we consider what have been the major sources of controversy in recent years. There were not only the issues of resource allocation and the break with Stalin and the "anti-party group"—important as these issues were and still are—but also a whole series of others. The main areas of controversy may perhaps be summarized as follows:

1. *Destalinization*: that is, at what tempo, by what methods, and to what extent changes should be effected that constitute a repudiation of (or departure from) the practices, methods, and principles of Stalin, as well as an adjustment to the new, altered conditions of Soviet society. (This includes, for example, the critique of Stalin, the complicity of various leaders in Stalin's crimes, the revision of the *Vozhd's* ideological theses, and changes in the forms of political rulership, in the laws, and in social and cultural policy.)

2. *Implementation of the party program*: that is, at what tempo, by what methods, and under what leadership the economic goals and the political, social and other changes laid down in the party program are to be carried out. (This takes in the allocation of investments, the role and function of the party in the economy and other areas, material and moral incentives in the economy, the solution of agricultural problems, the organization of economic management, the new constitution, the curbing of private-ownership tendencies, realization of the proclaimed "amalgamation of peoples," creation of the "new Soviet man," and the fight against "survivals of the past.")

3. *Functional controversies*: that is, controversies involving the question of what administrative apparatuses are to participate (and to what degrees) in carrying out specific goals and to bear the responsibility therefor. These would include:

a) Controversies between different vertical divisions of the administrative bureaucracy, *e.g.*, between the apparatuses for heavy and light industry, between those for industry and agriculture, and between those for ideology and organizational matters.

b) Controversies between horizontal (*i.e.*, higher, middle, and lower) echelons of the party apparatus, such as came to the surface in connection with the abolition of the *raion* party administrations and the party reorganization of November 1962.

c) Geographical-political controversies, perhaps between the party apparatuses of Moscow, Leningrad, the Ukraine,

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and Kazakhstan, and most of all between the Ukrainian and Leningrad party organizations.

d) Personal rivalries among leading officials or personal sympathies and antipathies within the top leadership which, though not officially acknowledged, nevertheless exist in fact and sometimes may become an influential factor, especially in time of a succession crisis.

In listing these points of conflict, I do not, of course, mean to imply either that all these issues are of equal significance or that political disagreements and functional controversies can, in practice, always be so clearly separated. On the contrary, they usually are closely bound together and overlapping. Moreover, it should not be forgotten that all these struggles were always carried on within the framework of an overriding common interest —in the preservation and strengthening of the system, in the expansion of its economic, political and military strength, and in the consolidation of the leading role of the party.

It is certainly true that there have been numerous direct confrontations on specific issues between "reformist" and "conservative" groupings (to which this writer would also add a "centrist" grouping). However, in analyzing the general political development of the post-Stalin period, it is probably more accurate to speak of reformists, conservatives (and centrists) in the higher party echelons rather as tendencies than as groupings. The disagreements and controversies that have actually taken place over crucial issues in recent years would seem too diverse and contradictory to permit them to be construed necessarily in Mr. Linden's terms.

"Vanka-Vstanka"

by Michel Gordey

THE LAST TEN YEARS have witnessed the steady rise of Nikita Khrushchev to become the wielder of ultimate power and authority in the Soviet Union. Many times in that period, especially at critical moments in Soviet relations or in the domestic economy, it has been rumored in the West that his political star was beginning to wane, that he faced powerful rivals and was in danger of defeat. Each time, these rumors have been based on reported facts or on a minute—perhaps too minute—analysis of speeches and other evidence gleaned from the Soviet press. Once, in April last year, Mr. Khrushchev himself gave impetus to such rumors by remarking in a public speech that he was 69 years old and could not remain in his present posts forever. Yet, up till now, he has not only eliminated his most dangerous political antagonists (the "anti-party group," among whom Malenkov was probably his most skilled opponent), but has also outmaneuvered those who do not agree with his policies. And he has even proven himself physically more durable than at least one presumed political challenger younger than himself—the now ailing Frol Kozlov.

For any observer who has closely watched Khrushchev in action through these years, as has this writer, it is not difficult to perceive the special qualities which have enabled this shrewd and farsighted political operator to achieve his rise to power and his present political dominance. Almost seventy, he still is faster in his political reflexes, more agile in his responses, and more skillful in manipulating the complex machinery of power, in both party and government, than any of the other Soviet leaders, with the possible exception of Mikoyan. But he also possesses another quality that has probably been an essential ingredient in his success, though perhaps less noticed abroad. This is his almost instinctive perception of issues, and of public moods and attitudes, that he can, and does, play upon most effectively to win himself a high "popularity rating" among the Soviet masses.

It has often been said, jokingly, that Khrushchev would have made a formidable presidential candidate in the United States had he been born an American. Jest though this is, it illustrates an important point. In the course of his ten-year rise to the summit of power, the Soviet leader has repeatedly chosen to identify himself with certain ideas, policies and slogans which, as their end result, have produced the highly popular Khrushchev "image" that now exists in the minds of the Soviet people. This image, whether true or forged, is so strong that none of Khrushchev's rivals can even dream of attempting to undermine it.

In assessing the importance of the Khrushchev image, it is of course necessary to recognize that public opinion obviously does not play anything like the same role in the USSR as in the democratic societies of the West. Nobody who knows the Soviet Union would conceivably argue that popular preferences or dislikes decisively mold the destinies of Soviet statesmen. Nevertheless, as Soviet society becomes more sophisticated and the restrictions upon public discussion less onerous, the "popularity index" of a Soviet leader tends to become more important to his political career. This goes not only for Khrushchev, but also for the leaders who in time will be battling for the succession.

Over the past several years, Khrushchev has identified himself in the people's minds with several simple but highly effective *idées-forces,* such as "peace in the nuclear age," "better housing, better food and clothing, and a better life for Soviet citizens," "destalinization,"

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and, more recently, "the fight against the Chinese danger." It can be argued, of course, that on each of these issues he was successful at first, but then met with resistance from some, or perhaps even most, of his colleagues in the Central Committee Presidium and was obliged to retreat. It may also be pointed out that some of his promises were too boastful and unrealistic—for instance, the pledge he made about overtaking the United States in per capita production of essential food commodities.

But significant as Khrushchev's tactical advances and retreats may be in evaluating immediate trends in Soviet party politics, the fact remains that they have had slight effect on his image in the minds of the mass of Soviet citizens. It is doubtful that the vast majority of citizens even notice or care very much about these tactical zigzags. What matters is that during the last seven or eight years—since Malenkov's dismissal from the premiership, or since Khrushchev's initial denunciation of Stalin's crimes—Khrushchev and the small group around him have consistently stuck to one aim: to create inside the Soviet Union an image of Khrushchev as a man who rose to his present eminence from humble origins and who, because he is one of them, understands the people's deepest impulses and desires—namely, peace, an end to terror, and a better life.

At times, of course, developments outside or inside the country have impelled Khrushchev to depart momentarily from this image, and on such occasions he has made a speech or some dramatic gesture to show that he can also be tough, strong, and threatening. But by and large, he has played the Man of Peace, the Bread-and-Butter Communist, the anti-Stalinist, so assiduously that even the liberal intellectuals have come by now to look upon him as a lesser evil than many of his associates or prospective successors.

THE RECENT MONTHS of open Soviet conflict with the Chinese Communists provided an apt illustration of Khrushchev's skill at sensing and utilizing deep-rooted popular feelings. Ever since World War II, the mass of Soviet citizens has harbored a profound fear of a new war—a fear which has been deepened by what Khrushchev has said in his speeches about the horrors of nuclear warfare. At the same time, there is in Russia a centuries-old distrust and fear of yellow, slant-eyed aggressors from the East, dating back to the Mongol and Tartar invasions. By playing up these dual fears—of war and of the "Asiatic hordes"—Khrushchev has found it easy to rally wholehearted support behind him in his battle with the Chinese Communist "warmongers."

The Soviet leader's remarkable quickness to sense and react to popular sentiments and themes has been evidenced, too, on his visits to foreign countries. This writer has personally seen it happen in France, in the United States, in Austria and Yugoslavia, and to a lesser extent in England (perhaps because the British are more reserved). After a few days in the particular foreign country (about which he certainly had been carefully briefed in advance but which otherwise was new to him), Khrushchev always managed to find out, on his own, attitudes and phrases that would "strike home." To be sure, he also made some bad mistakes, but on the whole he succeeded in leaving behind the image that he wanted to remain in the minds of the people of that country.

If to this adaptability we add Khrushchev's knowledge, acquired under Stalin, of the techniques of dealing with opposition—either by dividing and crushing it, or by stealing its thunder and making its program his own—we have the essential explanation of the Soviet leader's amazing success in confronting his enemies and coming out on top, even after a bad crop at home or such severe tests as the Polish and Hungarian upheavals of 1956 and the Cuban crisis of 1962.

In Russia one often sees a round little doll called "Vanka-Vstanka" ("Little John, Get Up"), which is weighted at the bottom with lead and always pops back up to a vertical position when pushed over on its side. For years, Khrushchev has reminded me of Vanka: it probably was his very first childhood toy.

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